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INTRODUCTION
From the very beginning of its existence as an independent nation,
the United States has found itself caught in a dilemma over its proper
role in international politics. From the Founding Fathers to the present
political figures, Americans both in and out of the realm of government
have debated and argued over the character and direction of American
foreign policy. In most instances, these debates have been characterized
as ones betv^een advocates of internationalism and isolationism. In fact,
the initial debate over foreign policy in the First Continental Congress
was between the "internationalists" who sought both commercial and military
ties with European nations, in particular France, and the "isolationists"
who argued that American interests should be separate and non-entangled
from those of Europe. At different times the debate has raged more intensely
than at others. In the 1850's the popularity of the "Young America" movement
and its demand for a more active international role by the United States
brought the debate to center stage. In the 1890 's the American expansion
into the Pacific was cause for alarm among those who defended America's
traditional policy of independence and non-entanglement. At different times
in the first half of the Twentieth Century the debate between internationalism
and isolationism threatened to split the nation in half particularly in the 1920's
VII
and the late 1930 's.
The American decision to take an active role in the post-World
War II period officially ended the debate over the direction of American
foreign policy. Through membership in the United Nations, NATO, SEATO,
and various other international organizations, the United States signaled
its intention to take an active part in the politics of the international
community. Now firmly committed to its international role, the debate
between internationalism and isolationism seemed irrelevant. But with the
breakup of the bi-polar world in the 1960's, the rising controversy over
American involvement in Southeast Asia, the erosion of Russian control
over the communist world, and the emergence of European and Pacific
centers of economic power there is again an important debate over the
character and direction of American foreign policy. Once again, the debate
presently taking place within the United States has been labeled as one between
the internationalists, those who want to continue American policies of
containment and intervention, and the isolationists, those seeking to with-
draw the United States from any international responsibility.
The focus of this dissertation is the present debate over American
foreign policy. Specifically, attention will be centered on those characterized
as "isolationist" for there is some question as to whether the use of that
label is a proper one. In fact, opponents of American "globalism" have
charged that the isolationist characterization of their position grossly
misrepresents their policies and goals for America in the international setting.
Vlll
They maintain that the isolationist label, because of its pejorative connotations,
is used by the globalist camp to discredit the anti-globalist position.
Chapter V will deal directly with this controversy by investigating the
relevancy of the isolationist label to the liberal critique of American foreign
policy.
The first part of the dissertation will be concerned with the explication
of the concept "isolationism. " Little attempt has been made to use isolationism
in a consistent manner. Different people use it in various ways, often
attaching different meanings to it. As a result, there exists a great deal of
controversy over what constitutes an isolationist foreign policy. This is
particularly important in terms of American foreign policy debates since the
concept of isolationism has been applied so often to describe it.
An important part of the explication of the concept isolationism will
revolve around Ludwig Wittgenstein's distinction between criteria and symptoms.
The major point here is that in seeking to arrive at a useful and meaningful
definition of isolationism, it is important that the definition include the
defining criteria. In the past the attempted definitions have been founded upon
symptoms of isolationism and not criteria which accounts for their rather
spurious nature.
To aid in clarifying the arrived at definition of isolationism three case
studies have been chosen. The case studies of both Japan and China are to be
used to help clarify the meaning of isolationism as it has been explicated
here. The third case study, that on Britain's period of "splendid isolation"
IX
Will by contrast demonstrate the often spurious application of isolationism
with regard to different kinds of foreign policy.
Armed with a useful definition of isolationism and hopefully with some
notion as to what constitutes an isolationist foreign policy the focus of the
treatise will turn to historical and contemporary American foreign policy.
In Chapter IV the purpose will be to apply the arrived at definition to the
special circumstances of America's traditional foreign policy, which has so
often been characterized as isolationist. By means of this examination it
can be seen as to whether or not this has been a proper characterization.
Finally, Chapter V will focus on the current debate in American foreign
policy and the relevancy of the isolationist label to the liberal critique of the
globalist position. Through such an examination it will be possible to put
the current debate into proper perspective and to clarify the real issues
involved in this debate.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION TO CONCEPTS OF FOREIGN POTJCY
In this brief initial chapter the aim is to explain in a general manner
the prevailing notions about the foundations, definitions and objectives of
foreign policy. Such a discussion is important in that it serves as a needed
guideline and foundation for treatment of the rationale for and against
adherence to a foreign policy of isolationism.
A foreign policy is a program designed to achieve the best possible
position for a nation vis-a-vis other nations. It is usually conceived of as
a program using peaceful means of diplomacy to achieve the objectives of
the nation. Foreign policies, however, have been pursued in which the
threat of war was used as a means of attaining national goals. The fact
that the behavior of states can have beneficial or adverse effects on other
states confronts every state with the major problem of minimizing the
adversities and maximizing the beneficial actions of foreign states.
Therefore, foreign policy is essentially a means of adjusting the actions
of states to each other.
A foreign policy is the vehicle by which a state propagates the values
of its society into competition vvdth the values of other nations within the
2international system. Because different societies have or decide upon
different values, the objectives of a foreign policy will vary from state
to state. This is so because a foreign policy "consists of a society's
attempt to realize in the international plane certain notions of what it
1
conceives as good." Not all nations will decide on the same goals as
"good.
"
There are, however, several objectives or goals which in general
all foreign policies seek to achieve. Such common objectives as self-
preservation, security or territorial sovereignty usually rate as the primary
objectives of all nations. This is especially true of the goal of security.
All other objectives and the values of that society mean relatively little
unless the goal of security has been achieved to some extent. Therefore,
it is the security goal which concerns most state's policy-maimers, as the
security required before that objective is reached is rather difficult to
calculate. Because of the ever-changing environment of international
politics, it is a never-ending process. According to Charles Lerche and
Abdul Said, (in Concepts of International Politics ) "what the security
objective of the state amounts to is no more than the reduction of all
visible and conceivable threats to a practical minimum. A measure of
""Charles O. Lerche, Jr. , Abdul A. Said, Concepts of International
Politics
,
Englewood: Prentice-Hall Inc. , 1963, p. 3.
insecurity is really an inescapable cost of doing business in the state
2
system.
"
After the securement of the above primary goals, there. are numerous
secondary goals which are common to most states in the conduct of their
foreign policies. These consist of (with no particular ranking order intended)
the well-being or welfare of the collectivity, meaning the improvement of
the citizens' state of being usually calculated through the measurement of
the "economy" or some measure of prosperity; national prestige, (a goal
difficult to measure but one continually sought by states in terms of
concessions of status from other states) and finally, the protection or
promotion of an ideology. ^
The goals of foreign policy are unlimited but the means to achieve these
goals are sharply limited in terms of the capability of a nation. That is,
while a nation may want to preserve its territorial integrity, as its major
objective, the very fact that an adversary may possess weapons superiority
is a serious limitation on its ability to preserve its territorial boundaries
in the event of war. The subordinate state is then forced to devise a foreign
policy which takes into account the serious limitations of its means in the
pursuit of its primary objective.
^Ibid
.
,
p. 10.
•^The present century has been one of ideological messianism, more so
than any since the sixteenth century. But even now some of the more militant
ideologically oriented states are having second thoughts about the practicability
of achieving ideological fulfillment via international politics. As a primary
foreign policy goal, promotion of ideology also carries with it definite problems
of measurement as to its success or failure.
4Kurt London in his book How Foreign Policy Is Made claims that
"national foreign policy will formulate and try to achieve its aims in accord-
ance with its historic aspirations, its ideological doctrines, and its physical
conditions. Such a statement s\mimarizes rather concisely the factors
which statesmen take into account when assessing the limitations on the
means of foreign policy. Interestingly, it is the physical conditions which
have and do receive a significant amount of attention when one speaks of the
limitations on a state's foreign policy. Over time, numerous theories
have developed about the influence of climate, geographical location,
territorial terrain and accessibility of seaports on the making of foreign
policy, enough so that a whole school of thought known as Geopolitics has
developed. Despite the controversy created by these various theories of
geopolitics (some go so far as to claim that geography determines the nature
of a society and its values) and the dubious nature of many of its assumptions,
the factors which make up a nation's physical properties do seem to
influence and thus place limitation upon the means of foreign policy. For
instance, it was for a long time easy for island nations, such as Britain and
Japan, to isolate themselves from the politics of their respective continental
neighbors. On the other hand, it is much easier for nations with large land
masses to develop their resources to attain self-sufficiency, while in
contrast, the smaller island nations must depend largely upon commercial
^Kurt London, How Foreign Policy is Made , New York: D. Van Nostrand
Company, Inc., 1949, p. 13.
5trade with other nations to provide needed products. Without doubt, for a
long time such natural barriers between states as oceans, mountain ranges
and deserts provided enough safety so that states did not have to retain
security arrangements at these points. Of course, once the technological
revolution of the 17th Century began, but especially since the end of World
War II, and "once the barriers of oceans, mountains and deserts could be
easily and speedily surmounted, once distance was being conquered, the
political position of every country naturally had to be re-evaluated by its
leaders.
The means of foreign policy are thus shaped by such factors as
geographical location, extent of territory, size of territory, size of
populace, economic geography, technological development, ideology and
national character. Other factors unrelated to the state itself are the power
of its adversaries and allies and the historical objectives of both adversaries
and allies.
It becomes necessary for a nation, while holding its primary
objectives constant, to develop a strategy of foreign policy determined by
several basic decisions which provide a quasi-permanent framework for
tactical decisions. These decisions revolve around considerations such as
choosing an interpretation of the contemporary historical trends and of their
relation to the national interest of the state; defining long-term objectives
^Ibid.
,
p. 18.
6which are to be consistently pursued unless external changes dictate
otherwise; the clarification of long term objectives of other states as
much as possible; and a general plan of action. A strategy must account
for and evaluate the above mentioned limitations in order that a foreign
policy is selected that is realistic in terms of the nation's capabilities
and serves as the most promising vehicle for enhancing the nation's interests
and achieving its objectives. In other words, "The task of the Statesman is
to reconcile the desirability of the possible with the possibility of the
desirable.
For statesmen of the Great Powers in the Twentieth Century, foreign
policy has meant world politics, principally the balancing of power on a global
scale. In previous centuries, the major principals in international politics were
concerned with the balance of power only in localized areas, notably the
European continent. Further, the advent of the nuclear weapon and its
potentiality for global destruction has changed many traditional conceptions
and objectives of foreign policy. Because of the disastrous realities of the
nuclear weapon, it is now imperative that foreign policy take into account
that nuclear conflict is to be avoided rather than employed. Moreover, any
confrontation between powers must be carefully handled as it has the
potential of leading to nuclear warfare.
The development of nuclear weapons has also meant that protection
of national sovereignty without nuclear capability is difficult. As a result,
^Op. cit
.
, Lerche and Said, p. 16.
7many sovereign non-nuclear nations must depend on the willingness of other
nations to protect and preserve their sovereignty. Yet, even with nuclear
weapons, it is highly doubtful that even the super-powers have the capability
of protecting their own integrity in the event of total nuclear war. As a
result, the foreign policies of all nations, but in particular the super-
powers, have been increasingly curtailed by the fear of a nuclear holacaust.
At the same time, they demand increased flexibility to cope with the dangerous
realities of the nuclear age. In other words, the advent of the nuclear
weapon has meant that statesmen have relinquished the alternative of waging
war with no consideration of the consequences of their decisions for mankind.
Yet, they also must now bear the additional burden of resolving ideological
confrontation with practical and flexible solutions while operating under the
threat of global destruction.
As different as are the individual and combined factors that enter into
the development of a nation's foreign policy, there are corresponding
differences in the specific types of foreign policies. Yet, the tendency has
been to group many different types of foreign policies under one general
category. Lerche and Said claim that "such catch-words as 'isolationism,
'
'balance of power' or 'imperialism' are often if somewhat inaccurately used
to characterize particular foreign policies. " This is done, it appears, for
the sake of convenience while forsaking all values of clarity. For example,
'^Ibid.
,
p. 12.
8it becomes hopelessly confusing when one attempts to sort out just what is
meant by an "imperialistic foreign policy" since at one time or another
most powerful nations have been accused of pursuing one. It also remains
unclear just what constitutes a foreign policy of neutralism, or just how a
foreign policy of globalism differs from one of imperialism, if it does.
These categories are widely used in labeling types of foreign policies adhered
to by states. Yet, they remain largely undefined and even ill-defined with
no clarity as to what elements of a foreign policy characterize it as either
global or imperalistic.
This point can be made about the categorization of foreign policies as
isolationist. Little thought has been given to a careful explication of what
isolationism means currently or has meant historically. There remain, as a
result, misconceptions about what isolationism is or should be. Questions
concerning what is isolated, by whom, from whom, by what means, or under
what circumstances have gone largely unanswered in the application of
isolationism. Foreign policies as different as Japan's two hundred years of
seclusion from the rest of the world and the American adherence to non-
alliance or non-entanglement with Europe have equally been designated as
isolationist, adding confusion and fostering unclarity on the concept, thus
rendering it almost useless. It i^he clarification of the concept of
isolationism that Chapter II is concerned with. The attempt will be made to
explicate the concept of isolationism in order to give meaning to the
9categorization of foreign policies under it. In this way, it can be used in ;
consistent and responsible manner.
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CHAPTER II
THE CONCEPT AND POLICY OF ISOLATIONISM
The focus of this chapter is the difficult yet important task of explicating
the concept and policy of isolationism. It is arduous in the sense that all
attempts at definitions prove to be a task of giving meaning and preciseness to a
concept. It is an important task in that the crystallization of a definition and
its subsequent application to specific instances of contemporary American
foreign policy constitutes the major issue of this treatise.
The task of explicating isolationism is made more arduous for two
reasons. On the one hand, there is a definite absence of any significant or
substantial literature on isolationism as a concept or as a theory of foreign
policy. As a result, as Kenneth Thompson recognizes, "The problem of
isolationism has been that lacking roots in an enduring theory, it has taken
root in ad hoc strategies and policies cast in the form of principles such as
non-intervention and non-entanglement. On the other hand, the task is
even more complicated by a plethora of meanings attached to isolationism
by those who use the concept without attempting to arrive at a meaningful,
'"Kenneth Thompson, "Isolationism" and "Collective Security," in Alexander
De Conde, ed. , Isolation and Security; Ideas and Interests in Twentieth
Century American Foreign Policy
,
Durham, N. C: Dul<e University Press,
1957, p. 169.
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definitive statement of it. Consequently, there are many proposed definitions,
explicit and implicit, of isolationism which, while useful in the narrow sense
of clarifying for the moment its use in each particular instance, in the long
run augment the confusion and distortion of the concept and thus the policy.
It is important that an attempt be made to rid the concept of as many
superfluous meanings as possible. In many instances, this can be
accomplished by a careful winnowing process of those definitions which are
either too broad or too narrow, or those which obviously apply in some
circumstances and not in others. As will be demonstrated, the range of
meanings applied to isolationism runs along a continuum including instances
where it applies to only hermit-like existence to instances in which the
meaning is considerably broadened to include "the unwillingness to make new
contacts.
"
A study of the diversified definitions used will only verify this state
of affairs. Although the presentation made below of asserted definitions of
isolationism is by no means exhaustive, those selected here do represent
the broad range of meanings generally applied to isolationism.
A primary source of definitions is a reputable dictionary such as
Webster's Third International Edition and The Random House Dictionary of the
English Language. Webster's defines isolation as "to set apart from others,
place alone." The synonym for isolation is solitude which is defined as
2
Webster's Third International Dictionary
,
Springfield, Mass.: G. and C,
Merriam Company, 1966, p. 777.
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"completely alone, cut off from all humaji contact.
_Webster's defines
isolationism as "the policy advocated by isolationists. Isolationist: person
who believes in or advocates isolation; person who wants his country to take
no part in alliances, etc."^ The Random House dictionary explicates
isolation as "to set or place apart; detach or separate so as to be alone
the separation of a nation from other nations by isolationism."^ Random
House presents isolationism as; "the policy or doctrine that peace and
economic advancement can best be achieved by isolating ones country from
alliances and commitments with other nations. "^ In these definitions there
is considerable variance between the core sense of isolation and its meaning
when applied to isolationism. No longer does isolation mean total or
universal separateness or aloneness. There is considerable inconsistency
in that "taking no part in alliances" does not necessarily mean to "separate
or place alone" or to be in solitude. Nor does the inclusion of "etc."
facilitate clarity. The question arises: what is to be included in "etc."?
What is to be embraced within the scope of an isolationist policy?
In an article, "The Uses and Limits of the Theories" reprinted in
Alexander De Conde's Isolation and Security
,
Kenneth Thompson claims
'^Ibid
.
,
p. 1388.
"^
Ibid
.
,
p. 777.
The Random House Dictionary of the English Language, College Edition
,
New York: Random House, 1968, p. 709.
Op . cit. , Random House, p. 709,
that "it is futile to talk of a theory of isolationism for the term is charged
with emotion and has increasingly acquired pejorative connotations.
He suggests, however, that some of the attributes surrounding isolation
are "inaction, passivity, lethargy, and withdrawal. "^
Added to these meanings are those of Thomas Cook and Malcolm
Moos enumerated in Power and Purpose. Isolation to them means
"exclusiveness, apartness, superiority, and suspicion."^ Isolationism is
a policy of apartness and exclusiveness based upon superiority of power
and suspicion of others' intentions. Cook and Moos claim that isolationism
is a selfish policy "to protect and reach self-interested enjoyment of a special
social vision. "^^ Unfortunately, their definition is not much of a contribution.
It is possible to isolate or place apart in instances of non-suspicion and non-
superiority. Moreover, their definition examines the "why" of isolationism
rather than the "what.
"
From this point on, the definition becomes increasingly broad and
divergent from the core meaning of isolation. Most of the writers below are
concerned with "American isolation" and have broadened the concept to suit
7Op. cit.
,
Thompson, p. 1G4.
Ibid
.
,
p. 164.
^Thomas I. Cook, and Malcolm Moos, Power Through Purpose; The Realism
of Idealism as a Basis for Foreign Policy , Baltimore: John Hopkins University
Press, 1954, p. 47.
l^Ibid., p. 46.
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their particular circumstances.
Alexander De Conde in his Isolation and Security explains that
isolation has meant at various times "the desire to avoid involvement in
the endless quarrels of Europe, At other times, it has meant immunity
from trouble and at still others, avoidance of war. Selig Adler takes much
the same position in The Isolationist Impulse
. Isolationism means to stay
out of foreign wars with an unwavering refusal to enter into alliances.
Ronald Steel in Pax Americana defines isolationists as "those who believe
the nation to be overextended militarily, morally and intellectually."''^^
Although later on, Steel backtracks a bit on this definition (he concludes
that the "neo-isolationists" are really internationalists), his is a good
example of the tendency to broaden the meaning of isolationism to the point
that it becomes vague.
The same must be said for Leroy Rieselbach's definition in The Roots
of Isolatioaism
. Rieselbach, a contemporary writer on American isolation,
claims that isolationism "refers only to a reluctance to extend American
overseas commitments with respect to all or to some particular segment of
13
foreign affairs. " He suggests that isolationism in its broadest sense "is
'^
^Alexander De Conde, ed. , Isolation and Security: Ideas and Interests in
Twentieth-Century American Foreign Policy
,
Durham N. C: Duke University
Press, 1957, p. 4.
'^Ronald Steel, Pax Americana , New York: Viking Press, Inc. , 1968,
p. 313.
'^'^ Leroy No Rieselbach, The Roots of Isolationism , Indianapolis: The Bobbs-
Merrill Company, Inc., 1966, p. 8.
15
an attitude of opposition to binding commitments
. . . that would create
new, or expand existing, obligations to foreign nations. "^^ Isolationism,
on the basis of this definition, is a policy of the status quo. Yet, this
represents a move away from a dictionary meaning. Like both Webster and
Random House
,
isolationism for Rieselbach has come to mean a policy of
non-alliance and non-commitment to other nations. Here again, this is
removed from a policy of solitude, apartness or separation.
Finally, in Dream and Reality Louis J. Halle expresses some rather
succinct thoughts on isolationism which only confound the situation. Halle
recognizes that non-participation in international politics is a possible
alternative for a national policy; yet, he maintains that to label non-
participation as isolation is both inappropriate and misleading. For Halle,
isolationism is "merely abstinence from involvement or from permanent,
inextricable involvement in the political or military conflicts of other
15
nations." He states further that:
It does not ordinarily mean, as it did in China and Japan,
commercial and cultural isolation. It does not exclude
trade or immigration. What it does exclude, typically, is
peacetime alliance, any obligation to take sides in the
quarrel of other nations. This is basic. Beyond this,
there may be other forms of non-participation practiced
by particular nations, but the freedom from peacetime
alliances or alignment is common to all nations that
IP
practice this policy.
^"^Ibid., p. 7.
^""^ Louis Halle, Dream and Reality; Aspects of American Foreign Policy ,
New York: Harper and Row, 1959, p. 5.
^^Ibid
. ,
p. 6.
16
Halle's contention about isolationism sounds very much like a working
definition of neutralism, not isolationism. For neutralism has come to
mean non-alliance and non-commitment politically and militarily, yet
with an emphasis on cultural and commercial contacts. It is, nevertheless,
difficult to understand why Halle discounts the periods of seclusion of the
Chinese and Japanese as instances of isolation.
Concept Clarification
The task of explicating a concept is primarily the chore of finding the
defining criterion or in some cases several defining criteria. Ludwig
Wittgenstein in his famous The Blue and Brown Books attempted to make the
distinction between defining criteria and symptoms relative to the existence
of a concept. "How do you know that so-and-so is the case? We sometimes
17
answer by giving 'criteria' and sometimes by giving 'symptoms'."
Although his premises and arguments have since been called into question and
in some instances qualified, his initial distinction between criteria and
symptoms remains an important one in the clarification of concepts.
Wittgenstein distingiiishes between criteria and what he terms
symptoms. Both arc indications of phenomena which are observed and
from which it is determined that something or other does exist. Wittgenstein
suggests that criteria are indications which are defining of that something
^'^ Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books , Oxford: Blackwell,
1958, p. 25.
17
and that symptoms are by themselves not defining but may accompany those
phenomena. Elizabeth Wolgast expresses this distinction clearly:
Symptoms and criteria are both signs by which we
discover or know that something is the case. In the case
of criteria, however, it may follow from the presence of
these marks that what the criteria serve exists. To say
that one has found symptoms of that thing or phenomenon
never has this necessary consequence.
Problems arise, however, when the distinction between criteria and
symptoms is put into practice. There may not be one defining criterion,
there may be several criteria. It is often difficult to distinguish symptoms
from criteria for in reality there may be little actual difference as to what
the defining criterion is and what a symptom is. Because it may be extremely
difficult in some cases to discover "the defining criteria," it is easy to
confuse symptoms for criteria and vice-versa.
And yet, to search for the criteria of a concept is the important
task in explicating concepts. For "to look for rrilori;) is In look at the use
of a concept whose role in our language is complicated—diilicult to
describe or picture, that criteria exist shows us that the use can be
19
described and that the concept is not occult. " Although the distinction
between criteria and symptoms is not always clear, the significance of
such a distinction is that it forces the process of conceptual clarification
•'•^Elizabeth H. Wolgast, "Wittgenstein and Criteria" Inquiry , Vol. 7,
Winter 1964, No. 4. p. 353.
^^rbicl_.
,
p. 353.
^^Ibid., p. 353.
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to deal with it. That is, conceptual clarification is. as clearly as possible,
the articulation of the defining criteria of a concept.
In relationship to clarifying the concept of isolationism, the task
of locating the defining criteria has been made more difficult as a result
of the ambiguous and confusing attempts at its definition noted above. In
many cases, the defining criteria of isolationism in those definitions
appear to be a state of non-alliance and non-commitment with others.
Granted that non-alliance is a relatively simple "state of being" to grasp
mentally (although there are several meanings to the term "alliance"),
yet, it is possible to be non-aligned or to be a member of no alliance and
not be isolated in the sense of being separated or secluded from others.
In the case of non-commitment, circumstances become more complex as
there arc many kinds of commitments (for example binding and non-binding)
and commitments on many different levels (a commitment to aid another
in time of war is very different from a commitment to peacetime commercial
ties).
It is suggested here that the above definitions are defining isolationism
in terms of symptoms and not criteria. Non-alliance is a symptom of
isolationism, not the defining criteria. That is, non-alliance will, in all
probability, accompany or be an instrumental part of isolationist policy,
but it does not constitute the total process of isolationism. Non-involve-
ment in binding commitments may be a component of isolationism, but it
does not define that concept. The same is true of, for example, the
19
withdrawal of military forces. Such a policy or procedure does not constitute
isolationism although here again it may embody a symptom of isolationism.
Other examples of symptoms of isolationism may be: acting alone,
avoidance of war, suspicion of foreigners, immunity from trouble or a
reluctance to extend overseas commitments.
What then is the defining criteria in isolationism? Taking a cue
directly from the meaning of "isolate," or "isolation," that being
apart from or separated from, secluded or to place alone, isolationism
is a policy of seclusion; a severance of all relationships, commitments,
communication and dependence with or on others; a hermit-like existence
of self-sufficiency.
This definition is more inclusive than those which claim non-alliance
as the important criterion, and it runs directly counter to the definition of
Louis Halle. It draws its meaning directly from the criteria defining
"isolate." It suggests a "state of being alone" or "apart from others" in
the sense of seclusion. It means non-involvement on all levels with others.
In terms of a foreign policy, it means a policy of withdrawal and seclusion
from other nations on all levels. In most cases for a nation adhering to an
isolationist foreign policy, it means the severance of all official relationships,
communications, and commitments with other governments. Yet there may
remain some unofficial contacts with other peoples through personal contacts,
illegal criminal traffic or through private commercial dealings depending
upon the ability or willingness of the official government to control these
20
aspects of the domestic society. The point is that for isolationism to have
meaning in terms of foreign relations, it must constitute a policy whereby
the effort is made by the government of one nation to sever all significant
relations, to take no part in alliances, to disavow any commitments on any
level and to withdraw into a state of self-sufficiency and seclusion.
There are two important observations which must be made here and
which hopefully can help to clarify the proposed definition of isolationism.
The first point concerns the observation made by Leroy Rieselbach in
The Roots of Isolationism
.
He suggests that isolationism is a multi-
dimensional phenomenon of which several different species may exist.
Isolationists may have different geographical foci: one
clearly definable group may reject all foreign involvements;
another may oppose all activity outside the Western Hemi-
sphere; a third may wish to avoid contact with Europe, while
participating actively in Asian affairs.^"*"
He further notes that:
Isolationists may also differ along subject matter lines. For
instance, a military isolationist may oppose the commitment
of troops to defend foreign areas; an economic isolationist
may object to the use of nonmilitary resources to assist other
nations; a political isolationist may reject participation in
international organizations; or a "general" isolationist may
decry any overseas commitments ^^ich might impose restraints
on future (American) activity ...
Rieselbach' s point is valid and must be granted in part; first, because he uses
isolationism to mean separation from or non-involvement in other nations'
affairs and, secondly, because there are different ways and means of
Op. cit
.
,
Rieselbach, pp. 7-8,
Ibid
. ,
p. 8.
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isolation. For example, a nation can diplomatically isolate itself from
another nation, and in fact this happens frequently in international politics
due to the practice of non-recognition. Or a country can isolate itself in
terms of political commitments from a whole continent as did the United
States during its practice of non-entanglement in European political and
military affairs in the nineteenth century. Or a nation can subscribe to
economic isolation by refusing to trade commercially with other nations.
These are instances of diplomatic, political and economic isolation.
However, they do not constitute by themselves a policy of isolationism.
They are parts of the whole and cannot, if isolationism is to be defined
meaningfully, constitute the whole in themselves. Ricsclbach is correct
when he claims that isolationism is a multidimensional phenomenon. But
he does misconstrue isolationism when he suggests that any single dimension
in itself constitutes isolationism. Political isolation from Europe is
exactly what it claims to be. Because a nation chooses to be politically
isolated from Europe does not mean that it is also politically uninvolved
with other parts of the world. Because a nation chooses to remain
militarily non-aligned does not suggest inactivity and non-involvement on
other levels. Isolationism as a policy must be practised or adhered to as
whole or hi toto if the concept is to have meaning. A policy of isolationism
is an attempt on all levels and by all means to separate a nation from all
other nations. It is a policy not directed at one nation or one part of the
world or on one or two levels, but rather it is a policy of general and
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consistent abstention and seclusion in all respects.
The second observation about the nature of isolationism is that it is
a policy which can take two forms. On the one hand, it can be a policy of
voluntary abstention and seclusion from others by a state. On the other
hand, it can take the form of an enforced or non-voluntary seclusion, an
induced isolation of one state resulting from the actions of other states.
It is the latter form which has been more prominent throughout history as
groups of nations for whatever reason sought to isolate "aggressor" states
from time to time. The forced isolation of a state was normally effected
via alliance structures and economic boycotts made possible by a common
interest, in most cases a security interest, among the isolating nations.
This formerly important type of isolationism, has largely been unsuccessful
since the era of interstate cooperation was ushered in by the Concert of
23Europe. This is due to the fact that "the friendship of a state threatened
by isolation can usually be had so cheaply that it will soon find a bidder and
the coalition opposed to it will soon begin to disintegrate."^'* Likewise,
the interdependency of the modern world both politically and economically
make it extremely unlikely that a nation would or could remain isolated by
others for long.
The Quadruple Alliance successfully isolated France for a short period
of time following the Napoleonic Wars. See Willian Langer, "Diplomatic
Isolation," Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences
,
Vol VIII, pp. 353-355.
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William Langer, "Diplomatic Isolation," Encyclopedia of the Social
Sciences, Vol. VIII, p. 353.
23
Isolationism in the other sense of the term, that being a self-imposed
policy of abstention and seclusion from the family of nations, is the form of
isolationism that bears careful examination here. For it is this sense of
the concept of isolationism that is being applied to those who advocate a
rearrangement of priorities, commitments, and goals in contemporary
American foreign policy.
CHAPTER III
ISOLATIONISM IN JAPAN, CfflNA, AND GREAT BRITAIN
Before delving into the specifics surrounding "American isolationism,"
it is important, as a point of contrast, to examine carefully instances or
examples of foreign policies which contain the criteria to be found in
isolationism as defined above. Two such examples are Japan's policy of
isolationism between 1638 and 1853 and China's isolationism in ancient
times, but primarily during the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. In addition to these two examples, a study of Britain's so-
called "period of splendid isolation" will be undertaken, the purpose of
which is to serve, along with the examination of American isolation in the
fourth chapter, as an example of misconstrued isolationism. It is thought
that by establishing such a dichotomy the meaning and definition of
isolationism can best be exemplified.
Although the major thrust of these four case studies is to clarify
what does and what does not constitute isolationism, throughout each of the
studies several other matters of concern will be examined. One issue
which must be dealt with is under what circumstances is a foreign policy
of isolationism possible? Are there instances in which a nation, although
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desirous of isolating itself, is actually prevented from doing so due to
geographical, political or technological restraints? Hopefully, this
examination will make apparent any requirements involved in the implemen-
tation of an isolationist policy.
Secondly, questions must be raised about why a nation would choose
isolationism over international involvement. Are there common aims and
goals which can best be served by isolationism? What are the circumstances
surrounding the adoption of an isolationist policy?
Finally, an examination must be undertaken as to why a nation
abandoned the policy of isolationism as its foreign policy. What were the
circumstances surrounding the decision to break down the walls of seclusion?
Was it a decision forced by outside influences or was it a decision taken
voluntarily in the best interests of the nation?
By dealing with these issues through the specific circumstances of
the four case studies, it is hoped that some general conclusions about the
issues can be drawn. It is also anticipated that the question of the
obsolescence of isolationism in today's environment might be answered or
at least dealt with thoroughly through the study of such issues. If so, then
the assumption that the United States is returning to a policy of isolationism
can be seriously questioned.
Japan in Isolation
The first study concerns Japan's period of isolation of over two
hundred years, and is presented here as a classic example of isolationism.
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During this time, the Japconese had no relations, commercially, culturally,
religiously or politically with the other nations of the world. The official
policy of the Tokugawa shogunate, beginning with the final Act of Seclusion
in 1638 and ending only under the guns of Commodore Perry's Qeet in 1853,
was a successful policy of repulsion of all foreign influences and contacts
with the other nations of the world.
Any complete account of Japan's policy of isolationism must begin
with a discussion of the special elements of Japanese geography, domestic
and international politics, plus other factors which are pertinent to an
explanation of why isolationism was a feasible policy for the Japanese in
the early Seventeenth Century. Several of the specific factors involved in
explaining the feasibility of Japan's policy of isolationism will provide
adequate substance for later generalization on isolationism.
The geography of Japan provides an important element as to why
she could successfully initiate a policy of isolationism. For many centuries,
the sea served as a barrier to Japanses travel abroad and to foreign
invasion of Japan. In fact, until the advancement in the technology of
shipbuilding and navigation, which was introduced to the Japanese largely
(luring the period of open commercial trade by the seafaring nations of the
West, the threat of foreign invasion against Japan was largely nil. George
Ballard in his book The Influence of the Sea on the Political History of Japan
maintains that "the first of those (isolation periods) was the period in
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which a great measure of compulsory isolation was imposed by natural
causes and the sea was a safeguard. "1 Likewise, by the time of the
initial stages of the imposed isolationism on the Japanese by the Tokugawa
rulers, the sea was still a very formidable obstacle to overcome for those
who desired contact with Japan. Even though the wide reaches of the sea
had been crossed and had, as Ballard suggests, become a source of danger
for the Japanese, it was still true that the sea was a very instrumental part
of the successful artificial isolation of Japan. Ballard submits that concern-
ing the artificial isolation "no such policy could have been either initiated or
maintained except in an island whose inhabitants were debarred by law from
taking to the water, or perhaps in a country such as Tibet whose natural
frontiers are very difficult to cross. Despite the advancements in
navigation and nautical technology, sea travel was and remained for sometime
a slow and hazardous undertaking. This was especially true in light of the
harsh reception given by the Japanese to those who managed the journey
safely.' As Ballard suggests, "The effect of the sea was to impose a
certain degree of isolation, conferred a degree of safety greater than that
^George Alcximdor Ballard, The Influence of the Sea on the Political History
of Japan
,
London: Albcmorle, 1921, p. 12.
^Ibid
.
,
p. 7.
3
Indeed, the sea remained a hazard for quite some time. In fact, one of
the main purposes which brought Perry to Japan in 1853 was to request
safe passage to American whalers shipwrecked off the coasts of Japan.
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obtainable in any other way. "4 This circumstance greatly aided the designs
of the Tokugawa government when it decided to sever all official contacts.
A second factor enabling the Japanese successfully to adhere
to isolationism concerns the international political conditions of that period.
The major threat to the Japanese came from the western seafaring nations
of Portugal, Spain, England and Holland, which had technological ability to
seek out Japanese trade and cultural contacts. Yet, during the entire two
hundred years that Japan practised isolationism, these nations were involved
in struggles with each other on the European continent. For the most part,
they seemed content to abide by the Japanese desire for isolation. Yet, in
reality, they were so drained by the efforts against each other that they
could not muster enough resources to make the concerted effort needed to
force the Japanese out of their self-imposed seclusion. As a result, the
Japanese, despite their acknowledged lag in technological military development,
were able to withstand and indeed deal effectively with the few foreign vessels
which attempted to force their way into Japanese waters and ports. These
were isolated incidents and did not constitute a concerted effort to reopen
Japan. As a result of the international power struggles among those nations
who posed a real threat to Japan's isolation, the Japanese were able to
maintain their policy far longer than other circumstances would have
warranted.
^Op. cit
. ,
Ballard, p. 7.
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A third element which greatly aided the propagation of Japanese
isolationist policy was the successful national unification of power under
one centralized structure. Until the latter part of the sixteenth century,
Japan was a feudal state controlled by local barons. The first aclmowledged
nationalist of any consequence was Nobunaga, whose ambition in the late
Sixteenth Century was to bring about national unification. By aligning
himself with the rising tide and forces of Christianity. Nobunaga overpowered
many of the local barons. In this manner, he was able to erode much of the
political and military power of the Buddhists who had until then controlled
the Empire of Japan. Yoshi Kuno describes Nobunaga's contribution to the
unification process, "Nobunaga, for his part, branded the communities and
militant Buddhists as national enemies because they opposed his work of
national unification, and he dealt with them brutally and mercilessly, being
bent on destroying their fighting power.
After the death of Nobunaga in 1582, the task of national unification
was carried on by Hideyoshi, who after his successful invasion of Kyushu,
and his victory in 1590 over the Hojo family, the last and most powerful
military force against unification, completed the national unification of
Japan.
It remained the task of Hideyoshi' s successor to consolidate the
5
Yoshisaburo Kuno, Japanese Expansion on the Asian Continent
,
Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1937, 1940, p. 6.
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power of a central authority over the whole of Japan. This was accomplished
by the first of the Tokugawa Shoguns, the ambitious and brilliant lyeyasu.
During his sixteen-year reign, lyeyasu established the Tokugawa claim to
legitimate authority over the entire Japanese islands and entrenched that
authority in a national bureaucracy. By the time of lyeyasu's death in 1616,
the Tokugawa rulers were beginning to embark upon the policy of Christian
repression and national seclusion. Because they held sway over the entirety
of Japan, the Tokugawa regime was able successfully to administer the laws
and decrees of repression and seclusion throughout the islands. Such a policy
would not have been possible under the feudal organization which existed in
Japan only twenty-five years before. The consistent cooperation which was
needed for the successful administration of a policy of national isolation
would not have been possible in a society controlled by local or regional
rulers whose major preoccupation was protecting or increasing their
personal power. National isolation was possible because there existed a
national povver structure to enforce it.
Finally, there were other factors which increased the possibilities
of isolationism. At the beginning of the period of seclusion, Japanese
teclinology in shipbuilding and ocean navigation was lacking. What
knowledge of sea navigation and nautical technology they had was a result
in large part of their recent intercourse with the western seafaring powers.
It was easy for the Tokugawa Shoguns to enforce their decrees against sea
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travel and regulation of shipbuilding because for the most part there was not
a great deal of activity which was not under the auspices and control of the
Tokugawa Shogunate.
A final ingredient making possible Japanese isolation was the fact that
the Japanese had been throughout their history largely an isolated people
and society. Mention has already been made of the importance of the sea in
this respect. It is also a fact that Japanese relations with the peoples of the
mainland of Asia, notably the Chinese and Koreans, were for the most part
hostile. Therefore, isolation from others was a natural phenomenon for the
Japanese, an important factor in the ready acceptance of the Tokugawa
policies of isolation by the Japanese people. Furthermore, the homogeneity
of the people in terms of their culture and race, a consequence resulting
from their being an island people, facilitated the isolationist policy, especially
the expulsion and repression of all foreigners and foreign influences.
During the five decades previous to the final act of seclusion in 1638,
the official policy of Japan was one of open trade and multi-relations with
other nations, in particular with the western nations. This program, beginning
under Hideyoshi and greatly expanding during the early years of rule by
the first Tokugawa Shogun, lyeyasu, sought to expand the power and
influence of Japan internationally. It was also designed to upgrade Japanese
technology and modernize Japanese society. This "open door" policy of
trade, initiated by Hideyoshi, became the official policy of lyeyasu during
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the early 1600's. He was able to pursue such a policy much more vigorously
than had Hideyoshi because of the consolidation of national power which had
taken place under the Tokugawa Shogunate. The specific goals .of the open
trade policy of lyeyasu were largely threefold. First, he wanted the
development of foreign commerce for economic reasons. Secondly, he
greatly desired the creation of a Tokugawa merchant marine. (For permitting
the Western seafaring nations to trade with Japan, lyeyasu asked in exchange
for technological know-how in shipbuilding and nautical navigation.) Third,
he wanted better tools and knowledge of resource development in order to
develop the new mines in Idau and Sado. He hoped to obtain these through
commercial exchange
o
While lyeyasu permitted open commercial trade with all nations
which so desired, politically he adhered to a policy of non-alliance or
neutrality. James Murdock in A History of Japan states that "the great
old statesman (lyeyasu), while according a hearty welcome to law-abiding
subjects of any and every foreign State, was resolutely resolved that Japan
should not in any way become embroiled in any differences beyond the
territorial waters of the country. During all the terms of lyeyasu's sway,
Japan vis-a-vis all European nations in the Far East had been strictly
neutral." Murdock suggests that:
James Murdock, A History of Japan
,
New York: Frederick Ungar
Publishing Company, 1964, Vol H, part 2, p. 485.
What lyeyasu wanted was foreign trade and foreign
instruction in certain matters for his subjects, and the
greater the number of rivals and competing nationalities
that could be enticed to Japan the better it was for the
economic interest of the country. ^
The open trade policy, while beneficial in most respects, was not
without its pitfalls. Not only was it difficult at times to keep an even keel
between competing commercial interests, the missionary zeal of the
competing Christian nations of the West proved to be a major threat to the
Tolcugawa Shoguns. During the early years of lyeyasu's open trade policy,
the number of Christian priests and converts, and the strength of
Christianity within Japan grew phenomenally. Yet, because of the over-
riding concern for commercial trade and technological development, "the
early Tokugawas were clearly willing to make great concessions in the
matter of that religion to which they themselves were so indifferent."^ In
fact, as James Murdock suggests, the Tokugawa Shogun used the presence
of the Christian Jesuits to enhance trade with the Christian nations.
He (lyeyasu) maintained that religious rivalry was no good
thing for the peace of the country, but it is perfectly clear
that he certainly adhered to the doctrine that competition
is the soul of trade
. . . the favours he bestowed on the
priests of the rival sects seem to have been graduated in
accordance with their proved efficiency as decoys for foreign
merchantmen to the harbours of the empire. ^
Despite the advantages to trade accorded by the lenient policy toward
Christianity, the growing strength and local influence of the Christians in
'Ibid_.
,
p. 627.
^Ibid
., p. 486.
9lbid_.
,
p. 480.
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Japan forced lyeyasu and his successors to change their policy in order to
deal effectively with the Christian menace. In reversing the policy of
leniency toward the Christian religion, the Tokugawa Shoguns over a period
of years dating from 1612 to 1638 moved from a policy of open trade and
cooperation with other nations to a course of isolationism and seclusion
from the world.
Beginning with the Anti-Christian edict of 1611 (actually lyeyasu
proclaimed the first anti-Christian edict of his rule in 1606 which was
really a reinforcement of a previous edict announced by Hideyoshi in 1587
but never carried out) which prohibited the conversion to Christianity of
any officers of lyeyasu' s government and the military followed in quick
succession by stiffer edicts of expulsion against the Christians themselves
in 1614 and 1616, lyeyasu sought to cope with the Christian threat to his
power. At the same time, he desired not to close or inhibit the commercial
trade relations which were of much benefit to the Japanese. Murdock
explains that "lyeyasu, while prepared to accord foreign traders a hospitable
welcome to Japan, the old statesman was thoroughly bent upon being master
in his own house and upon seeing to it that his hospitality was not abused by
his g-uest. "''"^ However, with the death of lyeyasu in 1616 and despite the
measures against the Christian religion, if w;)s ai^' ivl.'iuflv clear to the
succeeding Shogun that so long as foreign trade went unrestricted, and the
abuse of the edicts continued unpunished, the power and authority of the
^^Ibid
. ,
p. 502.
35
Tokugawa Shogunate remained threatened. Starting with Hidetade in 1616
and continuing with lyemitsu in 1623, Christians were dealt with severely.
No longer were they expelled as they had been under lyeyasu, but they
were now tortured and put to death by the Tokugawa authorities. Moreover,
because Christian nations illegally smuggled the Christian priests and
missionaries back into Japan, lyemitsu halted all trade with foreign nations.
In 1623, the Tokugawa authorities expelled the Spanish; in 1638, the
Portuguese. The English had left on their own account, but for over two
hundred years they too were excluded from the islands of Japan. E. H,
Norman explains that "after 1640, all foreigners and foreign trade were
excluded from Japan except for a small trading station in Deshina (Nagaski)
where the Dutch and Chinese were kept under strict supervision and allowed
limited trading rights. In 1637, the Shogunate forbade any Japanese to leave
the coimtry; to disobey their law and to return to Japan meant death. To
enforce seclusion, the capacity of each ship was henceforth limited to five
hundred koku. Thus, in the short span of forty years, Japan had moved
from a policy of open trade and exchange, tolerance of religious and cultural
differences and political neutrality to a policy of isolationism and xenophobia.
Questions arise as to the reasons behind such a drastic reversal.
It is correct to say that the threat presented by Christianity to the Tokugawa
Shogunate and Japanese society was a major cause or reason for the policy
"'•'^E. H. Norman, Japan's Emergence as a Modern State , I.P.R. Inquiry
series, New York, 1940, p. 13.
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of isolationism. Christianity posed a comprehensive threat to the Japanese
on political, religious and cultural terms.
Politically, Christianity and its adherents posed a threat to Japan
as early as the rule of Hideyoshi in the latter half of the sixteenth century.
In 1592, the fear of foreign invasion by Spain of which the Christian Jesuits
were but the advance party was implanted in the minds of the Japanese by
a letter written by Gomez Perez Dasmarinas, the Spanish governor of Manila,
to Hideyoshi. The letter contained an account of all the titles of the Spanish
sovereign, Don Felipe II. In 1596, further fears were raised by Dr. Antonio
Morga, a Spanish official who unwittingly showed a map of the world to an
envoy of Hideyoshi.
... in which could be seen all the countries which had been
discovered, and Espana and the other kingdoms possessed
by his Majesty, among which were Piru (Peru) and Nueva Espana.
When the favorite Ximonojo asked how these distant kingdoms
had been gained, the pilot replied that the religious had entered
first and preached their religion, and then the soldiers had
followed and subdued them.
A similar account is recorded by E. M. Cooper. She claims that "Spanish
sailors were heard boasting that after the traders and missionaries would
13
come the troops of Spain to annex Japan." The Japanese Shoguns'
suspicion and fear of an impending foreign invasion led by the Christians
already in Japan was substantial. As late as 1622, a date well into the period
Henri Bernard, "Les Debut des relations diplomatique entre le Japan
et les Espana des lies Philippines," MN, I (1938) p. 122.
13
E. M. Cooper, Japan, Australia: Pergamen Press, 1970, p. 43.
of Christian persecution, Murdock finds that "Hidetada's distrust of Spaniards
was profound, he was afraid of a foreign invasion, and he looked upon the
foreign priests as the avant-couriers and harbingers of a Spanish conquest. "^^
Furthermore, the fears and suspicions of foreign conquest were enhanced
by the bitter rivalry between the western nations in the race for Japan's
riches. As Gustav Voss explains:
All the great maritine powers—Portugal, Spain, England
and Holland—were deep in nationalist and economic rivalry
for political as well as commercial advantages. They used
every imaginable means to outwit and outrace each other in
their mad rush for the riches of Japan. The Dutch merchants,
for instance, envious of the profits made by Portuguese and
Spaniards, helped to prejudice the Japanese authorities against
their Catholic rivals. Repeatedly, they represented to the
Shogun that the missionaries had but one intention, that of
turning Japan into the state of a colony under the cloak of
Christianity.
The distrust of Christianity by the Shoguns was reinforced by the
domestic strength of the foreign missionaries. Large numbers of Japanese
had taken up the Christian faith. In some instances, whole cities and towns
had come under Christian influence. It was widely acknowledged that
Nagaski was under the control of the Jesuits. It became apparent that the
Christian foreigners were not hesitant about tal<:ing sides in local power
struggles, especially as their strength grew, and as they had a definite stake
in the outcome of those struggles. Kimo, in addressing himself to this point,
claims that "one reason for lyeyasu's dislike of Christians was that they took
^'^Op. cit.
,
Murdock, p. 623.
'^Gustav Voss, "Early Japanese Isolation," Pacific Historical Review ,
Vol. 14, No. 1 (1945), pp. 20-21.
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the side of Hideyori. the son of Hideyoshi, in the battle of Osaka in 1615
in hopes of regaining religious freedom. "^^ Such activity, if left
unrestricted, constituted a serious challenge to the power and authority
of the Tokugawa Shogunatc within the Empire of Japan. This fact, coupled
with the fear of foreign invasion by the Christian nations, proved to be one
reason for the eventual repression and expulsion of the Christians and
Christianity.
Christianity was also considered a menace to Japan on religious
grounds. From various Japanese documents, the Buddhists and Confucian
reaction to Christijmity can bo clearly discerned. In the first decree of
exile in 1587, Christianity was considered an "evile religion." Gustav
Voss gives an excellent account of the religious opposition to Christianity in
his article "Early Japanese Isolationism." Mc states:
This Buddhist opposition to Christianity dated back to the very
days of St. Francis Xavier. During an early stay in Kagoshima,
the bronzes, in the name of the outraged deity of Buddhism,
called upon the prince of Satsuma to expel the foreign creed. ^'^
In examining the pages of the Annual Letters
,
Voss discovers "the
pronouncement that Japan, as the 'land of llic CJods' .^-hou. . nol acc< |ti (he
evil religion of Kirishitan was put at the head of the document and that
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missionaries are openly accused of planning the destruction of Buddha."
^^
^Op. cit.
,
Kuno, p. 50.
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^^Ibid.
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Voss continues:
The idea that Japan is the nation of Shintoistic deities and
the land of Buddha recurs in almost every subsequent pro-
nouncement against Christianity.
. . . Whether we can
speak of Taiko Ilidcyoshi's lifetime as the beginning of a
Shinto revival is a question open to discussion, but it is
certain as someone has said, "the sacred fires of the great
Shintoistic tradition were far from being extinct. " They
smoldered beneath the ashes and helped to forge the weapons
intended to erase everything Christian and Occidental from
the face of Japan. Both Shintoism and Buddhism, as well
as the philosophy and ethics of Confucianism, played their
part in furnishing motives and arguments for the rejection
of Western thought and religion. 19
Finally, Christianity was rejected by the Japanese authorities because
Christian teaching and doctrine ran counter to ancient Japanese loyalties.
The Christian articles of faith demanded that one place loyalty to God before
any other loyalty. This was in direct conflict with the traditional Japanese
views regarding ancestor worship and filial piety. E. M. Cooper maintains
that Hideyoshi disliked the influence of the Catholic priests, who urged their
converts that their first allegiance should be to their religion and to the Pope.
Obedience to an outside power could prove much more dangerous than
obedience to a rebellious daimyo."^^ There was no room in Christianity
for ancestor worship nor for anything other than the worship of God. For
this reason, the Christian religion was pronounced as barbarous and radically
opposed to the Japanese way of life. Again Voss addresses himself to this
^^Ibid
.
,
p. 27.
^^Op. cit.
,
Cooper, p. 43.
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point:
Thus, the Christians were attacked for not being loyal
because of their worship of God, who claims the first right
to obedience. Such an accusation was bound to have its
effects. A doctrine that placed loyalty to God above loyalty
to the national ruler could easily be represented as
revolutionary to a Japanese to whom Bushido, the way of
the knightly samuri, was the all-inspiring ideal of Nipponese
manhood, and who saw in "chuke" and in the human relations
of the gorin the leftist expression of his religious patriotism
and the perfect blend of the traditional virtues of the Japanese
citizen. Christianity seemed full of revolutionary tendencies
and intrigues.
The Japanese tradition of religious tolerance also seemed to be
threatened by the Christian religion. Both lyeyasu and Hidetada learned
of the religious wars of the Christian nations through their secret envoy
to Europe. lyeyasu learned "that in their own countries, they (Europeans)
were in the habit of burning or beheading each other when one believed
something slightly different from another. He was not at all convinced of
22
the superiority of the Christian religion." Hidetada, for his part,
23
learned about the ravages of the religious wars in Europe and sought to
expel Christianity before such an occurrence could plague Japan.
In conclusion, the following is taken from Tokutomi, Kinsei Nippon
Kokumin-Shi
,
a series of documents which concretely express the attitude
of the Japanese authorities toward Christianity:
Op. cit.
,
Voss, p. 31,32.
^Inago Nitobe, Japan , New York:
^The Thirty Years War.
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1931, p. 92.
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1. Christianity wholly ignores both the traditions
and the laws of our nation.
2. Christianity ignores and despises our national
religions. It is continuously causing national troubles
and disturbances.
3. The Christian churches and organizations make
themselves centers of attraction to dissatisfied people
and stragglers. They are headquarters for disturbing
elements in Japan.
4. Because of their religious interests both the
Christian priests and the Christian converts in Japan
establish relations with the kingdom of Spain and serve
as spies for the Spanish king, thus paving the way for an
invasion of Japan.
5. Christian priests always enter into secret under-
standings with ambitious and unruly Japanese, and help
them to utilize religious influence for their own selfish
purposes. 24
For these reasons, the Japanese concluded that in self-defense they should
cut off all communications with the outside world in order to prevent further
inroads of Christianity.
Besides the threat which Christianity presented to the Japanese,
there were other reasons for the policy of isolationism. One of these
was the fear held by the Tokugawa Shoguns that continued trade and increased
technological development would lead to increased power of local barons
and possibly the overthrow of their authority. "One of the traditional reasons
for rejecting foreign intercourse was the fear that the guns and wealth it
Tokutomi, Kinsei Nippron Kokumin-shi, Vol. 14, pp. 244-245.
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would bring might make possible a successful revolt against Tokugawa rule. "25
Further apprehensions were caused by the notion that continued
intercourse with foreigners would gradually erode the traditional values and
customs of Japanese society. This notion is intertwined with the specific
and apparent threat of Christianity. But even with the repression of the
Christian religion, the modernization process could not help but change
Japanese society drastically, as it indeed did two centuries later. As a
result, Edwin Reischauer suggests that "Stability became the watchword.
And to achieve stability, change or the threat of change had to be eliminated.
This meant the freezing of society. "^6
A final reason behind the embarkment upon a policy of isolation by
the Japanese concerns the intentions and ambitions of the Tokugawa Shoguns
and, in particular, lyeyasu. The movement toward national unification was
accomplished through the efforts of lyeyasu, the first of the Tokugawa
Shoguns. It became his guiding principle that the power of the Japanese
empire be retained within the Tokugawa family. That was one principal
reason for his war on and the ultimate destruction of the offspring of
Hideyoshi. Shortly before his death in 1616, lyeyasu, in order to insure
the legitimacy of rule for his descendants, deliberately ended the ancestral
claim to power of the Hideyoshi family by putting them to death. By this
25W. G. Beasley, Select Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy 1853-1868
,
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action, lyeyasu rid the Tokugawa Shogunate of its chief domestic rival for
power once he died. With respect to the challenge of Tokugawa from abroad,
lyeyasu initiated the movement toward isolation and seclusion. It is
James Murdock who gives a hint as to the reasons behind such a move.
lyeyasu, however, evidently felt that his descendants, all of
whom might likely be no better than—if not actually inferior
to—the "average man" would find their greatest danger in
the support that Europeans might too readily extend to local
chiefs who wished to emancipate themselves from the yoke
of the House of Tokugawa—now invested with the Shogunate
of Japan. It is fairly safe to say that neither Hideyoshi nor
lyeyasu would ever have closed Japan to Western intercourse.
Japan was closed in the interests of the safe workings of the
administrative machine devised by lyeyasu to safeguard the
supremacy of his stodgy successors. 27
For these reasons then, seclusion and isolation became the fundamental
law of the Tokugawa House for over two hundred years. It was felt by every
Shogun of that period that only through isolationism could his country be
preserved from corruption and defeat. From 1638 through 1853, isolationism
was enjoined alike by the dictates of patriotism and by the sanctions of
ancestral law.
The one remaining question yet to be dealt with concerns the explana-
tion behind the Japanese abandonment of isolationism in 1853. With respect
to this question, the answer is relatively simple and clear. Japan was
forced out of isolation by the superiority of weapons possessed by the naval
fleets of the Western nations demanding trade agreements. For too long, they
felt, Japan had sealed herself off from the rest of the world. Her society
Op . cit.
,
Murdock, p. 577.
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had remained stagnant, without benefit or knowledge of the technological
revolution in the West. When Commodore Perry sailed his American
fleet into the Japanese harbor at Uraga in the summer of 1853, .demanding
that Japan open her ports and society to Americaii trade, the end of isolation
was at hand. Unable to counter the sophisticated weapons of the American
fleet, the Japanese were obliged to entertain the American demands,
knowing well that other nations were to follow the Americans. It was simply
a question of power. The Japanese capacity to enforce their policy of
isolationism no longer remained. Japan was obliged to cope with the
realities of international power-politics as they existed in 1853 and not as
in 1G38.
China in Isolation
The second case study of isolationism focuses on the vast and ancient
nation of China. In many respects, as the discussion will reveal, the
Chinese experience of isolationism is not unlike that of Japan. This is
especially true in relation to the circumstances surrounding the Chinese
reaction to and rejection of foreign influences, especially Christianity; and
to the eventual abandonment of isolationism under pressure from Western
nations. Similarity is not surprising, given the fact that both Japan and
China developed the major course of their isolationism from the sixteenth
to the middle of the nineteenth century and in response to like pressures of
foreign, mainly European, encroachment.
45
There are, however, important differences between the two nations-
isolationist policies. These differences are not of a nature that they would
cause a loosening of the definition of isolationism. They do, however,
point up the fact that isolationism can be adhered to for numerous and
various reasons and under significantly different circumstances, geographical,
political and cultural.
Throughout their long history, the Chinese people have been isolated
in large measure by geographic circumstances. Although China is, unlike
Japan, a land-based nation which stretches over an enormous amount of
territory, the nature of its geography, (notably the perimeter areas),
constitutes a virtual land-based island. China's borders presented for
a long time a considerable obstacle to any concerted attempt at
establishing a consistent commercial or political relationship. George
Cressey suggests that "China is like a huge oasis. On all sides, she is
surrounded by the most perfect of physical barriers. "^^ Kenneth Latourette
notes the influence of these geographic elements:
The boundaries of China have had a great influence
on her history and on the character of her people and
civilization. On the east is the Pacific Ocean which in the
old days discouraged rather than encouraged commerce
. . .
it shielded China from outside influences and the Chinese
showed little disposition to cross it.^^
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Further, Latourette states:
China's land boundaries reinforced her isolation. Onthe west, northwest, and southwest are great mountain chainssome among the highest in the world. They are buttres-sed by'
vast elevated semi-arid plateaus.
. . . The isolation was
nearly complete. On the southeast and northeast, to be surethe barriers are not so effective, but until the last hundred
'
years there were not in either direction peoples from whose
culture China could learn much. 30
As a result of their geographic isolation, the Chinese developed a
civilization with little influence from outside sources. The impact of
geographic isolation was to continue from the earliest times until a more
recent period when modern technology and the development of sea, land
and air travel overcame these barriers to outside influences.
The development of the early Chinese civilization, uninhibited by
foreign influence, was in large measure due to the seclusion provided by
the geographic barriers noted above. Yet, historians of early China have
documented in numerous accounts various instances of contact between the
Chinese Empire and the other major culture of the world, the Roman
Empire of the first three centuries A. D.^^ These contacts took place
only under the powerful Han and Chin regimes in China. Only a strong and
rich regime could afford to provide protection for commercial traffic
outside the Chinese Empire. Because of the inconsistent and haphazard
nature of these contacts, they had little influence on the Chinese.
^^Ibid.
,
p. 7.
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See Frederick Teggart, Rome and China. Berkeley: University of
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C. P. Fitzgerald maintains that: "The contact had no political significance,
did not in any way modify the policies of statecraft, had no influence on
thought or literature. The Chinese knew that the Roman world. existed,
they traded with it at long range, they admired what they knew, but all this
had no direct bearing on their lives, made no modification in their view of
the world. ""^^
Out of the early geographic and cultural isolation came the Chinese
conception of the world. In ancient China, there was no sense of belonging
to a nation or state. The sense of unity came from belonging to a civilization
Having developed a civilization in isolation from any other of even close
parity, the Chinese came to view their empire as the center of the universe.
Chinese culture was considered superior to any other. Any people who did
not imitate or learn from the Chinese were barbarians. V. P. Dutt writes
in China and the World ;
From time immemorial right down to the middle of the
nineteenth century, the Chinese looked upon themselves as
the repositories of the only fine culture extant in the world,
and their country as the centre of the universe. The Chinese
empire was the finest civilization and all others who lived
outside its domain were barbarians who ought to bow before
the superior culture of the Universal Empire and drink from
the fountain of all knowledge and wisdom to be found only in
this empire.
32
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Kenneth Latourette maintains that:
This lack of intimate contact with other cultural groupsbred m the Chinese a feeling of intense pride and disdain
They had known no other people with a civilization equal to
their own
. . .
what wonder that the Chinese, especially the
educated Chinese, should have a profound contempt for
foreigners. To him they were barbarians. 34
Quite naturally this philosophy of cultural and intellectual superiority
on the part of the Chinese carried over into their relations with other nations.
As a result, the Chinese state was for two thousand years aloof and self-
centered as no other great civilization has been. The Chinese conception of
foreign intercourse was one of inequality. Since all peoples outside of
China were naturally inferior, the only relationship which could exist between
them was that of vassalage. Those who sought parity but were unable to
force themselves upon the Chinese were rejected outright as inferiors and
barbarians. Fitzgerald makes this point quite clearly:
The Chinese have never had much experience of alliances.
Living in their own world in which they were long supreme,
their relations with other organized states as from time to time
existed in their vicinity were either hostile or those suzerain to
tributory.
. . .
They never envisaged foreign policy in terms
of alliances, of balance of power. The old rooted outlook that
China was the supreme central empire needing no friend, haviag
no equal hold fast. "^^
Following fi-om this superiority complex, the Chinese were incapable of
grasping the concept of the nation-state which came out of the Renaissance
and the Reformation in Europe. Furthermore, "they were incapable of
34
Op. cit
. ,
Latourette, p. 11.
•^^Op. cit.
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Fitzgerald, p. 52.
recognizing even the existence of any other distinct
-but equal-national
or social entities.
relationship was possible between
the Great Empire and other peoples and that was subordination. to the
Chinese.
Politically, the subordination took the form of tribute. Those
peoples who were either overpowered by the Chinese armies or who
wished to be part of the Chinese Empire and who eventually were
assimilated into it were controlled through the system of tribute.
From these two elements, geographic isolation and cultural
superiority, came the basis of Chinese isolationism once the western
nations began to make advances toward China in the sixteenth century.
Up until that time, the Chinese central authority had had no conscious
policy of anti-foreignism or isolation. Contact with foreigners merely
depended upon the ability of the Chinese Empire to sustain it, or in
many instances, repulse it, in particular those who sought to rule the
Chinese. ^'^ However, those contacts were with the inferior cultures of the
Mongols of central Asia and the minor nomadic tribes of the northern
steppe. The challenge by the West did not come until the geographic
barriers could be surmounted via the improved technology of the sixteenth
and later centuries.
Roberts. Elegant, "China's Next Phase, " Foreign Affairs
,
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•^'Principally the Mongols from the north and west.
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The development of a consistent policy of isolationism by the late
Ming and early Ch'ing dynasties parallels the rapid expansion of Western
trade routes by sea. The increased mobility of the commercial vessels
of the Dutch, Portuguese. Spanish and later the English, brought to the
coast of China traders in search of the riches that China had to offer.
The early years of trade with the West were marked by a rather
tolerant attitude on the part of the Chinese. Several circumstances
can explain their initial posture. First, the amount of trade was barely
significant as foreign arrivals from the West were infrequent. Secondly,
the Chinese traditionally were tolerant toward those they considered
inferior. Moreover, their religious beliefs of Confucianism and Buddhism
taught them forbearance. Initially, even Christianity was tolerated,
leniency being the way of life in China. Thirdly, the Chinese government
never regarded international trade as a means of enrichment and thus
ignoring rather than sponsoring or rejecting it. Lastly, the trade which was
carried on was on Chinese terms, as "all foreigners were treated as
subjects of the emperor. If they became too restive, the Chinese brought
them to terms by suspending all trade. " Furthermore, the Europeans
were regarded as another group of barbarians who had nothing to teach the
Celestial Empire and thus posed no threat to it.
By the beginning of the sixteenth century, the continuous and increased
activity of the Western traders brought a sharp reversal in Chinese policy.
38O^p . cit.
,
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As was true in Japan, the Western trade was accompanied by Christian
missionaries seeking to spread their religion amongst the heathen Chinese.
Chae-Kwang Wu in The International Aspect of the Mi...inn..v
in China, writes:
At the beginning of the sixteenth century, the benevolent
attitude of the Chinese government began to change. For the
first time it adopted the closed door policy and instead of treat-
ing aliens liberally it put extreme restrictions on them. The
reason for this sudden change of policy is not hard to seek. It
lay in the aggressive and unscrupulous actions of the Portuguese,
Dutch, Spaniards and English. They were the disturbers of
peace and order.
The Chinese hostility toward Christianity was induced by several circumstances.
First, so long as the propagators of a new religion remained peaceful and
did not attempt to meddle in the politics of the country, they were free from
persecution and proscription. It became apparent that the Christians
were not merely interested in the propagation of religion but were also
involved in the local politics within the Chinese Empire. The Chinese saw
that "Christian missionaries have come to China to advance the interests
of their own governments
. . . that the missionaries pretend to come to
China for the people's benefit, but that, in reality, each and every one of them
is an agent of some foreign government. "'^^
A second cause for the turnabout in the Chinese attitude lay in the
Christians' arrogance; specifically, their obvious attitude of superiority
^Chae-Kwang Wu, The International Aspect of the Missionary Movement in
China
,
Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1930, p. 132.
40^
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52
Which was in contradiction to the Chinese view of the world. The Christian
emphasis was on changing and civilizing the Chinese in accordance with
western culture and ideas. Wu explains this when he comments:
Tainted with the materialistic civilization of the West
and bound by their own prejudices, tastes, modes of thought
and plans of work, they have seldom been willing to adapt
themselves to the environment in which they labor. Some
even go so far as to thinly that a Chinese is not soundly
converted to Christianity until he learns to eat with a knife
and fork, or is not validly married until he conforms to
western usage in this respect.
The Christians also made it a point to insult the Chinese civilization by failing
to acknowledge or accept the Chinese tradition of ancestor worship, by
hostile activity toward the traditional religions of Confucianism and Buddhism,
and by propagating the claim that Christianity was the religion of peace.
Finally, the Christians, in building their churches and other
religious sanctuaries, set up within the interior of China virtual enclaves
of Christianity, in many cases resisting the authority of local Chinese officials.
These sanctuaries provided a base from which the Christians could carry
out their religious and political programs with little interference from
Chinese authority.
Such actions on llio of Llio Christian missionaries, coupled with
the anti-Chinese activity of the Chinese Christians, caused the Ming and
Ch'ing Emperors to proscribe Christianity. The Christian religion was not
to appear again until the West had forced open the door to China in the
^^Ibid., p. 134.
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middle of the nineteenth century. Subsequent actions on the part of the
Christians after the reopening of China in the nineteenth century lends
credibility and justification to the motives behind the Chinese proscription
of that religion in the time of the Ming and Ch'ing dynasties.
A second significant reason for the Chinese isolationist posture during
this period was the Chinese preoccupation with the security of the empire
from Mongol invasion. The defense of Inner Asia has always held a prominent
place in the priorities of the Chinese Empire. At the time of early western
expansion across the seas, the Chinese were becoming more and more
concerned with the Mongol threat on their northern and western fronts. As
a result, despite the earlier Chinese capacity for maritime power and expansion
of trade via the sea, all efforts at maritime growth were sacrificed for
the defense of China proper. As John Fairbank remarks, China turned
away from her maritime trade and contacts to insure the successful defense
of the mainland.
After 1644, China's new Manchu rulers, intent on building
their continental empire, ignored the sea. To suppress Ming
remnants, they even applied tactics once used by the Ming to
discourage Japanese pirates: the Ch'ing shut down maritime trade,
evacuated coastal islands and moved the coastal population ten
miles inland behind a patrolled barrier.
This driving concern for the defense of the Empire, combined with the
prohibition of Christianity, provided the major initiative for China's
isolationism. Yet, there were other compelling reasons for such a policy.
42John K. Fairbanks, "China's Foreign Policy in Historical Perspective,"
Foreign Affairs
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One of these was the awareness by the intelligentsia that foreign influences
would eventually lead to the erosion of traditional Chinese culture, philosophy
and, ultimately, political power. To permit Western culture and ideas
to be accessible to the masses would mean competition for those myths
nurtured by the rulers for centuries which enabled them to command the
loyalty of the people. Certainly, questions would be raised about China's
being the center of the universe and the Emperor being Son of Heaven. Surely,
it would become apparent that the Western culture had in many respects
advanced far beyond the Chinese culture. This could only result in the
erosion of the idea that all foreigners were barbarians with nothing to offer
the Chinese. Finally, the rulers and the intelligentsia would be exposed as
propagators of these myths in order to hold onto power. Thus, the Chinese
authorities sought to control contacts and trade with the West in order to
maintain their privileged positions in Chinese society. As Werner Levi
suggests:
A further reason for the control of trade not directly related to
the tribute system, may have been the desire of the ruling
class to preserve an agrarian, self-sufficient society. Such
a society did not need trade, which could only lead to its
destruction.
Further on he maintains that:
Behind the abstinatc Chinese refusal to alter ancient political
customs lay an additional, more materialistic consideration.
The demand for equal treatment by the foreigners struck at the
roots of Chinese society and threatened to undermine the position
of the ruling classes. '^'^
'^^Werncr Levi, Modern China's Foreign Policy
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Another reason for Chinese isolationism in this period of initial contact
with the West was the development of the dogma that
-'national security could
only be found in isolation and
. . . that whoever wished to enter into relations
with China must do so as China's vassal. "^^ This dogma of isolation had
developed in reaction to the aggressive activities of the northern tribes during
the twelfth century. As a result, Levi maintains,
There was no provision in the organization of the Chinese
government for the conduct of foreign relations in the Western
sense. There were no such relations. In fact, the Book of Rites
ordained that "the officials of the Empire shall have no intercourse
with foreigners. ""^6
Later, when the foreign influences began to batter at the exclusiveness of China
in the nineteenth century, the only system of foreign relations employed by the
Chinese for as long as possible were those of superior to vassal, a continua-
tion of their traditional policy.
Finally, the Chinese attitude that trade could only transpire with those
foreign states who aclmowledged the superiority of the Chinese and who were
willing to partake in the Chinese tributary system evoked sentiments of
hostility from the Western nations. Unable to understand the Chinese attitude
and unwilling to submit to their demands for humility, the West was faced
with either the impossible task of forcing themselves on the Chinese or of
respecting their demand for isolation. Because, as Latourette points out,
"The China power was as yet too strong, communication with Europe as yet
^^
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too difficult, and trade too unimportant to warrant a serious armed effort to
wrest better terms from China or to open her to foreign trade, "^V the
western nations were left with the alternative of respecting China's
isolation, at least, until such time as they were powerful enough to overcome
it.
Drawing from the above discussion, it seems apparent that the over-
riding reasons for Chinese isolation from the early sixteenth century to the
end of the eighteenth were the preservation of their culture .-md traditional
philosophy, plus continued domestic political control by the Manchu Emperor
and ruling classes. Implementation of the isolationist policy was pursued
through measures of anti-foreignism, tribute payment, anti-Christianity,
control of trade, the doctrine of superiority and proscription of maritime
development. The success of these measures was aided significantly by the
natural barriers provided by China's geography and by the size and strength
of her armies. So long as these conditions remained constant, and the
Manchu dynasty "was strong enough to exclude Christian teaching and limit the
activity of the few Catholic missionaries to strictly supervised scientific
woi-k, the cont:u;t with the West remained slight. ""^^ The Chinese policy of
national isolationism remained consistent and viable under these circumstances
for nearly three hundred years. As a result, Fitzgerald suggests:
47O^p
. cit.
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Up to the end of the eighteenth century, the Chinese
world still stood intact, aloof, uninterested in the West
unwilling to learn, unable to believe that the barbarians
had anything of value to communicate. 49
The one remaining question related to the period of Chinese isolationism
concerns the circumstances surrounding the abandonment of that policy. As
was true in the case of Japan, the Chinese were forced out of their isolationist
posture by the superiority of Western military capability due to advanced
technological development of weapons and communication systems.
The task of opening China to Western influence took the larger part of
the nineteenth century. It was England, the first nation to feel the impact of
the Industrial Revolution, who led the other nations to the coast of China.
Beginning with King George Ill's letter in 1793 to Emperor Ch'ien Lung of
China requesting trade relations and the Emperor's subsequent refusal, 50 the
English initiated the assault on China which was to end in her complete
capitulation. Like Japan, China was forced out of her isolation and compelled
to accept the foreign contact because of the overriding evidence that resistance
would be disasterous. In hindsight, any number of military victories could
not have been any worse or more complete than the eventual tragedy which
^^Ibid_.
, p„ ;]2.
50An excellent example of the Chinese attitude toward people they considered
to be inferior barbarians is the response of Ch'ien Lung to the letter of King
George III. It is significant, also, because it demonstrates that even after
nearly three hundred years of isolationism, the Chinese desire to remain
isolated is quite adamant. The letter is taken from J. L. Cranmer-Byng,
"Lord Macartney's Embassy to Peking in 1793 from Official Chinese Documents,"
Journal of Oriental Studies, IV (1957-58), 134-7.
overcame China due to Occidental imperali
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The Cultural Revolution
In relation to the previous discussion on China and isolationism, a
brief word on the foreign policy of Communist China, notably during the
recent Cultural Revolution of the middle and late 1960's. seems relevant.
Chinese foreign policy under the leadership of the Communist Party of China,
in particular. Chairman Mao Tse-tung, has often been characterized as
isolationist. It has been argued that since 1949 China has remained clearly
outside the international family of nations, showing no willingness to
participate in the United Nations nor its activities, all the while maintaining
"You, O King, live beyond the confines of many seas, nevertheless,
impelled by your humble desire to partake of the benefits of our civilization,
you have dispatched a mission respectfully bearing your memorial. Your
Envoy has crossed the seas and paid his respects at my Court on the
aimiversary of my birthday. To show your devotion you have also sent
offerings of your country's produce.
"I have perused your memorial: the earnest terms in which it is
couched reveal a respectful humility on your part, which is highly praise-
worthy.
. . .
"Swaying the wide world, I have but one aim in view, namely to
maintain a perfect governance and to fulfill the duties of the state: strange
and costly objects do not interest me. ... As your Ambassador can
see for himself, we possess all things. I set no value on objects or
ingenious, and have no use for your country's manufactures. This, then,
is my answer to your request to appoint a representative at my Court,
a request contrary to our dynastic usage. ... It behooves you, O King,
to respect my sentiments and to display even greater devotion and loyalty
in future, so that by perpetual submission to our Throne, you may
secure peace and prosperity for your country hereafter.
"
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a constant vorbage of hostility against all efforts at international coopora-
tion.
Such an image of Communist China, while largely eorrect. fails to
take into aeeount the reasons behind sueh a position. A eareful examination
of China's foreign poliey sinee 1950 demonstrates that it does not constitute
a national policy of isolationism. That is, it was not the intent or desire of
the communist leadership to withdraw from all commitments or to seclude
Chinese society from the rest of the world. China, during the decade of the
195()'s, was a recognized part of the international communist movement and
as such maintained many cultural, economic, political and military ties with
other communist states, primarily the Soviet Union. Even after the Sino-
Sovict schism became a reality within the communist world in the early I960'
Chinese foreign policy was not isolationist. In fact, as the self-appointed
champion of true Marxist- Leninist Communism, China's foreign policy was
predicated upon winning over as many nations to its side against the
revisionism of the Khrushchev-led Russians. The Chinese were particularly
aggressive in their foreign relations with the new nations of the Third World
as it was here th.-it the competition for ideological alliance included not only
the Soviet Union but also nations of Lhc capitalist world.
Secondly, China remained outside of those international organizations
which were dominated by the non-communist nations; in particular those
51China and Russia signed a Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual
Assistance in 1950 and numerous others during the 1950's.
controlled by the United States. But China was not wholly responsible
for her absence from these associations. (Although it is doubtful that the
Chinese would have participated in any relationship or organization which
they considered to be a mere instrument for American imperialism.) In
large measure, the Communist Chinese were isolated as a result of the
American policy of containment. It was the United States and its supporters
who were responsible for a certain degree of Chinese isolation because of
the "Free World policies of economic, cultural and military boycott,
non-recognition and their plan of military encirclement. China's reaction
did not, however, constitute a policy of isolationism as they successfully
searched for their own friends in the communist world.
The recent cultural revolution in Communist China, which ran its
course between 1965 and 1969, has also been considered to have had
isolationist overtones. Due to the lack of communication and the absence
of first-hand knowledge of what transpired inside the People's Republic of
China during those years of tumult, it is not too difficult to understand how
such a characterization could be made. Closer examination reveals that
China's foreign policy during the Cultural Revolution suffered from a
profound lack of direction. Inevitably, jmy sign of a radically different
program would have been evident had there been a conscious attempt on the
^^The Chinese Communists have also been portrayed as renegades of
international law. They, however, maintain that international law is based
on western philosophy and culture; thus, foreign and unfair to non-western
nations.
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part of the Chinese to isolate themselves.
Ironically, during these years, the only consistent policy pursued
abroad by the Chinese was that of spreading Mao Tse-tung's thoughts on
world revolution and national liberation. It is ironic because the Chinese
pushed the Maoist line so intensely that many nations in the Third World
with whom China had established diplomatic relations reacted by demanding
that the Chinese diplomatic missions leave their countries. Mainland
China was forced to recall many diplomats, who were expelled for pursuing
the Maoist line too ruthlessly. Likewise, many Chinese diplomats were
expelled by the host nation because of their occasional violent activity against
those nations as a means of expressing their support for the revolutionary
forces which were rooting out the impurities within Chinese society. In this
way, thoy hoped to make their position secure when they returned home and
also to justify their presence in a revisionist or even capitalist country.
In other words, the excesses of the Cultural Revolution in China spilled
over into and affected Chinese relations abroad. The result was growing
diplomatic isolation of China brought on by the reaction of her ruthlessness
and brashness abroad. But diplomatic isolation does not constitute isola-
tionism. China continued to rely on trade during even the most tumultuous
years of the Revolution. In fact, foreign commerce played an important role
during the time of the revolution. Foreign trade provided needed materials
not available as a result of the disruption to work. The Chinese Communists
also maintained diplomatic missions as well as commercial and cultural ties
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in those countries which permitted them. Once the excesses of the cultural
revolution ended, and the Foreign Office was put back in order, it was
apparent that it was absence of a consistent direction in foreign policy rather
than a conscious national policy of isolationism which lent the appearance that
China was withdrawing from the rest of the world.
Summary of Japan and China
The case studies of Japan and China of the Ming and Ching dynasties
represent instances of a nation in pursuit of isolationism. Based upon the
definition of isolationism explicated previously, these t-wo studies are intended
to be representative of isolationism in accordance with its historical meaning.
During their respective periods of national isolation, both Japan and China
managed to sever all official contacts with other nations, were self-sufficient
in that they alone provided the necessnrv imi III "> 'line resources
for their society and were able to i)lacc themselves apart or in seclusion
from the rest of the international community. Neither had military nor
commercial commitments with any other nation. Both were able to repulse
foreign contact and influence. And most important, both nations pursued a
conscious policy of isolation that was executed on a. national level. Isolationism
was, for both Japan and China, a policy which was applied to all other nations
and on all levels. In other words, isolationism constituted the specific
program for achieving their national goals of security, prosperity and cultural
purity. Isolationism was thus the vehicle or means to accomplish those
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specific ends.
Several general observations about isolationism arise out
of the preceding case studies. In both instances the policy of isolation was
greatly aided by the respective geographic conditions. It is probable that
isolation could not have been possible without these natural barriers to choke
off foreign intrusion. On the basis of the Chinese and Japanese experience one
might generalize that it is much easier for a nation with "island-like" geography
to pursue isolationism than for one which is geographically vulnerable to
foreign influence and encroachment.^^ As a result, many nations may not
possess the option of isolationism as a possible foreign policy as they lack the
geographic elements necessary.
^'^
A second observation, is that isolationism more than any other foreign
policy can only be successfully executed with the full cooperation of all elements
of society. This cooperation may be enforced or it may be voluntary.
Isolationism is not possible if some segments of the society are open to outside
incursion. For this reason, isolationism is a national policy of exclusion,
53 For example, Germany lacks any substantial geographic barriers, thus
making her vulnerable to foreign incursion, whereas her neighbor Switzerland
possesses formidable barriers.
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In theory, a nation lacking sufficient geographic barriers could compensate
by building man made obstacles in the effort to isolate themselves. However,
historically, these attempts have been largely unsuccessful. The fortified
walls of the early city-states were vulnerable to siege and ultimately the cannon.
The French Maginot Line, erected as a defense against Germany, was avoided
by going around it. Even the Great Wall of China had its leaks. Had it not
been for the geographic setting in which it was erected, it too would not have
been of much consequence.
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pursued by society as a whole and rendering equal treatment to all other
peoples. Both Japan and China, basically because of the controls exercised
by the central authorities over the domestic society, achieved the necessary
support for a successful isolationist policy.
A third point is that isolationism for China and Japan was possible
largely as a consequence of the state of scientific and technological develop-
ment in that period. Both countries adhered to isolationism in the centuries
just before the Industrial Revolution. Development of communication,
transportation and weapon systems had not progressed to a very sophisticated
stage. In large measure, isolation was possible in that period because those
foreigners who desired to make inroads into Japanese and Chinese societies
simply did not possess the technological resources to overcome the physical
obstacles of geography, let alone the obstacles of national resistance.
The question must be raised whether or not isolationism is obsolete
as a foreign policy in the modern world. When intercontinental missiles can
probe any corner of the world how realistic is it to speak of a nation in
isolation? Of what advantage is a policy of isolationism if a nation must
sacrifice technological development because it lacks the resources to carry
on vital research? Ultimately, the retardation of technological growth will
imperil that nation's security, thus negating the primary goal for which it
adopted the policy of isolationism. (This is one of the problems that both
China and Japan failed to understand until the reality of their economic and
technological backwardness was made apparent by the West.)
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Finally, unless a nation in its isolation is able to generate sufficient
technological growth on a par with its adversaries, its security will be
threatened. Isolation must not cause stagnation in a nation's growth and
development of its resources and technology. Such was the case with Japan
and China. In both cases, the purity of their respective cultures was
paramount. As a result, scientific research and experimentation were not
stressed in either society. The later abandonment of isolationism was due
in large measure to the resulting backwardness of those societies compared
with the advanced nations of the West. In general, isolationism can only be
of use as a foreign policy which promotes the nation's goals, both long and
short range, if the effort is made on all levels to develop the national
capabilities. This is true with respect to all foreign policies, but it is
especially relevant to isolationism since self-sufficiency is an essential
ingredient in fulfilling the goals of separation from the outside world.
It is hoped that the meaning of isolationism can be clarified from the
previous discussion. Up to this point, the approach to a sharpening of the
concept of isolationism has been to explore examples of what isolationism is.
It is apparent that the concept is being defined in its historical sense.
Granted that over time, meanings relating to concepts change. Such changes
occur because some aspects of a concept have more relevancy and thus take on
more meaning at different times.
It is important that concepts which have taken on new meaning have
foundation in the historical sense in which they were used. (For example,
neutrality has taken on new meaning with the advent of the Cold War; yet.
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its meaning is based in its historical underpim^ings.) Without the foundation
new meanings may result in the distortion of that concept.
The subsequent case studies, one on British foreign policy in the
nineteenth century and the other a study of American foreign policy, deal
with isolationism in a newer context. Much of the discussion, especially
concerning American foreign policy, will be concerned with tracing the
evolvement of the new and different meaning attached to isolationism. In
this matter, it is hoped to demonstrate just how far the sense of isolation
has shifted from its historical moorings. By setting up a dichotomy between
what is and what is not isolationism, some conceptual clarification may be
established.
Britain and "Splendid Isolation"
In the examination of British foreign policy of the nineteenth century,
three basic questions will be raised. First, what were the broad policy
outlines under which British foreign policy operated during this century,
particularly during the years of "Splendid Isolation"? Secondly, what was
the meaning (or meanings) of the concept isolation as it was applied to
British foreign policy? And thirdly, in light of the definition of isolationism
presented above, does British policy fulfill the requirements established as
meaningful for conceptual clarity. An important question is raised at this
point. Can Britain's foreign policy be considered as isolationist? Or has the
meaning become so diffused that when applied to British policy it is basically
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a misnomer?
The nineteenth century foreign policy of Great Britain has been
labeled "Pax Britannica.
" It was a century when British power and
innuence were spread throughout the world when the British Empire was
at its peak. The foundations of its strength were based on overwhelming
naval power which enabled the British to achieve an unchallenged mastery of
the seas. As a result, Britain was the "world's leading economic power-
its workshop, its banker, and the carrier of its goods. "^^ For the British,
the nineteenth century was a time of power and prosperity unparalleled since
the days of ancient Rome.
During this century, British foreign policy can be divided into two
distinct phases. The first, which began in 1815 following the defeat of
Napoleon ajid the Treaty of Vienna, was a period of rapid expansion overseas.
The peace and stability on the European continent established by the Concert
of Europe permitted the British to concentrate on expanding their economic
and military interests into the non-European regions of the world. Under the
guise of protecting British nationals, they gained footholds in Africa and
Asia, especially securing their position in the Indian sub-continent. It was
a period of expanding and consolidating British power abroad. At the same
time, she continued to position herself into the "balancer" role on the
European continent and concentrated on thwarting any European challenge
to her position as the headmaster of Europe, Involvement in European
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politics was considerable as the British sought to maintain peace and stability
through the Congress system.
as
The second phase of British policy, the one characterized
"Splendid isolation," began under the Liberal ministry of William Gladstone
in 1868. If the previous policy was one of expansion and consolidation of
British interests abroad, the major emphasis in her policy now turned to
protecting these interests in the face of the aggressive colonial aspirations
of France, Germany and Russia. Through the successive ministries of
Gladstone, Disraeli and Salisbury, British foreign policy is depicted by
British historians as one of "isolationism, " a policy which sought to protect
her interests, yet retain the nation's ability to act freely and independently.
In 186(5, the Earl of Derby expounded the principles which were to form the
foundation of British foreign policy until the end of the nineteenth century.
He stated that it was the British government's duty "to keep itself upon
terms of goodwill with all surrounding nations, but not to entangle itself
with any single or monopolizing alliance with any of them." ^'^ In 1868,
Prime Minister Gladstone sought to put these principles into practice.
Anxious to retain the Concert of Europe as a mejms of ensuring peace.
5GrThis shill in policy was duo to a revulsion against the costly and al
times unfortunate exj^erienccs of the IH.^O's and 186()'s, cs])ociall\ . fix
Crimean War. Also, Prime Minister Gladstone hold a 'I'lTci .:i
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he wrote:
I do not believe that England ever will or can be unfaithful
to her great tradition, or can forswear her interest in the
common transactions and the general interests of Europe Buther credit and her power form a fund, which in order that
they be made the most of should be thriftly used. ... 58
Preoccupied with domestic matters, Gladstone was determined to avoid
all needless and entangling alliances. During his first administration, 1868-
1874, Britain gave no leadership to Europe. Writing on Gladstone's policy.
William Edwards suggests that "Gladstone's government adopted a policy of
splendid isolation. It took no part in the remaking of Europe but attempted
to assert the important principles of the sanctity of treaties made by a
Congress of Powers. "^^
Disraeli continued the Gladstonian principles of isolation during his
ministry. His policy was "reestablishing the Concert of Europe without
committing Great Britain to a close alliance with any foreign power. "^^
To these endeavors he was faithful despite his taste for imperialism which
at times degenerated into jingoism, .
The ascendancy of Lord Salisbury to the Prime Minishership in 1885
ensured the continuance of Britain's policy of "isolation." Salisbury was a
staunch supporter of the Gladstone and Disraeli principles of non-alliance
and non-entanglement. It was Salisbury's contention that Britain's insular
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position and her great naval power made the burdensome conditions of an
alliance unnecessary. Through careful articulation of his position.
Salisbury was able to defend the Victorian tradition of entering into no
alliances in time of peace or avoiding any commitment to go to war and of
retaining a free hand for British diplomacy. m his study of Salisbury's
foreign policy, J. A. S. Grenville claims that:
Salisbury did not believe that in a changing world there
could still be permanent alignments or even "short term"
alliances. Circumstances might alter and then if the
material interests of a nation should conflict with her written
engagements, the latter would be of little consequence.
Support for this position also came from Earl Rosebery who occupied the
Prime Ministership for a brief period between 1892 and 1895, after which
Salisbury again held the reins of power. Rosebery, in a letter to Lord
Kimberley on April 28, 1895 argued:
We cannot embroil ourselves in the quarrels of others
unless our own interests imperatively demand it. I say,
because our commerce is so universal and so penetrating that
scarcely any question can arise in any part of the world without
involving British interests. This consideration instead of
widening rather circumscribes the field of our action. For if we
did not strictly limit the principle of intervention we should
always be simultaneously engaged in some forty wars.^'^
The end of British policy of "splendid isolation" came on January 30,
1902, with the signing of an alliance with Japan. Circumstances had
6
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Changed as the continental powers of Prance, Germany, and Russia challenged
the British supremacy and security policy via a series of alliances. Protection
of British interests could no longer be achieved in isolation. William
Edwards explains that "Isolation had become dangerous and Great Britain
must be strengthened by a close alliance with a nation strong enough to give
military and naval support if necessary. "^^^he concluding of the alliance
with Japan marked the end of "splendid isolation" for Britain. It also
signaled the end of a century of Pax Britannica.
In general, British foreign policy from 1868 through 1902 adhered to
the broad policy outlines of non-alliance and non-intervention. William
Edwards concludes that Britain's policy was one where "she played a leading
part in the Concert of Europe but refused to fetter her liberty by making an
alliance with any other power, and remained aloof both from the Triple
Alliance which was formed by Germany, Austria and Italy in 1882 and the
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In a speech to the Birmingham Liberal Unionist Association on May 13
1868, Joseph Chamberlain articulates the position as to why isolationist
policy IS dead. He states that "all the powerful States of Europe have made
alliances and as long as we keep outside these alliances, as long as we are
envied by all, and as long as we have interests which at one time or another
conflict with the interests of all, we are liable to be confronted at any
moment with a combination of Great Powers so powerful that not even the
most extreme, the most hotheaded politician would be able to contemplate it
without a certain sense of uneasiness. " (From The Times
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•Dual Entente, which France concluded with Russia in 1893." ^6
^ord Strang,
a Permanent Secretary of the Foreign Office, summarized British policy
during this period as "to establish the Kingdom's peace and security by
isolationism; her prosperity by protecting world trade; and to use her navy
to safeguard overseas interests and lines of communication with the Empire.
Specifically, this meant the necessity of preserving Britain's "free hand" or
of avoiding any "entangling,"
"exclusive," "monopolizing,"
"separate,"
"single" or "special" alliances with other powers.
The British use of the term isolation and specifically "splendid
isolation" as a means of depicting their foreign policy did not become popular
until late in the nineteenth century. As a matter of fact, it was not until
the historical meaning of the concept was abandoned and replaced by a less
disparaging meaning that isolation was used to characterize Britain's foreign
policy.
Up until the 1890's, isolation was used by the British in the manner
that it had been used historically; first, in the sense explicated in this treatise,
as a refusal to collaborate in any way with other nations; secondly, as a
depreciatory implication of a nation's weakness. (This is understandable in
the context of British participation in the isolation of a weak post-Napoleonic
^'^^lbkl_.
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France on the European continent.) It was in this latter sense of an involun-
tary position of weakness which the British applied to isolation that gave it
its pejorative connotations. Christopher Howard maintains that to the British
"a policy of isolation was something that one attributed to one's political
opponents or against which one advised one's colleagues.
It is not until the middle 1890's, during the debate over Britain's foreign
policy's constituting "splendid isolation" or "dangerous isolation" that
indications of a change in the atmosphere and meaning surrounding isolation
are apparent. In a speech by George Joachim Goschen on February 26, 1896,
the two meanings of isolation, one old and one new, were articulated.
Goschen suggested that:
There may be the isolation of those who are weak and who
therefore are not courted because they can contribute nothing,
and there, on the other hand, is the isolation of those who do not
wish to be entangled in any complications and will hold themselves
free in every respect.
. . . Our isolation is not an isolation of
weakness; it is deliberately chosen, the freedom to act as we
choose in any circumstances that may arise. '^^
The controversy created by Goschen's speech was enormous. Until then,
"the normal meaning of the word 'isolation' when employed in international
context was, as it still is, an embarrassing lack of friends among other
powers on whom reliance can be placed for support in case of need.
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Goschen's acknowledgment of isolation as a deliberate policy of Britain and
his insistance that such a policy was preferable to any other for the present
ran counter to previous thinking about isolation. The importance of Goschen's
speech, which becomes apparent in subsequent defenses of his position by
others, is that the meaning of isolation has been altered to fit the circumstances
in which Britain found herself at that time. To put it more succinctly, it
became fashionable to label British foreign policy as that of "splendid
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isolation."
Isolation used in the sense that Goschen and his supporters spoke of it
meant a policy of systematic avoidance of any permanent alliance with another
power. Sir William Harcourt, in a speech before the House of Commons in
March of 1896, spoke of two kinds of isolation. He explained that there was
"isolation which arises from the unfriendliness of the world, but also that
isolation may be that you have not desired to enter into permanent or entan-
gling alliances. " From this, isolation became synonymous with the phrase
"freedom of action" because that was the goal intended for Britain in
international politics. British policy was based upon the preservation of the
72The popularity of the term "splendid isolation" was due in large measure
to the press campaign of 1895-6. The major contributors to its popularity
and, therefore, largely responsible for its becoming fashionable were the
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nation's freedom of individual action^ Isolation in the sense of non-alliance
was expected to retain this publicly acknowledged British goal.
However, as Howard so aptly points out, "It is significant nnd can
hardly have been a coincidence that talk of Britain's 'isolation' as a matter of
deliberate choice became fashionable within a few months of its being
generally realized that France and Russia had come together. Britain's
detached position was thereby rendered all the more conspicuous."^^ From
this, Howard concludes:
Had it not been for her aloofness from the groups of travellers
(the Dual Entente and the Triple Alliance) much less would, in all
probability, have been heard of Britain's deliberate "isolation. "'^5
In all likelihood, this is probably correct, especially since the British had
previously shown little reluctance to involve themselves in European power
politics as the balancer of conflicting interests.
Yet, because British policy was one of non-alliance and because her
non-involvement in the European alliances distinguished her from those other
nations, she was thought to be "isolated" which meant retaining the freedom
to act, unrestrained by commitments to others.
In conclusion, the essence of "isolation" for the British was that
Britain be free from any alliance in the sense of a formal written agreement
pledging her, should a certain stated contingency arise, to go to war in
support of another power; indeed this freedom was sometimes stated in terms
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so comprehensive as to imply, not merely that Britain was not bound by any
alliance, thus defined, but that she was under no treaty obligation ot any
kind that entailed the "casus belli. But it was a policy which did not
exclude cooperation with others when common interests necessitated it.
This is the meaning drawn from Joseph Chamberlain's speech at Wakefield
77in December, 1898.
One crucial question remains: Could British foreign policy, during
the period 1868 to 1902, be defined as isolationism without distorting the
meaning of the concept? In other words, does the concept of isolationism
have any relation to its historical sense if Britain's "splendid isolation"
qualifies as an instance of that policy?
In the light of the criteria of seclusion, non-contact, non-commitment,
and non-involvement in or with others established by the definition explicated
previously, Britain's "splendid isolation" does not constitute a policy of
isolationism. Here, it appears is an example of the meaning of isolation
T 6
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"When I spoke, as I shall speak again, of the splendid isolation of this
country, I gave expression to my deep-rooted conviction that the British
Empire, by which I mean the United Kingdom and her children across the
sea, is well al)]c to defend against all attack its own possessions and its own
exclusive interests. That is a task which we will undertake alone, and in its
performance we ask for no help and wc need no alliances. But there are
other interests which are not ours exclusively, which others have with us in
common, and surely it is not unreasonable to anticipate that in promoting these
interests there shall be a certain amount of cooperation. " (From The Times
,
December 9, 1898.)
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being sufficiently broadened and distorted as to forego its application in a
precise sense.
It should be remembered that during her "splendid isolation" the
British Empire spread around the globe. The fact that the British did not
relinquish their colonial possessions is enough to disqualify her policy as
being isolationist. However, a case might be made that during her
"isolation," Britain did not expand her territory abroad, thus "isolating"
herself in a restrictive sense from expansion opportunities. Such an argument
is countered by the fact that between the years 1870 and 1900, the British
Empire absorbed 4, 754, 000 square miles of land and 88, 000, 000 people. Also
during this period, the aggressive policies of the French, Germans and
Russians on the African continent forced the British to abandon their long-
standing policy of non-intervention in the local politics of the societies with
which they traded. Now, it was imperative that they establish British rule
over these new territories or else face the prospect of French, German and
Russian intervention. All this occurred during the period of "splendid
isolation.
"
During the nineteenth century, it was the British desire to be "self-
serving, to pursue a nationalist program unencumbered by long-term
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obligation and entangling alliance." Yet, the British were unable to
isolate themselves from involvement in European affairs or to prevent
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increasingly burdensome commitments to their empire. The possession
of great power plus the will to maintain that power required commitment.
On this point Grenville submits that:
British interests in the last quarter of the nineteenth
century came into conflict with those of other nations all
over the world. Consequently, no British foreign secretary
could adopt a completely isolated position, even had he sodesired.
The argument for British isolation has been perpetuated through their
reluctance to commit the nation to alliances. There were, in fact, several
occasions when the British government declined to collaborate with other
powers. This is especially true in relation to their refusal to join either the
Triple Alliance or the Dual Entente. Christopher Howard points out, however,
that "All powers decline on certain occasions to collaborate with others in
intervening at particular junctures, if their interests so require. One could
not build a theory of a sustained policy or attitude of 'isolation' on such
episodes. Further, while Britain's Prime Ministers, notably Salisbury,
were not willing to commit the nation to any long standing formal alliances,
they were not reluctant to intervene in the politics of the Continent when
British interests seemed threatened. Again Grenville remarks:
In many respects Salisbury's policy had been anything but
isolationist. His first great state paper of 1, April. 1878,
ended Lord Derby's efforts to hold aloof from continental affairs;
it substituted for a policy of drift an assertion in precise terms
of England's claim to be heard on any settlement of the Eastern
question.
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Further evidence of this contention comes from Harold Temperley and
Lillian Pensoa in their study, FcHmdations^nBri^^
They claim:
Dislike of binding alliances did not prevent Salisburyfrom establishing, and Rosebery and Kimberley from
mamtaining, entente relationships. All were prepared to
admit that an entente might have to be reinforced by
practical cooperation. Therefore, "isolation" is too
strong a term to apply to British policy. ^2
Finally, to argue that British foreign policy in the last third of the
nineteenth century parallels that of Japan and China during their isolation
periods would be a misrepresentation of the meaning of isolationism. Clearly,
at no time in the later nineteenth century did the British pursue a policy of
isolationism in the sense that they had no allies or friends. For as Anne
Laurens suggests, "Britain is no island if by that is meant an isolationist
country proudly protected against outside influences by a natural barrier and
seeking only to remain aloof from the arrogant restlessness of the world. "^^
To adhere to a policy which seeks to limit intervention but remains involved
in the politics of other nations, refuses to join formal alliances while
cooperating in other ways, seeks out trade and cultural ties with other nations,
and is engaged in colonial impcralism is quite different from one which seeks
to withdraw and set apart a nation from the rest of the world. As was stated
82
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before, to be non-aligned is not to be isolated. To limit ones intervention
is not to set apart or suspend contaet from. To categorize British foreign
policy as isolationism is to abandon the essence of the concept, the
consequences of which are unclarity and lack of meaning in the language of
political science.
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CHAPTER IV
ISOLATIONISM AND TRADITIONAL AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
IS
In a farewell address of 1796 George Washington gave this
nation some advice. It was important, but not strange or even
original. In urging the people and their leaders to avoid perm^
nent European alliances, Washington merely expressed a
conviction of long standing, a sentiment even then almost hallowed
by age. Isolationism was a natural, almost a spontaneous reaction
to social and political conditions in Europe and particularly
against Europe's military strife.
A constant premise continually expressed concerning American foreign
policy is that for 150 years isolationism served as the cornerstone upon which
America's foreign policy rested. The notion that isolationism is the sacred
heritage of American diplomacy has found favorable response among large
and diffuse audiences. Nurtured by intellectuals and common men alike, it is
a tradition which has enjoyed acceptance in both public and private circles.
It has been successfully propagated by both proponents and opponents of
isolationism. Even at the present time, the idea that America's successful
beginning as a sovereign nation and its subsequent rise to a position of inter-
national power was due principally to its policy of isolation holds a prominent
position in the mainstream of American political thought.
"'^J. Fred Rippy, America and the Strife of Europe
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The popularity of the isolationist tradition is based principally on
three faetors. First, the physical separateness of the American continent
from Europe and Asia supports the claim that America developed in isolation
from the rest of the world. Travel and communication between the Americas
and other continents were not only difficult and dangerous but time-consuming.
Secondly, there exists the idea that the American experiment in democracy
constituted a unique experience in government from the Europc:m tradition of
monarchial rule. The idea that America was attempting to throw off all
remaining attachments to an elitist and repressive European society proved
to be readily accepted by the American people. The theory that the novelty
of American society and its institutions of government have been preserved
by means of a conscious and consistent policy of isolation remains implanted
in the minds of the American public. Kenneth Thompson maintaincs that
"the notion that isolation is the one means of preserving democracy runs like
a red thread from the views of the founding fathers to Senator Borah to
Senator Robert A. Taft."2
Third, imd probably most important, the popularity of the concept is
a product of the argument that isolationism was the policy advocated and
adhered to by the founding fathers of the United States. Supporters of the
idea that American foreign policy is grounded in a tradition of isolationism
have consistently based their views on the writings of the early American
2Op cit.
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leaders. Most notable among these and the most cited and quoted as evidence
of isolationism are Washington's Farewell Address, Thomas Jefferson's
warning against entangling alliances, and the Monroe Doctrine.
Of the three sources, the most frequently mentioned as an explicit
expression of isolationism is Washington's Farewell Address of 1796.
Leading advocates of American isolationism as William E. Borah find
comfort and support for their position in the warnings of Washington. Speaking
before the United States Senate on February 21, 1919, Borah articulated the
traditional connection between the statements of Washington and isolationism.
When Washington assumed the responsibilities as adminis-
trator of this Government, he immediately set about to change that
condition of affairs: to wit, to separate the European system from
the American system, to withdraw our people from her broils, to
individualize the American Nation, and to divorce us from the
quarrels and turmoils of European life.^
Quoting directly from Washington's text, Borah established the connection:
Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? Why,
by inter-weaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe,
entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European
ambition, rivalship, interests, humor or caprice ?4
Historian J. Fred Rippy is another advocate of the American heritage of
isolationism. In his book America and the Strife of Europe
.
Rippy discusses
at length the pronouncements of the founding fathers, interpreting them as
evidence of the traditional policy of isolationism. Concerning the Farewell Address,
3William E. Borah, American Problems, (Edited by Horace Greene),
New York: Duffield and Company, 1924, p. 72.
"^Thc Farewell Address in William A. Williams, The Shaping of American
Diplomacy, Chicago: Rand McNally, 1956, p. 42.
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Rippy maintains that "Washington merely expressed sentiments which had
long prevailed in the nation as well as in his own mind. "5 Q^^^ing from the
Farewell Address, Rippy supports his claim:
The rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is
in extendmg our commercial relations to have with them as
little political connection as possible
. . . Europe has a set
of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote
relation. Hence, she must be engaged in frequent controversi
the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns.
Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselve
by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politic^
the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships
enmities.
es
s
s or
or
imsFurther proof of isolationism was expressed by Washington, clai
Rippy, when he warned against joining permanent alliances, "maintaining
that it was American policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with the
rest of the world."'''
The writings of Washington are not the only sources for proving that
the founding fathers intended the foreign policy of the United States to be one
of isolationism. In fact, Rippy claims that in the statements of Washington's
contemporaries much stronger assertions can be found. Among the clearest
and most complete are those of John Adams and Thomas Jefferson. In the
early months of the Revolution, Adams declared:
Op. cit.
,
Rippy, p. 8.
Op . cit. , The Farewell Address
, p. 42.
Ibid
.
,
p. 42.
85
That we ought not to enter into any alliance with her (France)
which would entangle us in any future wars in Europe; that
we ought to lay it down, as the first principle and maxim
never to be forgotten to maintain an entire neutrality in all
future European wars
. .
.
^
In 1784, Adams was convinced that "if all intercourse between Europe and
America could be cut off forever, if every ship we have were burnt, and
the keel of another never to be laid, we might still be the happiest people on
earth and, in fifty years, the most powerful."^
Thomas Jefferson also is looked on as a founder of the American
policy of isolation. The most often quoted among his numerous statements
on foreign policy, as evidence of isolation, is that of his Inaugural address
as president in 1801 when he stated the famous maxim for American
relations abroad: "Peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations,
entangling alliances with none, "^^/^l
Finally, the supporters of isolationism look to the Monroe Doctrine as
a major expression of that policy. As important as the Farewell Address was
in establishing the American relationship to Europe, the Monroe Doctrine is
^John Adams, The Life and Works of John Adams, (edited by Charles Francis
Adams), Boston: Little and Brown, 1850, 10 vols, pp. 505-506.
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'''There are other examples of isolationist sentiment running throughout the
writings of such notable American patriots as Alexander Hamilton, Thomas
Paine, Richard Henry Lee and James Monroe. See Rippy and Debo, "The
Historical Background of the American Policy of Isolation," in Smith College
Studies in History, Vol IX, No. 3, 4, April, 1924.
presented as the basic document laying the foundation for the European
relationship with the American continent. According to those who
perceive American foreign policy as traditionally one of isolationism,
there is a definite linkage between the policy established by Washington
and the principles enumerated in the Monroe Doctrine. If the Farewell
Address is the first real public articulation of American isolationism
(In fact, Rippy claims that it constitutes Washington's "rule of isolation."),
the Monroe Doctrine embodies the expansion and refinement of that policy.
In the same speech noted above, William Borah draws the relationship
between the two:
Washington succeeded in establishing the policy that we
should not interfere in European affairs. It would have served
no good purpose and would not have been beneficial to the
American people in the least had we simply remained aloof from
European affairs but had permitted Europe to transfer her
system to the American Continent. Therefore, the Monroe
Doctrine. It was designed to support the policy of Washington.
He had warned against the danger of entering Europe—the
Monroe Doctrine declared that Europe should not enter America.
Permit me to say that one of these cannot stand, in my judge-
ment, without the support of the other. It is an inevitable
result of Washington's teaching that the Monroe Doctrine should
exist
. .
In essence, claim the advocates of American isolation, the Monroe
Doctrine set apart the Old World from the New. Rippy maintains that
"Monroe's doctrine was less the establishment of a precedent than the
confirmation of an old ideal. It merely repeated the maxim of isolationism
'Op
. cit.
,
Rippy, p. 30.
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With emphasis on its expanded American phase, recalled the universal setting,
and once more directed attention to the old antagonist. "13 ^he uniqueness
of the new world was to be preserved by its abstention from the Old and the
adamant separation of the old from the new.
These are the three primary sources from which come the argument
that American foreign policy has been traditionally one of isolationism. By
rooting their argument in the revolutionary writings of the founding fathers,
supporters of this interpretation of American diplomacy and foreign policy
have in essence sought to wrap their case in the American flag and surround
it with testimonies to American patriotism. The success of their efforts
can be measured to a large extent by the popularity of this interpretation
within America. It has yet to be successfully challenged. Even the abandon-
ment of the "traditional policy of American isolationism" after World War H
has failed to discredit the premise that United States foreign policy was
founded in isolationism, and that America owes her power and position in the
world today to adherence to that policy.
The second major purpose of this treatise is to challenge the characteri-
zation of historical and contemporary American foreign policy as one of
isolationism. By means of a thorough examination of the premises and
principles of American foreign policy from its earliest stages, it will be
demonstrated that the concept of isolationism is inapplicable when character-
izing United States' foreign policy. Furthermore, the attempt will be made
to illustrate that the interpretation represented by Rippy, Taft and others is in
1 o
Op cit.
,
Rippy, p. 30.
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essence incorrect, principally as a result of their inability to define and
thus apply in a meaningful manner the concept of isolationism.
Before presenting the arguments against the isolationist interpreta-
tion it might prove useful to discuss the origins of United States foreign
policy and the events surrounding the evolution of the basic tenets of
political and military separation from Europe and commercial expansion.
By way of such a discussion the needed background on the precedents to the
Farewell Address and the Monroe Doctrine can be established. This will
aid in clarifying the arguments challenging the isolationist interpretation.
The Revolutionary Period
It is difficult to prove that in the pre-revolutionary years there was a
general and conscious anti-European sentiment throughout the colonies.
Although many people had endured the difficult voyage across the Atlantic in
search of a new life in a new land, it would be incorrect to say that there
existed universal rejection of the old world. The sentiment was present,
however, especially among the more politically conscious, such as William
Penn who expressed those sentiments of hope for a new life separate and unique
from that of the old world. In a letter to the colonists written in 1710, he said:
Friends, the eyes of many are upon you; the people of
many nations of Europe look on that country as a land of
ease and quiet wishing to themselves in vain the blessings
they conceive you enjoy.
14
Isaac Sharpless, A Quaker Experiment in Government
,
Philadelphia:
A. J. Ferris, 1898, p. 100.
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It is enough for the purposes here to suggest that although there exist no
articulate expressions of overwhelming repudiation of European politics,
the very fact that America held out hope of a new beginning for many early
settlers is indicative of their favorable feelings toward the new world.
Moreover, that such feelings found adamant expression early in the
revolutionary period indicates that they did exist among the early pioneers
regardless of how dormant they were.
The first statements concerning a desire to separate America from
the politics of Europe came early in the revolutionary period. Among the
early advocates of American independence from Europe were John Adams
and Thomas Paine. Adams especially sought to and was largely successful
in separating the new nation from the intrigues of European politics. As
early as 1775, he expressed the idea which was to become the fundamental
tenet of Washington's Farewell Address. Debating the issue of foreign
assistance in the Continental Congress, he said:
. . .
that we ought to lay it down, as a first principle and a
maxim never to be forgotten, to maintain an entire neutrality
in all future European wars; that it never could be our interest
to unite with France in the destruction of England ... On the
other hand, it could never be our duty to unite with Britain in too
great a humiliation of France; that our real, if not our nominal
independence, would consist in our neutrality. If we united with
either nation, in :my future war, we must become too subordi-
nate and dependent on that nation, and should be involved in all
European wars, as we had been hitherto; that foreign powers
would find means to corrupt our people, to influence our councils,
and in time, we should be little better than puppets. We should
be the sport of European intrigues and politics; that, therefore,
in preparing treaties to be proposed to foreign powers, and in
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the instructions to be given to our ministers, we ought to
confine outselves strictly to a treaty of commerce. 15
Thomas Paine was also an early supporter of the position voiced by
Adams. In 1776, he wrote in Common Sense ;
Dependence on Great Britain tends directly to involve
this continent in European wars and quarrels. As Europe
is our market for trade we ought to form no partial connec-
tion with any part of it. It is the true interest of America to
steer clear of European contentions, which she never can do
while, by her dependence on Britain, she is made the make-
weight in the scale of British politics. 16
Adams and Paine in their respective passages argue for independ
from Europe, and in Paine's case, from Britain specifically. Adams lost
his arg-ument against foreign connections when the colonies sought aid
from France in the war against Britain. His warnings did not go unheeded
although it took the experience of the French treaty to justify them. E
though he lost his argument against the French treaty Adams was able,
during the negotiations for French aid, to eliminate many of the dangers
inherent in such a commitment which he had warned against. ^'^
ence
iVen
^^Op. cit
.
,
Adams, Vol II, pp. 505-506.
^^Thomas Paine, Common Sense, New York: Willey Book Company, 1942,
p. 27.
17
Originally, Adams had argued against any foreign assistance, but it
soon became clear to those concerned with the prosecution of the war
that the colonies had no chance of winning without obtaining supplies of
gunpowder and other war materials. Faced with this prospect, it was
difficult for Adams to maintain this position.
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In securing aid from the French in the form of a treaty of alliance,
Adams played a major role. Consistent with his desire to refrain from the
quarrels of Europe, he sought French aid for America, giving only
commercial privileges in return. For his part, Adams thought that
America could negotiate a treaty of foreign assistance and remain aloof
from European quarrels only if certain principles were upheld in the
agreement. These principles included:
1. No political connection. Submit to none of her
authority; receive no governors or officers from her.
2. No military connection. Receive no troops from
her.
3. Only commercial connection; that is, make a treaty
to receive her ships into our ports; let her engage to receive
our ships into her ports; furnish us with arms, cannon, salt-
petre, power, duck, steel. 18
Not all of the Revolutionary leaders were in agreement with Adams
19on these points. ' Some felt that stronger ties should be established with
any European ally who might aid the colonies against Britain. Adams, much
later in his autobiography, recalled the debate when his proposal for a
treaty was put before the CongTess. He wrote:
18
Op
. cit.
,
Adams, Vol. U, pp. 488-489.
19
For example, Richard Henry Lee, Samuel Adams, Patrick Henry
and Elbridge Gerry argued against John Adams on the issue of foreign
assistance. They felt that commercial ties would not be enough to
induce other nations, particularly France, to join the war effort.
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When It came before Congress, it occupied the attention of
that body for several days. Many motions were made to
msert m it articles of entangling alliance, of exclusive
privileges, and of warranties of possession
.
.
.20
The first indication that a majority of Congress agreed with the Adams
arg-ument of non-involvement in the affairs of Europe was the adoption by
that body of the treaty advocated by him. The acceptance of the principles
of non-entanglement, meaning no political or military commitment to Europe,
marked the first appearance of a rising expression of sentiment in favor of
such principles. It is significant that this occurred close to twenty years
before the Farewell Address.
The actual experience of the Americans in their alliance with the
French, beginning in 1778, only succeeded in furthering their suspicions of
Europe and increasing the Americans' desire to separate themselves as
quickly as possible from the intrigues of European politics. Fred Rippy and
Angie Debo in their study, "The Historical Background of the American
Policy of Isolation,
" cite numerous examples of conflict and distrust between
the two allies. It was felt by many American diplomats that France, in
accepting the provisions of the treaty, expected to be able to gain commercial
20
Op. cit.
,
Adams, Vol II, p. 516.
21One conflict of interest between the French and Americans arose as a
result of the willingness on the part of the French to sacrifice American
fishing rights to the British. Rippy and Debo also cite a conversation men-
tioned by John Adams in his diary in which he relates feelings of distrust
towards the French. Adams writes,"
. . . [The French] were our good
friends and allies and had conducted themselves generously and nobly, and
we should be just and grateful. But they might have wishes which we were
not bound by treaty not in justice or gratitude to favor, and these we ought to
be cautious of.
"
war.
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and political concessions from the colonies after the termination of the
It was also thought that the French were sabotaging the American efforts to
gain recognition of their independence from other European governments.
Rippy and Debo confirm this point when they write, "This suspicion that
France was working against American recognition by other courts comes
out frequently in Adams's correspondence and seems to have been shared by
the other American envoys. Dana wrote from St. Petersburg to Adams
that he suspected France of scheming against him there. "^^
The conclusion of the war brought about increased expressions of a
desire to disassociate the American nation from Europe. The warnings of
Adams spoken before the war were now echoed by many prominent Americans.
Alexander Hamilton, on March 24, 1783, expressed his desire to George
Washington to disassociate from Europe and strengthen the domestic society.
He wrote, "It now only remains to make solid establishments within, to
perpetuate our Union, to prevent our being a ball in the hands of European
powers, bandied against each other at their pleasure. "^^ Richard Henry Lee,
an early supporter of alliances, expressed much the same attitude when he
wrote: "I wish most sincerely that the full possession of wisdom and virtue
may make our common country, the United States, independent, indeed not
^^Op. cit., Rippy and Debo, p. 115.
•^Alexander Hamilton, The Works of Alexander Hamilton, ed.
,
Henry
Cabot Lodge, New York: G. P. Putnam's sons, 1904, 12 vols.. Vol DC,
p. 327.
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of one but of all the nations upon earth. ^^^^^ expressions came from
John Adams: "I confess I have sometimes thought that after a few years it
will be the best thing we can do to recall every minister from Europe, and
send embassies only on special occasions, "^^ and from George Mason,
"I wish America would put her trust only in God and herself and have as
little to do with the politics of Europe as possible. "^6
One other circumstance out of which the tenet of political separation
from Europe originated was the war between France and Britain and the
subsequent event of the American proclamation of neutrality in 1793.
Previous to this, the United States had signaled its intention to avoid
European entanglement by its refusal to join the League of Armed Neutrality,
a collection of nations attempting to unite in the effort to protect their
commercial interests. (The United States had reluctantly withdrawn its
application from the League only after considerable debate and only because
it was attempting to establish the principle of non-alliance.) Rippy and
Debo maintain that "Congress decided in 1783 to remain aloof from an
European convention because participation would violate the 'fundamental
policy' of the United States. This is probably the first instance of an action
24
Richard Henry Lee, The Letters of Richard Henry Lee, (collected
and edited by James Curtus Ballagh), New York: Macmillian, 1911-14,
2 volumes. Vol.
,
LL, p. 280.
2^0p._cit.
,
Adams, Vol. VIII, p. 37.
Kate Mason Rowland, The Life of George Mason , New York: G. P. Putnam's
Sons, 1892, 2 volumes. Vol II, p. 47.
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destined to be repeated many times in the history of American detachment
from general European conferences."^'^
By the time of the outbreak of war between France and Britain in 1793.
the desire to abstain from European affairs was firmly rooted in the American
conscience. The ensuing proclamation of neutrality by the Washington
Administration was evidence of consistent application and adherence to that
principle. After much debate among those concerned with the course of
American foreign policy, the members of Washington's administration,
including those two archrivals and political opponents Alexander Hamilton
and Thomas Jefferson and the Congress agreed with the terms and restric-
tions of the Neutrality Proclamation. (Their only major disagreement was
on how to explain away the French alliance of 1778.) Again, Rippy and Debo
confirm the point concerning the consistency of American policy up to the
Farewell Address. They maintain that "The Neutrality Proclamation was the
natural expression of a policy that had long since come to be regarded as a
fundamental principle of American intercourse with foreign nations. "28/29
Besides the desire for political and military detachment from Europe,
commercial interests influenced early American foreign policy to a large
27Op
.
cit
.
,
Rippy and Debo, p. 124.
28The arrival of the French Minister plenipotentiary to the United States,
Edmond Genet, in 1793, and his subsequent activities on behalf of his
government constituted an early test for the United States policy of neutrality.
President Washington's request for Genet's recall was further evidence of
American desires to stay out of European politics.
29Op
. cit
.
,
Rippy and Debo, p. 163.
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extent. There is much proof that the American Revolution was a partial
result of the British mercantilist activities toward the American colonial
economy. One expert Curtis Nettles, relates in an article on the
history of the mercantilists' activities in the seventeenth and eighteenth
31
centuries. He reports how Britain, during this period, through the
mercantilist practices of trade and manufacturing restrictions, had managed
to achieve extensive economic control over the colonies. Nettles claims
that the situation became so oppressive to the colonial commercial interests
that,
In its total effect, British policy as it affected the
colonies after 1793 was restrictive, injurious, negative.
It offered no solutions of problems. In the meantime, the
colonists having lived so long under the rule of mercantilism
had become imbued with mercantilist ideas. If the British
imperium would not allow them to grow and expand, if it
would not provide a solution of the central problem of the
American economy, the colonists would have to tal^e to
themselves the right and the power to guide their economic
development. They would find it necessary to create a new
authority that would foster American shipping and commerce,
make possible the continued growth of settlement, and above
all, stimulate the growth of domestic manufacturing industries.
30There is much controversy concerning the effect of the British Mer-
cantilist practices on the American economy. For another view see
George Louis Beer, The Commercial Policy of England Toward the American
Colonies, New York: Peter Smith, 1948, and Louis M. Hacker, The Course
of American Economic Growth and Development
, New York: Wiley, 1970.
See "British Mercantilism and the Economic Development of the Colonies,"
The Journal of Economic History
,
XII No. 2 (Spring 1952), pp. 105-114.
Also Curtis Nettles, "British Policy and Colonial Money Supply," Economic
History Review
, Vol III, 1931-32, pp. 219-245.
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Thus, another result of English mercantilism was the
American Revolution and the creation thereafter of a
mercantilist state on this side of the Atlantic. 32
It is possible to reach the conclusion as does Charles Beard in An
Economic Interpretation of the Constitution that members of the Second
Constitutional Congress had considerable vested interest in the commercial
policy and the expansion of American trade because they constituted the
economic elite within the colonies. Although Beard may have overstated his
33
case a bit, it can be claimed, as Felix Gilbert does, that:
A reflection of the economic motive can be seen in
the close connection which in American eyes, existed
between commerce and foreign policy. Of course, it was
natural for people whose main contacts with the outside
world were those of trade and commerce to regard these
activities as the principal object of foreign relations
. . .
Thus, the existence or non-existence of commercial rela-
tions with other powers appeared as the touchstone of
participation in a state system as an independent power.
Throughout the actual revolutionary period there is ample proof of
the desire on the part of the Americans that every effort should be made
to develop and expand the colonial commerce. John Adams, while arguing
against political involvement, maintained, "I wish for nothing but
commerce, a mere marine treaty with them. "^5 Earlier, he had stated
32
Ibid
.
,
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•^•^See D. W. Brogan, "The Quarrel Over Charles Austin Beard and the
American Constitution, " Economic History Review
,
Vol. XVIII, 1965,
pp. 199-223.
34
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that in dealing with Europe "We ought to confine ourselves strictly to a
treaty of commerce. "36 i„ ^is restrictions to be upheld in any treaty
made with France. Adams again insisted that only commercial connections
could be made. Thomas Paine was another who spoke in favor of commercial
dealings with other nations. From Common Sense comes Paine's contention
that "America's plan is commerce, and that well attended to, will secure
us the peace and friendship of all Europe; because it is the interest of all
Europe to have America a free port. "^^ Needless to say. it was also in the
interest of America that she be a free port, for this was the only way her
dependence upon British commerce could be broken. Other statements
displaying a desire to keep the commercial interests of America in the
forefront of foreign policy early in the Revolution came from Benjamin
Franklin and Robert Morris. These statements, added to the fact recorded
by John Adams that the first debate of the Continental Congress concerned
the state of trade and the question whether colonies could exist without
commercial ties abroad, bolster the argument that the foreign policy
decisions of the early statesmen were influenced by commercial interests.
This fact became even more apparent after the end of the war with
Britain in 1783. Despite the United States having refused to join the League
of Armed Neutrality, commercial expansion was very much a motive of its
3 6
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. ,
Vol. II, p. 506.
37
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foreign policy. Even before the end of the war, the American nation had
signed commercial treaties with Holland, Sweden and Prussia.
The Proclamation of Neutrality in 1793, was thought to be a way to
further the commercial interests of the United States. By remaining neutral,
not only would the Americans avoid involvement politically and militarily
in the war, but they could expand their trade by selling to both belligerents.
Furthermore, the announcement of neutrality meant, as has been discussed,
the abandonment of the French treaty of 1778. The American economy
depended on trade with Great Britain as it had during the entire colonial
period. As a result, the fiscal policy of the Washington administration
under Alexander Hamilton depended in large part on the acquiescence of the
British. Neutrality was one means of possibly gaining that acquiescence
(The Jay Treaty is another), as it meant undercutting the French alliance.
A. H. Bowman suggests that "Hamilton and his supporters were motivated by
devotion to the revenue-producing commercial connection with England and
to the course England represented rather than by a concern with America's
real interests. "^^ Here again, evidence exists that the commercial interest
of the United States played a significant role in the development of American
foreign policy prior to the Farewell Address.
This brief history of the evolution of the principal motives of
American foreign policy, namely, political separation from Europe
38, „Albert II. Bowm;in, "Jefferson, Hamilton, and American Foreign Policy ,
"
Political Science Quarterly
,
Vol. 71, 1956, p. 33.
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and commercial expansion, reveals the circumstances and sentiments
later expressed in Washington's Farewell Address and the Monroe Doctrine.
It is the interpretation of these two documents and the explicit and implicit
meaning attached to each that constitutes the thrust of the challenge to the
isolationist interpretation.
The Farewell Address
It is generally conceded that Washington's Farewell Address, delivered
at the end of his second term as president of the new American nation, is
the first major political pronouncement of importance. Its importance lies
in the fact that the principles and maxims articulated by Washington were to
guide the nation through a century of growth and maturity until it took its
rightful place in the international community.
When Washington delivered his Farewell Address, there were two
principal motives behind it. One concerned the domestic situation.
Washington addressed himself to the potential problem of domestic political
strife. Basically, Washington warned that political disunity of the kind
apparent between the Federalists and the Republicans posed a grave threat
to the future of the Union. Secondly, Washington sought to articulate the
principles of foreign policy which would guide and protect the nation from
foreign interests. Many have claimed that Washington set down principles
of American isolationism, and that he meant for the United States to pursue
a policy of isolationism. In contrast, the point argued here is that Washington
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did not mean for the United States to adhere to that policy. Rather than
isolationism, American foreign policy has been, from its very inception,
guided by maxims of political and diplomatic independence, neutrality a^d
commercial expansion.
Drawing upon the experience of twenty years of national independence
and his perception of established American interests, Washington concluded
that:
The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations
IS, m extendmg our commercial relations, to have with
them as little political connection as possible. So far as we
have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with
perfect good faith. Here, let us stop.^^
The question must be raised as to whether or not this "great rule of
conduct" constitutes a conscious policy of isolationism. Advocates of such
an interpretation contend that it does do so. There are two points which
appear to contradict such an interpretation. First, and foremost, is
Washington's contention that while America should remain politically
uninvolved, commercial ties were to be maintained and encouraged. Implicit
in Washington's position is that commercial interests are in essence non-
political and can be separated from the political realm. This contention was
basic to American political theory at this time and can be traced to the early
revolutionary-period debates over soliciting aid. Some American merchants
in their desire to expand commercial interests and holdings perpetuated the
idea that commercial ties would not involve the United States in the politics
39
Op . cit. , The Farewell Address
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of Europe, and it was in the best interest of a developing nation to encourage
such connections. In other words, commercial interests, being essentially
non-political, did not present any danger to the nation as they were not
susceptible to political intrigue. Supporters of the isolationist interpretation
point to this idea and contend that since commerce was of non-political nature
it did not play any important part in developing the political stance of America
in terms of foreign policy. That is, foreign policy is concerned with
principles guiding political relationships and, therefore, America in her
pursuance of a policy of political separation from Europe was adhering to
isolationism.
This contention rests upon dubious foundations. The theory that
commerce is of a non-political nature is Utopian and demonstrates a certain
naivete" on the part of the Founding Fathers. There is much evidence that
commercial and political interests are intricately United. Indeed, the efforts
at acquiring control over their economic destiny meant that they first had to
win their political independence. Furthermore, commercial interests must
be protected; thus, the need for military establishments which break down
the facade of non-political interests. Political realists such as Alexander
Hamilton were well aware that foreign commerce could not escape involve-
ment in power politics. Writing in the Federalist
,
he posed the question:
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Has commerce hitherto done anything more than change
the objects of war.
. . . Have there not been as many wars
founded upon commercial motives since that has become the
prevailing system of nations as were before occasioned by the
cupidity of territory or dominion? 40
In speaking of Hamilton's position, Felix Gilbert suggests that "To him,
regulation of commercial relations remained subordinate to power politics.
Commerce was a weapon in the struggle of power politics, in the arrange-
ment of their commercial relations, nations did not follow idealistic
principles but only their interests. "^''^
The importance of this position is that it negates the argument that
foreign policy is made without regard to commercial interests. Consequently,
a nation desiring to isolate itself from political entrapment, as did the
United States, cannot at the same time pursue a policy of commercial
expansion. Isolationism requires abstention both politically and commercially
or it is not isolationism.
This is not to say that commercial isolation was not advocated by some
colonials. The Second Continental Congress, hoping to bring Britain to her
Imees, cut off all commerce with that country and then for a brief period
followed this with a complete interdiction of all commerce. (These measures
proved to be disastrous not only to American trade but especially to the war
effort.) Both Jefferson and John Adams expressed sentiments of complete
40
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isolation at times. Jefferson wrote in 1785:
You ask what I thinl< of the expedience of encouraging
our states to be commercial? Were I to indulge my own
theory, I should wish them to practice neither commerce
nor navigation, but to stand with respect to Europe precisely
on the footing of China. We should thus avoid wars, and
all our citizens would be husbandmen. 42
Earlier, Adams had suggested that America might recall all its ministers
and send no more even for commercial reasons. Yet, as Gilbert maintains,
complete isolation was not possible "for it would mean that the Americans
would give up the most of their commerce to live by their agriculture. Such
an option existed in theory only."'^^
The second part of the argument against the isolationist interpretation
of the Farewell Address is that Washington did not advocate the abandon-
ment of existing political and commercial commitments. If the goal of
American foreign policy were indeed isolation, it would have been necessary
for the United States to discard any and all existing ties with foreign parties.
This Washington clearly was not prepared to do. For not only would it have
had grave commercial consequences, but such a move would greatly damage
American credibility in the international community.
While cognizant of the dangers that these relations presented,
Washington was still reluctant to forego a policy of complete separation on
all accounts from Europe.
'^^Op. cit.
,
Jefferson, Vol. IV, p. 469.
43Op . cit.
,
Gilbert, p. 74.
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Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation?
Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by
interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe,
entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European
ambition, rivalship, interest, humor, or caprice?
It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent
alliances with any portion of the foreign world so far, I
mean as we are now at liberty to do it.
. . .
Taking care always to keep ourselves by suitable
establishments on a respectable defensive posture, we may
safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary
emergencies.
From these passages most observers draw the conclusion that American
foreign policy was isolationist, implemented through the principles of non-
alliance and non-entanglement. However, careful analysis of Washington's
words proves this conclusion incorrect. In the first place, while Washington
did warn against permanent alliances (this in response to the problems
arising out of the French Alliance of 1778), he clearly states that temporary
alliances are to be employed as a means of defending or enhancing American
45interests^ In fact, as one observer notes, history shows that "neither
^^Op. cit. , The Farewell Address
,
p. 42.
The meaning of the term "alliance" in the eighteenth century may again
raise the hopes of those who argue the case that commercial interests can be
separated from politics. F. Gilbert, in his book To the Farewell Address ,
points out that during the eighteenth century there developed a distinction
between political alliances and commercial alliances, the result being that
it was possible to have an alliance with foreign nations and yet remain separated
politically from them. It might well be that this was the meaning given to the
distinction between "permanent alliances" and "temporary alliance" by
Washington, although there is no hint that this is the case. Even so, the
argument that commerce does involve a nation in the politics of foreign nations
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Washington nor Jefferson intended that the United States should refrain
permanently from the exercise of its due influence in matters which properly
concern the peace and welfare of the community of nations. Washington did
not object to alliances for special emergencies, nor did Jefferson object to
special alliances for the accomplishment of definite objects. "'^^ As has
been discussed, the precedence of employing alliances has already been
established, even of the permanent type, during the early years of the nation's
diplomatic history. The conclusion can be drawn that to characterize
America's traditional policy as "non-alliance" may be dubious in light of these
events.
Secondly, analysis of the concept "non-entanglement" done in the
sophisticated and thorough manner that Albert Weinberg manages in "The
Historical Meaning of the American Doctrine of Isolation" provokes the
conclusion that "America's Index Prohibitorum ends at a point that leaves,
47believe it or not, as much outside as within." First applied in a pejorative
sense to the existing alliance systems of the eighteenth century, an entanglement
overrides such a distinction. Regardless of whether or not an alliance is one
labeled "traite d'alliance offensive et defensive" or "traite de commerce,"
the agreements reached in each have in some way involved political maneuver-
ing. Or they may at sometime cause interests to clash which will in all
probability have political overtones.
^^John H. Latone, From Isolation to Leadership
,
(Revised), New York:
Doubleday, Page and Company, 1922, p. 4.
^'^Albert K. Weinberg, "The Historical Meaning of the American Doctrine of
Isolation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 34, 1940, p. 545.
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"in international life as in the love life, is not a mere association but a
relationship so intimate that two destinies become intertwined-and by
implication not for better but for worse. "48 j^^.^^^^ expressed by John
Adams during the debate over joining in alliance with France and thus
destroying America's "real independence," this sentiment was confirmed
by the Farewell Address. 4^ Furthermore, claims Weinberg, "Americans
became aware that the attribute of entanglement was not peculiar to alliances,
but must be watched for throughout international life
. . . What is really
envisaged in non-entanglement is freedom of action in so far as it is
preserved through the avoidance of certain political relationships with others. "^^
In explaining the specific nature of these relationships, Weinberg concludes:
In sum, non-entanglement is the absence of voluntarily
incurred relationships, formal or informal, which remove
the substantial control of the nation's action, or even of its
experience from its own choice by placing it in the will,
influence, or career of other nations. ^1
48
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49John Adams wrote in 1777, "I do not have to be entangled in the politics of
Europe." Common Sense
,
(Philadelphia, 1776, et al . 38) Thomas Jefferson
also used this term, but later in 1787, he wrote, "I know too that it is a maxim
with us, and I thinly it a wise one, not to entangle ourselves with the affairs of
Europe. " (Paul L. Ford, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson
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IV, p. 83.)
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Given this definition, non-entanglement as a maxim of foreign policy
differs greatly from the principles of isolationism. For while it does
exclude relationships between nations which tie together two destinies into
one, it does not prohibit "single-handed action from interposition to war and
when in accord with comity, in behalf of world interest; moreover, even
intervention in behalf of world interest is allowable when there is a
coincident national equity. Nor is entanglement seen in free international
collaboration such as consultation and coincident action. "^^ Humanitarian
and economic activity on an international level for the purposes of mankind
also not conceived of as being relationships of entanglement. In fact. Weinberg-
concluded, "Fundamentally, nothing is entangling or disentangling but
thinking makes it so. "^"^
Isolationism prohibits all connections and activity on an international
level. The doctrine of non-entanglement bars only "certain relationships. "
Given Washington's statements, it seems clear that while he was advocating
a policy of non-entanglement, meaning that America and Europe had separate
interests and destinies which it would be unwise (and dangerous for America)
to mesh, (except for commercial ties) that policy should not be confused with
isolationism. For as A. B. Hart maintains, "The diplomatic history of the
country shows that the government has never hesitated to assert itself
^^Ibid
.
,
p. 545.
^^Ibid.
,
p. 545.
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anywhere on the globe if its interests seemed sufficient. "^^
Finally, the claim that the Farewell Address embodied a clear-cut
statement of isolation can be challenged by arguing that the Farewell
Address was directed at the French. Mention has already been made of the
problems arising out of the alliance with Franco, particularly during the
peace negotiations of 1782. The French alliance had become increasingly
embarrassing to the Americans after the declaration of war between the
French and English in 1793. Although there was no binding legal commitment
for the United States to come to the aid of the French, there was a moral
obligation which caused discomfort among some Americans. It was lil^ely
that the French expected reciprocal support in return for their earlier
assistance. The Americans, in an effort to establish their commercial interests
abroad and their political independence from Europe, could not realistically
support the French. French expectations of American support amounted to a
case of overt European manipulation of American national interests, which,
if permitted, would end in the subordination of American interests to those
of Europe.
As a result of these circumstances, one of the purposes behind the
Farewell Address was to strike a powerful blow against European meddling
in.American affairs. As Samuel Bemis pointed out, the message was
54
Albert Bushnell Hart, The Foundations of American Foreign Policy ,
New York: The Macmillian Company, 1910, p. 2.
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especially directed toward the French, for while "it did not disown the
French alliance, it taught a patronizing ally that we were independent and
a sovereign nation, and that the French Republic could not use in America
the tool that had been so successful with the border satellite states in Europe,
the lever of political opposition to overthrow any government that stood in
the way of French policy, purpose and interest. "^^ Through his policy
statements on avoidance of foreign alliance and entanglements, Washington
addressed himself to these questions of independence and national sovereignty,
not isolation. Samuel Bemis summarizes the position taken here concerning
the formative period of American foreign policy:
What we have generally construed as a policy of "isolation"
we ought really to interpret as a policy of vigilant defense
and maintenance of sovereign national independence against
foreign meddling in our own intimate domestic concerns.
The Monroe Doctrine
Although the Farewell Address is most often mentioned as the principal
source of the basic tenets of American foreign policy, it can be argued that
the Monroe Doctrine is a more definitive statement. Because it was issued
at a later period, the Monroe Doctrine should clarify any changes or
inconsistencies in foreign policy that may have occurred after the Farewell
55Samuel F. Bemis, "Washington's Farewell Address: A Foreign Policy of
Independence," American Historical Review
,
Vol. XXXIX (January, 1934), p. 267.
56
Ibid
.
,
p. 268.
Address. The Monroe Doctrine does contain statements relating to the
heretofore unstated American postion that Europe's proper relationship
with the American continents was to be one of non-involvement. This is
significant to the purposes of this paper, as advocates of the isolationist
interpretation point to the principles of foreign policy in the Monroe
Doctrine as a complete statement of American isolation from Europe and
American insistence that Europe keep out of the American continents. It
was, they contend, the final step in separating the new world from the old,
based upon the uniqueness of the American experiment and the desire of
Americans to have the freedom to develop apart from the intrigues and
embroilments of European politics. It is the logical extension of the tenets
of isolationism as enumerated in the Farewell Address.
The challenge to this position comes from two principal sources other
than the assertion previously made and defended that the Farewell Address
does not embody principles of isolationism. These sources consist of the
American desire for commercial expansion and the political motives behind
the establishment of the Doctrine.
There is evidence that a major motive behind the Monroe Doctrine
stemmed from the possibility of increased American commerce in South
America if the European powers could be prevented from re-establishing
the colonial status of the former Spanish colonies then on their way
toward independence. Important American commercial interests existed
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in Hispanic America by 1823. In his article. "United States Commerce
with Latin America at the Promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine," Charles
Lyon Chandler presents an extensive analysis of those interests. He
states that by 1823 approximately a fifth of the exports of the United States
went to Latin America, and an equal proportion was imported from there.
Also, claims Chandler, this proportion had been increasing at a fast and
steady rate. 57 since 1812, most of the mainland provinces of Latin
America had become de facto independent of Spain, which meant that the
commerce of those provinces was thrown open to the world. Having acquired
new markets in those former Spanish provinces, the United States as well
as the European powers developed considerable stake in the existing status
quo.
There was fear among the Americans, notably Secretary of State,
John Quincy Adams, that the commercial connections of the European powers
in the provinces of South America would eventually lead to a re-establish-
ment of colonial rule over them. Adams "disliked colonialism not alone
because it was a reminder of political subordination, but because it was
57Charles Lyon Chandler, "United States Commerce with Latin America at
the Promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine," in William A. Williams The Shaping
of American Diplomacy
,
Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1956, p. 136.
The table presented below and compiled by Chandler demonstrates the rapid
and substantial growth in trade between the two American continents.
1821 1822 1823
% of Total U.S. Exports to Hispanic America 15.0 16.2 18.8
% of Total U.S. Imports from Hispanic America 17. 7 16. 8 22.0
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connected in his mind with the commercial monopoly and the exclusion of
the United States from the markets of the New World. "^8 This fear and
dislike of colonialism, articulated in cabinet debates by John Q. Adams,
became a principle laid down in the Monroe Doctrine.
The American continents, by the free and independent condition
which they have assumed and maintained, are henceforth not to be
considered as subjects for future colonialization by any European
powers.
. .
.60
There can be little doubt that the commercial interests of the United
States would be greatly aided by the enforcement of this principle in contrast
to the European re-assertion of control over Hispanic America. Not only
would colonial rule mean favored treatment for the mother countries (in fact,
a monopoly over natural resources), but it would also make possible the
exclusion of United States' trade interests with South America. At this time
58Dexter Perkins, "The Monroe Doctrine" in William A. Williams' The
Shaping of American Diplomacy
.
Chicago: Rand McNally, 1956, p. lisT
r q
John Quincy Adams had a profound effect on the ideas and maxims of the
Monroe Doctrine. William F. Reddaway, who is perhaps the best critic of
the history of the Monroe Doctrine maintains that the document contains to a
great extent the ideas of Adams. See William F. Reddaway, The Monroe
Doctrine
,
Cambridge, England: University Press, 1898. Albert B. Hart in
his The Monroe Doctrine; an Interpretation. Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
1916, concurs, suggesting that Adams was the primary force behind the doctrine.
President Monroe's inability to give real leadership was overcome by the force,
influence and foresight of Adams. As a result, the Monroe Doctrine includes the
positions espoused by John Quincy Adams including avoiding any discussion of the
monarchy or home government of European nations, support for a unilateral
declaration by the United States, and embodiment of his position on the question of
colonialization.
George F. Tucker, The Monroe Doctrine
,
Boston: George R. Reed, 1885
p. 18.
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the idea of colonial acquisition was repugnant to American statesmen. Thei
was little possibility that they would join in the move to re-establish colonial
rule in the Western Hemisphere. To do so would only damage their
revolutionary heritage and the claim to the uniqueness of their domestic
experiment.
The maintenance of free trade was an important motive behind the
Monroe Doctrine, yet it did not represent a departure from earlier American
policy. It was a consistent application of that policy of commercial expansion
expounded as early as 1778. As was true of its relationship with Europe, the
United States involvement in South America was of a commercial nature.
Therefore, to claim that commerce played an important part in development
of the tenets of the Monroe Doctrine suggests that the principles which gxuded
the founding fathers in their foreign relations were still at work and were
embodied in the Monroe Doctrine. It also raises questions about the isolation-
ist's claim that the doctrine was established on the principles of an isolationist
foreign policy.
The second point of contention with the isolationist interpretation of
the Monroe Doctrine concerns the political motives for its implementation.
While advocates of the isolationist interpretation and those opposed to it
agree that the Monroe Doctrine establishes firmly the American intention of
political separation from Europe, they differ on the motives behind such a
policy. Isolationists interpret the statements of President Monroe as logical
and consistent extensions of isolationism enumerated by the Founding Fathers.
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Those who challenge such an interpretation maintain that this refinement
of the American policy of independence from European politics was
motivated first of all by the conditions surrounding the balance of power and,
secondly, by the United States' desire to retain a pre-eminent power position
in the Western hemisphere.
With the movements in this hemisphere, we are of
necessity more immediately connected, and by causes which
must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers.
The political system of the allied powers is essentially
different in this respect from that of America. ... We owe
it therefore to candor and to the amicable relations existing
between the United States and those powers to declare that we
should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system
to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace
and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any
European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere.
But with the Governments who have declared their independence
and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great
consideration and on just principles, acknowledged we could not
view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them or
controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European
power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly
disposition toward the United States. ^1
This message of warning was motivated by the American desire to
influence the balance of power among the European powers. American involve-
ment in balance-of-power politics was nothing new by 1823. Long before the
Monroe Doctrine, in fact, since the nation's inception, American statesmen
had recognized that their interests and security were related to the maintenance
of a balance of power on the European continent. Hans Morgenthau maintains
Ibid., p. 19.
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that:
We have always striven to prevent the development of
conditions in Europe which would be conducive to an European
nation's interfering in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere
or contemplating a direct attack upon the United States. Those
conditions would be most likely to arise if an European nation,
its predominance unchallenged within Europe, could look
across the sea for conquest without fear of being menaced at
the center of its power; that is, in Europe itself. G2
He goes on to suggest that the United States has consistently opposed those
powers who demonstrated the capability of dominating Europe and has
supported those powers who have attempted to restore the balance. It is
not surprising that the formula for American foreign policy espoused by
John Adams early in the American Revolution of "Independence, confederation
and alliance" was based upon principles regulating the balance of power.
Addressing himself to the formula and thoughts of John Adams, M. W. Graham
concludes:
. . .
He therefore appears to have concluded from the evidence
of the antecedent colonial experience that since the colonies
had enjoyed a condition of non-aggression while Britain was
balanced by France, the United States of America would enjoy
independence and freedom when and while holding the balance
between England and France.
In short, it appears that the inarticulate major premise of Adams'
"'^Hans J. Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interest, New York: Alfred
A.. Knopf, 1952, p. 5.
^•^Malbone W. Graham, "The Revolutionary Leaders and Foreign Policy,
"
in William A. Williams, The Shaping of American Diplomacy
,
Chicago:
Rand McNally and Company, 1956, p. 23.
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reasoning was that the United States had merely to adjust the existing
balance of power and then, by an abstentive neutrality, to hold it so. The
openly expressed terms were short-term alliance, if alliance at all there
must be full freedom of commerce and no territorial guarantee.
It was this attempt to adjust and influence the European power balance
which partly motivated Monroe's warning. Knowing that the extension of
European colonial rule to the former Hispanic American continent would
mean the extension of balance-of-power politics into the Western Hemisphere,
Monroe was determined to prevent it if he could. He feared that if the
European balance of power was allowed to become a part of the Western
Hemisphere that delicate power balance would be even harder to maintain.
It would also mean that the United States would be directly involved as a
participant in the balance instead of influencing it indirectly from across the
wide reaches of the Atlantic Ocean. American interests could not help but
be entangled with those of Europe if the European system was allowed entrance
into the Western Hemisphere.
^%id
.
,
p. 23.
^^It should be mentioned that not all scholars of the Monroe Doctrine agree
that Europe was intent on extending its colonial rule over the ex-colonies of
South America. Dexter Perkins is one who questions the validity of such a
contention.
Regardless of whether such a movement was afoot among the European powers,
the fact remains that- Monroe and his Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams,
were under the impression that such an occurence was true and made policy
decisions based upon it.
118
In connection with the balance-of-power motive is the fact that
the Americans desired, as Alexander Hamilton declared in 1787, "to
become the arbiter of Europe in America, and to be able to incline the
balance of European competitions in this part of the world as our interests
may dictate. ".In order to accomplish such ends, Hamilton advocated in
the Federalist:
Let the Thirteen States, bound together in a strict and
indissoluble union, concur in erecting one great American
system, superior to the control of all trans -atlantic force or
influence, and able to dictate the terms of the connection
between the old and the new world.
The goal was American ascendancy in the Western Hemisphere.
By 1823, it has become clear that the United States' "predominance was not
likely to be effectively threatened by any one American nation or combination
6T
of nations acting without support from outside the hemisphere." In order
to preserve the unique position of the United States in the Western Hemisphere,
Monroe dictated in his address the terms of the relationship which were
acceptable to the United States between the old and new world. In other words,
the Monroe Doctrine was not a statement of isolationism but was the
establishment of the political relationship between European and American
continents, both North and South, which would guarantee United States'
predominance in American affairs and would not prove injurious to its national
^^Op. cit.
,
Hamilton, The Federalist , No. xi.
67
Op. cit. , Morgenthau, p. 5.
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interest.
Conclusion
In summarizing the indictment against the isolationist interpretation
of early American foreign policy two other points should be made. The first
of these centers around the fact that nowhere in the literature of the revolution-
ary period is there any appearance of the term "isolation" to depict American
foreign policy. From the earliest days of the First Continental Congress,
John Adams contended that "our nominal independence would consist in our
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neutrality." Other statements by other American colonial leaders include
the use of non-entanglement, independence, neutrality and avoidance of foreign
alliance to describe the principles of foreign policy. There is no mention of
a "policy of isolation" which evokes the conclusion that the application of the
concept of isolationism to American foreign relations is due to later interpre-
tations. There is substantial evidence that a foreign policy embodying the
historical principles of isolationism was seriously considered by the colonists
and applied early in the war only to be rejected as unacceptable because of the
disastrous repercussions to commercial and war interests.
^^Op. cit.
,
Adams, Vol. II, p. 505.
^^Much the same was true of Jefferson's attempt at complete isolation
through the commercial embargo of 1807-1809. It, too, was a failure because
American commercial interests suffered.
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Secondly, if American foreign policy was indeed isolationist, there
would have been no need for the young nation to announce its intention of
adherence to the principles of neutrality once war broke out between France
and England in 1793. A nation in isolation need not proclaim its impartiality
in the conflicts of others as it does not possess the means for involvement.
Further, impartiality in a contest does not denote isolation from it. By
proclaiming its neutrality, America sought recognition not of its isolation
but of its rights as a neutral power. A. H. Bowman claims that the real
issue was not neutrality, but whether the United States could maintain
freedom of action (meaning commercial dealings with both belligerents) and
diplomatic independence. Samuel Bemis agrees, noting that the "proclama-
tion of neutrality was a tangible expression, not of isolation but of diplomatic
independence. "'^^ other words, the Proclamation of Neutrality was a
blueprint to keep the United States out of the embroilments of European politics
and to establish its rights as a neutral commercial party. The correctness
of such a contention is made more apparent because America went to war in
1812 partially in defense of the neutral rights. It did not go to war in support
of isolation.
Finally, there are in the challenge to the isolationist interpretation of
American foreign policy consistent themes. One is the consideration given
the commercial interests of the United States in arriving at policy decisions
and direction. The second, is the desire for independence and non-entangle-
ment from European politics although this did not mean a rejection of its
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culture or historical ties. Finally, there is consistency in the acknowledge
ment that the European balance of power played an important part from the
very beginning in determining United States foreign policy and America's
relationship to that balance.
Towards A New Definition
This is not to say that the isolationism interpretation lacks consistency.
It is consistent in its misinterpretation of the foundations of American foreign
policy and its misapplication of the concept of isolationism to that policy.
However, the isolationism interpretation can claim one success. It has
managed to bestow a name or la^bel on American foreign policy no matter how
incorrect that label may be; not that there is a shortage of attempts to
characterize American foreign policy in other ways than isolationism. Arthur
Vandenberg in his book, The Trail of a Tradition, labels the traditional foreign
policy as "Nationalism, " a policy striving to maintain the independence of the
nation. He rejects "isolation" and "internationalism" as improper definitions of
that policy. Vandenberg claims that "Ours is the case for the defense—the
'national' defense. . . . ours is the trail of self-sufficient, self-reliant, self-
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determining America. " Kenneth Thompson suggests that the true characterization
of America's foreign policy rests in the policy of national reserve, meaning
^Arthur H. Vandenberg, The Trail of a Tradition , New York: G. P.
Putnam's Sons, 1926, p. vii.
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"a deliberate and more or less regular abstention from certain political
72
relationships. " Other labels such as "political isolation, " neutrality,
"Americanism" and "insulation," while possibly accurate at times, fail to
renect the basic tenets upon which American foreign policy was founded.
It is possible to arrive at a definition of American foreign policy
other than those presented above and other than isolationism. Throughout
the early period, her statesmen had been primarily concerned with
guaranteeing the nation's independence. By characterizing American foreign
policy as one of independence, it is meant that the nation retained "freedom of
action" in its commercial and political or diplomatic ventures abroad.
Independence for the Founding Fathers meant the ability to act unilaterally,
to define the nation's interests separate from any others. Or as Albert
Weinberg states, "to remain non-entangled." Non-alliance in terms of
refusing to join in any permanent alliance system was a means to that end.
Neutrality also was a means of maintaining the nation's independence primarily
in time of war. It is possible, were one inclined, to make use of present-day
concepts in international language to characterize America's traditional
foreign policy as one of "neutralism"; that is, a policy seeking independence
in international power politics through political and military non-alliance.
This does not prevent participation in joint efforts to serve humanity or rule
out unilateral action in behalf of the national interest.
7
^p . cit. , Thompson, p. 165.
The Evolution of Isolationism in American History
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At first, it seems surprising that the isolationist interpretation of
United States foreign policy with the amount of evidence brought to bear at
different times against it has remained fixed in the minds of most Americans
for such a long period. Yet, in many ways, the use of the term "isolatio)!-
ism" to label foreign policy is not unlike its application to British forcig-n
policy of the late nineteenth century, in that it survived because it was
accepted by the public. Albert Weinberg makes this point clear:
Isolation as a superficial description of American policy
was the coinage, not of advocates of reserve, but of opponents
seeking to discredit them by exaggeration
. . . history of the
term exhibits the increasing use by anti-isolationists of this
conscious or un-conscious strategy, the repeated denunciation
of it not only l)y adherents of moderate reserve but by
"irreconcilables" as well, and, finally and only rather recently,
the bravado or thoughtlessness of an extremist minority in
accepting a label that misrepresented even them. If, together
with the other spectators, diplomatic historians came to use
the word, it was only because they were well aware that mere
scholars can change no social ha})it
.
[My italics. ]
Popular coinage of a term over a period cannot avoid eventual distortion
of its historical meaning. Such is the case with isolationism as it applies to
American foreign policy. The point has already been made through the
previous analysis of the early period in America's history that the foreign
policy of political independence, non-entanglement, commercial expansion
•'Op. cit.
,
Weinberg, p. 539.
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and neutrality in war has been misconstrued as a policy of isolationism.
Unfortunately, American distortion of the concept of isolationism does
not end with the revolutionary period. Its application in different periods,
while taking on various and often spurious connotations, reflects a history
of distortion and misrepresentation of the historical meaning of isolationism.
This is true even at present although the United States is firmly committed
to international objectives in its foreign policy.
Twentieth Century Isolationism in America
The task of tracing the applications of isolation to American foreign
policy is an arduous one simply because it has meant so many things to many
people. Generally, the concept has been used circumstantially; that is, its
meaning is defined by the specific circumstances of American politics at
any given time. The first general application of isolation to America's
traditional foreign policy appeared about the middle of the nineteenth century
when "interventionists desirous that 'Young America' help actively Europe's
revolutionary liberalism, called upon those less rash than themselves for
an abandonment of 'isolation, ' and thus for the first time identified it not
merely with a geographical situation but with a theory of foreign relations. "'^^
From that time, isolationism was applied with increasing frequency to that
policy established by the founding fathers, a policy of independence and non-
entanglement. That American goals in foreign relations had not changed during
74Op . cit.
,
Weinberg, p. 539.
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a century is made evident by the fact that as late as 1885 President Grover
Cleveland, addressing himself to America's foreign policy, maintained that,
It is the policy of independence, favored by our position
and defended by our known love of justice and by our power.
It is the policy of peace suitable to our interests. It is the
policy of neutrality, rejecting any share in foreign broils and
ambitions upon other continents and rejecting their intrusion
here. It is the policy of Monroe and of Washington and
Jefferson—"peace, commerce and honest Friendship with all
nations; entangling alliances with none."'^^
(Actually, while the basic tenets of America's traditional policy had not altered,
the nineteenth century found the United States much more global in its interests,
particularly since the opening of Japan in 1853 to American commerce.)
It was the debate over the direction of United States' foreign policy in
the early decades of the twentieth century which resulted in the popular
characterization of the traditional policy as one of isolationism. At this time,
the United States was fast becoming a major international power (finally
realized in World War I) and due to the shrinkage of the world in space-time
relationships, digression from the traditional postulates was inevitable. Yet,
the concept of isolationism continued to be employed to distinguish those in
American politics who advocated continued adherence to principles of
unilateralism and independence from those who sought American participation
in international communal efforts such as the League of Nations. A case in
point is the turn of the century debate between the imperialists and the anti-
"^^James D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the
Presidents, 1789-1897 , Washington: Government Printing Office, 1889, 12
Volumes, Vol XIII, p. 301.
;s or
;ome
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imperalists in connection with American expansion into the Pacific. This
debate centered around the question of whether American interests should
be broadened to include areas not contiguous to continental United States
whether the traditional tenet of non-entanglement should still be employed.
The deviation of the meaning of isolationism from its historical
foundations can be clearly established through an analysis of what it has c(
to signify and how it has been used since the 1920's. Throughout, the
attempt will be made to note the changes which occur in defining just what
"isolationism" stands for.
Characterization of. isolationism in the 1920's and 1930's is difficult
principally because it was advocated by several spokesmen who fought for and
against different causes in the name of isolationism. It is safe to suggest
that the label "isolationist" was applied to those who rejected American
membership in the League of Nations, who had second thoughts about
America's participation in World War I, and who sought to retain the United
States' traditional policy of unilateralism. Among the spokesmen of such a
policy were Senator William E. Borah and Senator Hiram Johnson. These
men opposed United States' involvement in collective security arrangements,
maintaining that such a policy would be an abandonment of the traditional maxims
of independence and non-entanglement established by the founding fathers.
They placed the successful attainment of such a policy not in the complete
separation of the United States from the world but rather on the postulates of
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international law and the rights of a neutral power. Others, such as John
Bassett Moore, Gerald P. Nye. Norman Thomas. Arthur Vandenberg and
Bennett C. Clark, placed their hopes for American isolationism on
neutrality legislation and restriction of the power of the executive branch to
conduct foreign affairs. In this manner, they hoped to keep the nation out of
international security arrangements and thus out of war.
The leading spokesman among those mentioned was Senator William
E. Borah. It is his statements about American foreign policy that provoked
the writer to the conclusion that "American isolationism" has little or no
foundation in the historical meaning of that word:
In matters of trade and commerce, we have never been
isolationist and never will be. In matters of finance, unfor-
tunately, we have not been isolationist and never will be. When
earthquake and famine, or whatever brings human suffering,
visit any part of the human race, we have not been isolationists,
and never will be
. . . But in all matters political, in all
commitments of any nature or kind, which encroach in the
slightest upon the free and unembarrassed action of our people,
or circumscribe their discretion and judgement, we have
been free, we have been independent, we have been isolationist.'''^
From this, it is clear, according to Manfred Jonas, that:
the movement did not aim at literal isolation of the United States
from the rest of the world. The cultural ties binding America
to Europe were never challenged by the isolationist; nor was the
necessity for maintaining diplomatic relations with other countries.
No American isolationist made a principle out of cutting off all
foreign trade nor seriously advocated trying to attain economic
self-sufficiency. None sought to close this country's doors to
immigrants or foreign travelers. '^'^
"^^William E. Borah, Bedrock
,
Washington, D. C: National Home Library
Foundation, 1936, p. 58.
'^'^Manfred Jonas, Isolationism in America , Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1966, p. 5.
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Further clarification comes by drawing a parallel between the
American foreign policy characterized as isolationism in the 1920's and
1930's and British foreign policy during the period of "splendid isolation-
ism. " Both were influenced by principles of political freedom, commercial
development and colonial possessions. Both were attuned to a nation
holding the key in the international balance of power. For both Britain
and the United States, the issue was independence and freedom of action,
not isolation.
Much of the support for the so-called "isolationist" policy in the 1930 's
came from a pacifist element in America. This became especially true as
the revisionist argument concerning the United States' involvement in World
War I found support. Manfred Jonas suggests that the two elements of
policy that the isolationist movement could agree on were unilateralism and
a kind of pseudo-pacifism. Wars, especially on the European and Asian
continents, were of no interest to them for the very reason that American
involvement in them would commit this nation to uphold the interests of others
rather than those of the United States. The outbreak of war in Europe in
1939 intensified the controversy surrounding this position. However, with
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December, 1941, the issue was resolved
until the end of the war. The anti-war sentiment so prevalent during 1939-41
and embodied in the United States proclamation of neutrality lost its relevancy
after the Japanese attack.
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Post World War II
With the end of World War II, the United States committed itself to
a policy of internationalism. Membership in the United Nations and the
military alliance structure of NATO signaled the abandonment of the
traditional peacetime policy of non-entanglement. American isolationism
was formally and unceremoniously declared dead by most scholars and
statesmen of American foreign policy. Yet, there remains even today a
constant and conscious effort to keep alive a debate between American
internationalism versus a return to the "traditional policy of isolationism.
"
In the early 1950's, there emerged a movement loiown as "The new
isolationism." This movement was motivated by five principles. First,
its advocates rejected the term isolationist. Senator Robert Taft, a leading
spokesman of the movement, declared that nobody was isolationist today
for it was impossible to be one what with the United States committed around
the globe. Secondly, they expressed a dislike for allies and demonstrated a
preference for the United States to "go it alone." Third, they wanted other
nations to build their strength first in order to prove that they deserved
American aid. Fourth, they stressed the importance of domestic issues
over international. And finally, they were against large spending and taxation
78
and were anti-socialist. These were the principles of a policy labeled
'^^From Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. , "The New Isolationism," Atlantic
Monthly, CLXXXIX, May, 1952, pp. 34-38.
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isolationism. Here again the distortion and digression away from the core
meaning of isolation is apparent.
The 1960's brought about a resurgence of the isolationist-international-
ist debate. It also brought on new meaning to isolationism. Henry Graff,
in an article entitled "Isolationism Again—With a Difference, ""^^ spells out
the new connotations of what has become known as "neo-isolationism": It
is a policy which claims that the days of globalism ought to be over; that
the Cold War cannot be carried on everywhere; and that co-existence with
Communism must be accepted with equanimity. Graff claims that neo-
isolationism is not anti-war but only supports wars in which the United
States' national interest is involved. Neither is it anti-communist, as it
takes a more realistic attitude toward accommodation with it. It does not
call for major reductions in the military but warns against overextension of
military capabilities and calls for recognition of the limitations of "military
solutions." Finally, says Graff, it is wedded to the idea of collective security
in that European and American interests are thought to be interlocked.
Summary
It is evident that the use of the concept of isolationism to characterize
American foreign policy has been from the beginning a case of misguided and
inappropriate application. Consistently, those policies labeled as
"^^Henry Graff, "Isolationism Again—With a Difference," New York Times
Magazine
,
May 16, 1965, pp. 26-27, 98-100.
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isolationism have had little or no relationship to the core meaning, in its
historical sense. The conclusion may be drawn that the recent arguments
against any re-evaluation of American foreign policy commitments and
priorities, couched as they are in accusations and warnings against a
"return to isolationism," falsely represent the principles of isolationism
and the arguments of their opponents.
It is hoped that the foregoing discussion has made clear that American
foreign policy never was one of isolationism, and that the subsequent and
ensuing arguments were not and are not between advocates of internationalism
and isolationism. Rather, it is between those who seek new direction and
priorities in foreign policy to cope with the ever changing international
environment and those who battle to protect and preserve the status quo.
That the issues have been once again clouded by the inappropriate and mis-
guided use of the concept of isolationism is unfortunate. The pejorative
connotations attached to isolationism make it most difficult for any new
policy direction, stigmatized as "isolationist" by its opponents, to achieve
not only support but more important, legitimacy.
The challenge to the overworked and nondescript concept of isolationism
as it has been applied to American foreign policy can come at no better time
than the present. The United States finds itself in a major dilemma over
the direction, values and priorities of its foreign policy which it has not yet
been able to solve. The application of the isolationist label to new initiatives
in foreign policy, if it is allowed to continue, can only result in the dis-
creditation of many foreign policy programs of considerable worth.
CHAPTER V
THE NEW INTERNATIONALISM
The decade of the 1970 's promises to be an important period in the
continuing debate over American foreign policy. Not since the early post-
war period of the 1940's has the controversy surrounding isolationism and
internationalism raged so intensely. Like the outcome of that earlier
discussion won by those who espouse an international role for the United
States, the end product of the present argument promises to be of great
significance, not only for the United States but for the world. Thus, it is
important that the contemporary controversy be put into a proper perspec-
tive. This chapter will pursue that goal by seeking to examine the present
debate, especially the claims and assumptions of those characterized as
isolationist. The important task here is to apply the definitional require-
ments established in Chapter Two and tested in the preceding case studies
to the current argument over America's proper international role.
United States Postwar Foreign Policy
For close to two and one-half decades, the United States has adhered
to a global foreign policy largely implemented by the dual measures of
containment and intervention. The underlying assumptions of American
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foreign policy during this period are based upon what William D. Coplin
labels as the "folklore of power politics." Assumptions such as the
concern for international peace and stability as the only path to national
security, military and political strength coupled with the need for
moderation and flexibility and the calculation of self-interest as the basis
for dealing with states formed the foundations of American policy. ^
Overriding these basic assumptions was the concern for the perceived
threat of Communism. In large part, American foreign policy since 1945
has been one of anti-communism, a war sometimes hot and sometimes cold
against an oppressive, international, and monolithic ideology. It was
assumed that the Communist movement was united in an effort to subject
the world to the will of the Soviet Union. Any threat to the stability of the
status quo was assessed to be Communist-inspired and, therefore, must be
contained. The policies of containment and intervention resulted from the
assumption that peace was indivisible and a threat against one part of the
system constituted a threat against the whole. Peace through war or the
readiness for war remained a fixture in the American mind for twenty-five
years. The success of NATO in Europe, the Korean War, and the early
years of the Vietnam War are pointed to as proof of the correctness of the
assumptions of globalism.
"^William D. Coplin, "The Folklore of Power Politics from Containment to
Vietnam, " in Robert W. Gregg and Charles Kegley, Jr. , After Vietnam ,
Garden City, Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1971.
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The historic conviction that American society is better than others,
and that this nation has a mission to share the virtues and values of
democracy with the world, especially with the new developing nations, have
played a significant role in American foreign policy. America has been
portrayed as the force of good against the dark evils of Communism. This
image resulted in the policy of intervention and increased the scope of
America's vital interests. As a result, national security has been extended
geographically and expanded conceptually. American commitments have
become so far flung that the rationale for intervention in other parts of the
world has become tied to the issue of American credibility. Not only the
ability but the willingness to carry out commitments has become justification
for American actions against universal aggression. The United States, having
chosen to play power politics must, as General Henry Higlin says, learn to
play it well. If that involves dropping bombs on Indochina, then activity of
this kind must be recognized as such. For at stake in all of this is not only
the security of the nation but the security of the "free world" and the prestige
and power of the United States.
For two decades these assumptions of American foreign policy went
largely unchallenged. Despite many radical and important changes in the
international environment, it was not until serious questions were raised
concerning the United States' policy in Vietnam that doubts surfaced from
the liberal establishment about the premises of American foreign policy in
general. As the American commitment to stop communist aggression in
Indochina grew in terms of troops, deaths, bombing missions, and dollars,
questions were raised about that commitment and about the nature of the
war. The policy which committed the United States to spend so much money,
blood, and lives to save an elite and corrupt government from communism
has given rise to controversy over other American commitments, its policy
of containment and its practice of intervention. The apparent schisms
within the supposedly monolithic Communist world, notably that between
China and Russia, plus the loosening of control exercised by the Soviet Union
over her satellites in Eastern Europe, have not gone unnoticed by the critics
of Cold War policies. The re-emergence of Western Europe as a potential
superpower has raised questions about the necessity for maintaining a large
American presence on that continent. Critics have also focused on the
defense budget, the sale of arms to military dictatorships and the increasing
amount of military aid being distributed under the foreign aid programs. The
plight of the American cities and the sagging economy have raised the question
about the need for alternatives to the arms race and the American policy of
globalism. As a result, with the Vietnam War as the catalyst, a strong and
sustained challenge to the assumptions underlying the foreign policy of the
United States is now underway.
This challenge has not gone unanswered by those who continue to support
American globalism. Surrounding themselves and their arguments with
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tributes to patriotism and democracy, raising the specter of the evil and
threat of Communism and employing the time-tested virtues of military
strength and capitalist economics, advocates of America's post-war policy
have attempted to discredit their critics by portraying those who sock change
as neo-isolationists. Fully aware that isolationism carries with it an
image of weakness which evokes the inter-war head-in-the-sand posture of
the United States to which many ascribe the catastrophe of World War II,
supporters of globalism have characterized the debate over foreign policy as
one between internationalism and isolationism.
References to the proposals advocated by critics of American policy
as examples of isolationism are numerous, non-partisan, and most important,
they come from high echelons of government. For example. President
Richard Nixon speaking at the Naval Officers' graduation in March 1971,
made reference to his critics:
I know the arguments of the new isolationists . . . today,
despite the terrible evidence of this century there are those
who have refused to learn the hard lessons of the history of
tyranny. They would tell us, as their predessors in other
times have told us, that the appetite for aggression can be
satisfied only if we are patient and that the ambitions of the
aggressor are justified if only we understand them properly.^
Reporting on Nixon's speech, Robert Phelps of The New York Times
wrote that "President Nixon today denounced 'new isolationists' who favor cuts
^Richard Nixon, Speech before the Graduates of the Naval Officer Candidate
School on March 12, 1971.
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in the defense budget in order to spend more on domestic programs. The
President said he also understood the sentiment behind those who favored
a shift in national priorities, but added, »I understand these arguments.
I understand the cost of weakness, too. • ""^
An article in the Washington Post
, written by Stephen Rosenfeld,
credits Nixon with this statement, "The great internationalists of the post-
World War 11 period have become the neo-isolationists. "4
Vice-President Spiro Agnew has also attempted to label the critics of
American foreign policy as advocates of isolationism. Speaking before the
Co-<c-?t Guard Academy Commencement ceremonies in June, 1972, he said.
Will we bear any burden, pay any price, as President Kennedy
pledged we would? Or is the American ideal now reduced to
maintaining our own personal freedom and to hell with all others. ^
Other supporters of globalism such as Senator Hugh Scott and Senator Barry
Goldwater have linked the critics' arguments with isolationism. Scott, speaking
about the new proposals on disarmament, claimed that the "Unilateral dis-
armers, the isolationists, favor withdrawal into a shell of presumed security
which is unilateral obsolescence."^ Senator Goldwater, a staunch supporter
of American globalism argues in his article "The Perilous Conjuncture,
Soviet Ascendancy and American Isolation," that:
3
Robert Phelps, "Nixon Warns of Peril to U.S. in Domestic Demands of
New Isolationists, " New York Times , March 13, 1971, p. 1.
^Stephen S. Rosenfeld, "Word on a Word," Washington Post , June 23, 1972,
p. A18.
^Spiro Agnew, Speech at U.S. Coast Guard Academy Commencement, June 7,
1972, in New York Times, May 8, 1972, p. 33.
^Senator Hugh Scott, Washington Post , June 23, 1972, p. A18.
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It should be apparent that if the neo-isolationists in
the Senate and House succeed in forcing United States'
withdrawal from world affairs on a massive scale, the
Soviets will win the game of world supremacy by default.'^
In a speech given before the American Fighter Aces Association in August,
1971, Goldwater depicts the abandonment of the SST project as an example
of American isolationism. He ends his address with a statement on the
perils of isolationism and a plea for continued support of global policies:
Yet, gentlemen, I would remind you that this is the stuff
that the new isolationism is made of. It sounds great, actually
very comfortable, to say that we will once again withdraw
between our two oceans and friendly frontiers to the north and
south and let the world take care of itself.
Actually, we went through all this nonsense back in the
days before World War II when important people were assuring
each other that Europe's troubles were strictly provincial and
had nothing to do with the United States of America some two to
three thousand miles away. The idea of an isolated America
proved ridiculous then and we didn't even have the benefit of jet
airplane travel. And I say to you, if it was ridiculous in the late
1930's it is downright ludicrous in the 1970's. . . .
I suggest that the hour is growing very late. Our credibility
as a powerful nation is coming into serious question. Our defense
policy is rapidly becoming inadequate to the job of defending our
country and the security of 205 million Americans is beginning
to be threatened. ^
Finally, former President Lyndon Johnson in an address to the Graduate
School of Business Administration of New York University in November, 1971,
"senator Barry Goldwater, "The Perilous Conjuncture, Soviet Ascendancy
and American Isolationism," Orbis , Vol XV, Spring 1971, No. 1. p. 55.
^Senator Barry Goldwater, "International Blackmail," An address before
the Tenth Annual Reunion and Honors Banquet of the American Fighter Aces
Association, San Diego, California, August 14, 1971, p. 5.
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articulates the classic arguments against isolationism and in support of con-
tinued American policies of globalism:
My third conviction is this: We must understand and
agree that there is no safety for America in isolation—now,
or as far ahead as we can sec . . .
Another assumption is that we Americans were endowed
by our Creator with a considerable supply of common sense—
and that our policies and actions will be based on that endow-
ment.
There is nothing new about this desire to retreat into
Fortress America. It has been with us for as long as I can
remember. What is new--and disturbing—is how widespread
it has become! There appears to be forming in the United
States a New Coalition of isolationists which could be mistaken
for the majority opinion
. . .
But the New Coalition is something different. It is made
up of conservatives and liberals who seek to diminish America's
role in the world— for entirely different reasons. Some are
angry because what we have done for the world hasn't made other
nations automatically do what we say. Some just don't like
foreigners. Some think we should spend everything on ourselves
instead of trying to help avoid chaos elsewhere. Others just
don't like spending money
—
period. Others just don't want to
get involved.
. . .
We have to recognize, first that there is no safety in a
sudden turning away from Europe or Asia, from the Middle
East or Latin America. If we fall into isolationism, we will
find that we are the ones who are isolated. We cannot afford to
repeat the tragic mistakes of the past . . . ^
Opponents of American globalism have not taken lightly the linl<;age between
their proposals and isolationism. Many critics, aware of the stigma attached
to isolationism, have spoken out against such characterization for they know
Lyndon B. Jolmson, Lecture at New York University School of Business,
November 15, 1971, pp. 11, 12, 13.
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that it is an effective ploy for muddying the real issues. Hans Morgenthau
is one who realizes the pitfalls of such a portrayal. He writes that "to
stigmatize a position that falls short of such indiscriminate globalism as
'new-isolationism' is a polemic misuse of terms; it derives from the globalist
assumption that indiscriminate involvement is, as it were, the natural stance
of American policy. "^^ Robert W. Tucker in Nation or Empire arg-ues the same
point. He suggests that, "It clearly does not follow that one must be an
isolationist to protest against an imperial destiny for America, particularly an
imperal destiny that results in the kind of war we have waged in Vietnam. ""^^
Richard Barnet is another who maintains that the isolationist label has been
applied inappropriately. He acknowledges that "Those who wish to renounce the
right to threaten nuclear war on behalf of American vital interests, to stop
seeking American security by killing or assisting in the killing of Asians,
Africans and Latin Americans, are stigmatized as 'isolationists, ' ""'^'^
Barnet 's position is that:
The issue is not whether the United States should or
can withdraw from the world, but the character of American
-'-^See Mike Mansfield, "The Nixon Doctrine, " speech at Olivet, Michigan,
March 29, 1971.
"'"^Hans J. Morgenthau, A New Foreign Policy for the United States , New
York: Frederick Praeger, 1969, p. 16,
1 9
Robert W. Tucker, Nation or Empire ? Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press,
1968, p. 9.
13
Richard Barnet, "The Illusion of Security" in Robert W. Gregg and Charles
Kegley, After Vietnam, Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1971, p. 25.
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involvement
. . . Americans cannot and will not resign from
the world. But they can renounce the myths on which their
contact with the world has been so largely based; that the
United States government can manage social and political
change around the world; that it can police a stable system of
order; that it can solve problems in other countries it has
yet to solve for its own people
. . .
Robert Gregg and Charles Kegley in their edited volume After Vietnam
concur with Barnet and the other critics. They counsel that "the alternative
to neglect of foreign problems or a ritual response to them need not be a
Hobson's choice between comprehensive interventionism and comprehensive
isolationism. It can be rather, a flexible policy, evolving from a thoughtful
and searching review.
. .
.
""''^
Striking at the crux of the issue is Michael Roskin in his article "What
New Isolationism?" Pointing to the meaningless manner in which the term
isolationism has been used throughout the debates on American foreign policy,
Roskin concludes:
Will the real "isolationism" please stand up? The meaning of
"isolationism" or "new isolationism" finally dawns on the reader;
it is whatever the user happens to oppose in foreign policy.
While critics of the present United States' foreign policy are adamant
^"^Ibid
.
,
pp. 85-86.
15
Robert W. Gregg and Charles W. Kegley, Jr. , After Vietnam
,
Garden
City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1971, p. 5.
'^^Michacl Roskin, "What 'New Isolationism' ?" Foreign Policy, No. 6,
Spring 1972, p. 119.
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in their refusal to accept the isolationist label, they have not been able to
define precisely by title their specific plan or direction for American foreign
policy. Some, such as Senator J. William Fulbright
(A New Internationalism ^
and Michael Roskin (Non-intervention) have attempted to do so. It may not be
important that one hibcl be fixed on the critics' proposals as a group, llnfortunately,
as has been the case noted above, the label of isolationism has been applied to
the critics' proposals. Unless an adequate defense of the critical position is
forthcoming, the stig-ma of isolationism is likely to remain. And unless the
controversy surrounding isolationism is recognized as a conceptual dispute
rather than one of terminology, where labels have become divorced from
substance, there will be no resolution of that controversy.
Having attempted through the process of conceptual clarification to
define the specific meaning of isolationism, and because confusion reigns as
to just what the critics of American foreign policy are advocating, the remaining
discussion in this treatise will attempt to explain the specific and at times
various positions on foreign policy of those chastized as isolationists. Here
as in the past case studies, the effort will be to demonstrate that there remains
a disparity between a foreign policy given the label of isolationism and the
substantive meaning of the concept as defined in Chapter Two. Through such
an effort, it can be made clear that, as was true of British foreign policy
during the period of "splendid isolation" and as was also true of American
traditional policy throughout the nineteenth and half of the twentieth centuries,
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the characterization of the proposals for change in American foreign policy
as isolationist are misleading, inaccurate and without meaning.
In any analysis of the critiques of American foreign policy, acknow-
ledgment must be made of the fact that criticism comes from different sources.
Critics, depending upon their orientation, differ in their underlying assumptions
about the goals and methods of foreign policy as much as they do about domestic
politics. A radical analysis of foreign policy is based on far different assump-
tions from that of a liberal or conservative critique. Unfortunately, these
varying critical analyses of American foreign policy, especially the radical
and liberal critiques, have been lumped together as though they were one and
the same. In the effort to clarify the positions of those who are being labeled
as isolationists, it is important to recognize that theirs is a liberal critique
and not a radical one; a view sustained by those critics of American foreign
policy who are in positions of power, largely within the Congress of the United
17
States and various political and academic positions of importance. This
analysis is not a critique of the system under which foreign policy is carried
out but rather a difference of opinion about certain decisions and methods.
For those who are in a position to influence the direction of American foreign
policy by having a stake in the system as it is are not likely to be at fundamental
odds with it. Robert Tucker argues this point when he states that "critics
'^'^For example, Mayor John Lindsay of New York City, Governor John
Gilligan of Ohio, Hans Morgenthau of New York University, Robert W. Tucker
of Johns Hopkins University and Kingman Brewster, President of Yale.
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seek change in style or outlook rather than policy"^^ and "What separates
Fulbright and others is not disagreement over purpose but how to achieve
that purpose. "^^ In other words, the indictment by the liberal critics is
not against the "folklore of power politics" but against the faulty application
of it.
<"! Ml. Mil,.'
I
hand, the radical critique, based almost exclusively in
the academic community, finds fault with the whole range of assumptions
which underlie the American capitalist system. Radical critics such as
Harry Magdoff, Gabriel Kolko, William A. Williams, Norman Chomsky,
and Richard Duboff challenge the basic assumption of capitalist economics
and portray the market-place society as the reason for the evils in American
foreign policy. Their basic disagreement is with the system under which
foreign policy operates. For them, it is not a question of methods or decisions.
Their critique is based upon fundamental differences with the capitalist system
which has perpetuated an oppressive and imperialist foreign policy. Richard
Duboff provides an excellent statement of the radical point of view:
".
. . the ideology of anti-communism and free world
preservation, and its implementation in the long run serves
the interests of corporate business more than any other sector
of our society. This ideology has helped create a political
environment that permits if it does not necessitate interventions
that are irrational if each of them is taken in isolation.
18Op . cit . , Tucker, p. 155.
^^
Ibid .
,
p. 132.
^^Richard B. Duboff and Edward S. Herman, "Corporate Dollars and Foreign
Policy." Commonweal , Vol XCVI, No. 7, April 21, 1972, p. 163.
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It is not the purpose here to defend or criticize either the radical or
liberal critiques. The significant point is that they do differ in their basic
assumptions and hypotheses about American foreign policy and should not be
21grouped as one. However, it is the liberal critique which has been attacked
as isolationism and thus warrants careful examination here. The following
discussion will examine the general and specific arguments of the liberal
analysis focusing on their relevancy to the definitional requirements of isolation-
ism explicated in Chapter Two.
The Liberal Critique
In general, critics of American post-war foreign policy have articulated
their proposals for change in such sweeping phrases as "a re-arrangement and
re-examination of priorities, " "re-appraisal of communist capabilities and
intentions, " "a policy of detente and co-existence, " "a reduced American
presence abroad" and "a policy of non-intervention. " Such broad statements
tell little about the basic premises upon which their proposals are based. But
what they do indicate is that there is needed a review of the fundamental assump-
tions upon which the policies of containment and intervention are founded. Hans
Morgenthau makes this point when he states that "We must free ourselves
from the burden of obsolescent policies which have become mechanical routines
and embark upon a radical rethinking of the issues and of the policies adequate
^^See Robert W. Tucker, The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy ,
Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1971.
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to them.
"
Specifically, the liberal critique of foreign policy has been directed at
three particular but at times overlapping areas of controversy. The first
involves a re-assessment of the communist threat to the free world. Most
critics have taken stock of the changes within the communist movement,
have noted the schism within it, the softening of the hard line which so
characterized the early post-war years and the influence of nationalism
over communism in determining political postures. The feeling runs high
among the critics that the ardent anti-communist stance taken by the United
States for nearly thirty years is outmoded and continues to be an obstacle in
the path of serious negotiations on topics of real interest to both the United
States and the Communist nations. Opposition to the ardent anti-communist
posture along ideological grounds has surfaced recently. A more realistic
attitude toward the communist countries has been advocated which differs
significantly from the attitude of the staunch anti-communist ideologue.
Fears that continued belief in the specter of international communist aggression
means the adherence to policies of intervention and containment, which are
responsible for American involvement in Indochina, are abundant among the
critics. Senator J. William Fulbright articulates these fears clearly:
How have we come to inflate so colossally the importance
of Indochina to our own security? The answer lies in that
22
Op . cit
. ,
Morgenthau, A New Foreign Policy for the United States ,
p. 3.
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hoariest, hardest, most indestructible myth of them all: the
myth of the international Communist conspiracy.
... For
all the sophistication and fine distinctions that are supposed
to have refined our policy since the bad old days of the cold
war, there is little discernible difference in spirit between
Mr. Nixon's ominous reference to "those great powers who
have not yet abandoned their goals of world conquest"
.
and the portentous language of President Truman's proclama-
tion of national emergency twenty years ago.
The myth distorts our perceptions. It has made it
difficult for us to see the Soviet Union for what it has become—
a traditional, cautious, and rather unimaginative great power,
jealously clinging to its sphere of domination in Eastern Europe
but limited to methods of pressure and persuasion in its dealings
with other Communist movements especially in Asia. 23
Advocates for change in the American response to Communism have argu
against the isolation of mainland China from the international community as a
policy of foolish motives and faulty intent. It is their premise that the distinc-
tion between the Communist bloc and the free world obfuscates more than it
illuminates and that opposition to Communism is a misleading guide for
American foreign policy. The critics advocate a more realistic assessment of
local revolutionary situations as opposed to the mechanical response of inter-
vention every time there is local unrest. Finally, opponents of the hard-line
Communist posture seek a lessening of the rhetoric of anti-communism and a
more conciliatory attitude toward peaceful negotiations and cooperation.
The second major controversy revolves around what Robert Tucker
describes as a "broad disparity of view over both the condition and even the
meaning of American security and the other interests whose vindication would
23 J, William Fulbright, "Old Myths and New Realities-I, " Congressional
Record, Vol. 116, No. 51, Part 8, April 2, 1970, p. 10150.
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justify if necessary the use of American military power. "^^ opposing
American policies of globalism the critics raise four questions pertaining
to national security. What are vital interests? What is the nature of the
threat to those interests? What to do to preserve those interests? What is
America's purpose in the world and how best may that purpose be realized ?^^
In answering these security questions, the critics reject outright the assump-
tions of the globalists that America's vital interests are world-wide. Threats
to the national security as justification for intervention and involvement in
faraway places such as Indochina have been used indiscriminately with no
assessment of or distinction between vital and secondary interests. The
critics reject the belief in the universal crisis; that a threat against one part
of the system is a threat against the whole. They propose the establishment of
crit'.^ria for defining American security needs in less grandiose terms. Robert
Tucker strikes at the heart of the issue when he concludes:
Whereas in the later nineteen-forties, America's purpose was
a function of her security, in the late nineteen-sixties security
has become a function of her purpose. 26
Unless American security is defined in a realistic manner with specific limita-
tions and a cohesive, conscious idea of where its vital interests lie, the critics
predict that the United States will find itself overcommitted and overextended
beyond its military and economic capabilities. It will also find itself wallowing
^'^Op. cit.
,
Tucker, Nation or Empire ? p. 3.
25ibid_.
96
Ibid.
,
p. 38.
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helplessly in a sea of change because it refuses to abandon its policies of
attempting to maintain the status quo.
Critics maintain that the failure or refusal to reassess changes in the
balance of power inevitably results in an aberration of that balance. It also
results in a circumstance where there is no distinction made between vital
and secondary interests. A generalized commitment to interests on a global
scale can result in tilting the balance of power one way or the other causing
instability in areas where stability had prevailed, it is a foregone conclusion
that balance of power politics on the international scale necessitates a distinction
between vital and non-vital interests. Critics claim that such a distinction
has been abandoned under the assumptions of globalism. As a result, even
though changes in the power balance in certain areas have occurred, American
policy makers have failed to examine those changes. Consequently, United
States influence has been dangerously overwhelming in some places and sadly
27lacking in others.
The American pre-occupation with stability and its measures of inter-
vention and containment have been soundly denounced by those who see change
as inevitable and in fact necessary. Richard Barnet argues against this pre-
occupation with stability and its relationship to national security:
^'^Hans Morgenthau suggests that Indochina is an area where the United States
has failed to recognize that the balance of power does not necessitate the
preponderance of power now committed there. The recent India-Pakistan war
in early 1972 is an example of where United States influence was found to be
lacking in a critical situation.
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To set as a "national security" goal the concept of
"stability" in a world of convulsion, in which radical
change is as inevitable as it is necessary is as practical
as King Canute's attempt to command the tides.
To be able to roll with the tides and still keep intact
the essentials of our own political experiment and our own
identity is the real security task. 28
Because American foreign policy has overemphasized the need for order and
has misunderstood the means of maintaining it, all in the name of security,
the United States has been pursuing a kind of dangerous international
adventurism. The danger, maintain the opponents of globalism, is not only
to American interests abroad but to the domestic society as well. Diversion
of needed domestic resources to bolster right-wing dictatorship simply
because they are anti-communist and thus allegedly reinforce the security of
the United States is wasteful and without meaningful purpose. What is
advocated by critics such as Lincoln Bloomfield is a "rolling reassessment of
United States priorities and of interests that are truly, and not just rhetorically,
'vital.
'"^^
The third fundamental criticism of American foreign policy is closely
bound to the question of national security. It involves the issue of American
commitments to other nations and in particular the commitment to aid and
defend with military power if necessary those nations threatened by Communist
(alleged or real) aggression. Critics are questioning not only the validity of
^^Op. cit.
,
Gregg and Kegley, p. 48.
^^L. P. Bloomfield, "After Neo-isolationism, What?" Bulletin of Atomic
Scientists, Vol 27, April, 1971, p. 11.
global commitments but how they are made and the cost of these commitments
to the United States. Many critics feel that a substantial number of American
commitments abroad, given the changes in the international environment, are
outdated relics of the Cold War era and should be discarded. Erwin Knoll
and Judith McFadden arrive at the conclusion in American Militarism 1970 that
"American policy-makers have tended to believe that policies which were
successful in one era can be applicable in all places at all times. '"'^^ They
also maintain that "Many of the 'threats' against which we maintain military
forces exist not where a core interest of the United States is at stake, but
because we have taken a particular historic position in a particular part of the
world. We must now reconsider the extent to which the maintenance of these
positions is appropriate.
In line with this thinking, opponents of globalism now seek a reduced
American involvement in the political affairs of other nations. There is a
strong rejection of the assumptions of those whom Senator George McGovern
calls the "neo-imperialists" "who somehow imagine that the United States has
a mandate to impose any American solution the world around. " There is
also growing awareness that American interests are not necessarily identical
to those of other nations and that the United States has no right to impose its
'^^Erwin Knoll and Judith Nies McFadden, ed. , American Militarism, 1970
New York: Viking Press, 1969, p. 37.
^^Ibid.
,
p. 37.
^^George McGovern, A Time for War, A Time for Peace , New York:
Random House, 1968, p. 178.
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Will on others. An agreement to give aid and assistance to a nation does not
necessarily mean that a nation must be armed to the teeth with sophisticated
American weapons or that American corporate interests have a permit to
"develop" that nation's economy to fit those corporate interests. What is
needed, claims Stanley Hoffman, is for Americans "to remind ourselves of
the foreignness of foreigners-to realize, not only that we have-quite properly-
less control over them than over men and goods of our national policy but also
what may be in their national interest (such as certain kinds of political
development) is not necessarily either in our interest or a proper concern of
our foreign policy. ""^"^
Included in the desire for a reduced profile abroad is the hope that the
American preoccupation with maintaining its self-sustained image of inter-
national power and prestige and the reflexive policy of rushing to fulfill its
commitments (perceived or real) will be abandoned. At present, Hoffman
argues "There is a tendency, when challenged, to be far more concerned with
proving ourselves than with finding out whether our objectives are worthwhile
or reachable and whether our involvement serves them adequately. "'^'^
Finally, critics of American foreign policy have taken issue with the
tendency to forsake problem-solving via negotiations in favor of the "quick
military solution." The American faith in military power to cope with
33
Richard M. Pfeffer, ed. , No More Vietnams
,
New York: Harper and Row,
1968, p. 201.
Ibid
.
,
p. 198.
political change, claim the critics, is the classic paradox of American foreign
policy and can only result in failure; Vietnam being the tragic example.
Military power should be used as a last resort, not as the first. The assump-
tion that lasting solutions to peace can be achieved through massive troop
intervention and bombing of indigenous and ideologically-motivated forces is
rejected by those such as Senator Mike Gravel, who argues that "to stand up
and talk about peace when we are really killing people is totally schizophrenic.
That, of course, is the problem with our policy today. It is totally
schizophrenic. "'^^
In summing up the disparate generalizations of the liberal critique,
several underlying assumptions are apparent. First, hard-line anti-commu-
nism as a guide for United States foreign policy is misleading. The Soviet
Union is seen as a status quo power with marginal influence over other
communist nations. Secondly, the United States should not attempt to main-
tain international stability and order through force. It has neither the power
nor the right to serve as the policeman of the "free world." Third, peace
is divisible; a threat against one part of the system does not constitute a threat
against the whole and thus, makes a reflexive response unnecessary. "It is
not clear that development in Latin American, Africa, or Asia (except Japan)
would affect the security or vital interests of the United States. "^^
^Mike Gravel, "Foreign Relations Authorizations Act of 1972," Congres-
sional Record, Vol. 118, No. 75, May 9, 1972, p. 7517. ~
^
•^^Graham Allison, "Cool It: The Foreign Policy of Young America," Foreign
Policy
,
No. 1, Winter 1970-71, p. 159.
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Fourth, indiscriminate increases in military strength will only brin-- increased
national security. The arms race, unless controlled can only lead to further
insecurity and possible disaster. Fifth, America should be less blatantly
visible while maintaining her responsibilities in less grandiose ways. Commit-
ments abroad should be re-evaluated so that they are in tune with clelined
national security interests. Finally, domestic health is vital to the national
security. Pressing problems at home should not be neglected in favor of
ostentatious projects abroad. Sufficient allocation of resources to cope with
the domestic ills of American society is far more desirable than a foreign
policy of international adventurism.
So far, the discussion has considered only the broad generalizations
entailed in the liberal critique of foreign policy. There are, however, specific
projects and movements initiated by critics of American foreign policy that
are aimed at bringing about desired changes. The most obvious is the peace
movement to end the war in Indochina. But within the Congress of the United
States, principally the Senate, there is a serious effort on several fronts to
reshape United States foreign policy. At times, these proposals have sought
to force changes in policy through the use of such tactics as withholding of
funds and restricting executive powers. It is these proposals which are
castigated as examples of isolationist policy. Thus, it is important that they
be examined to determine the appropriateness of such a claim.
Vietnam
The most obvious and best-publicized activity of the critics has been
their opposition to the war in Vietnam. Opponents of American policy in
Southeast Asia consider the long involvement there a failure of the Cold War
assumptions concerning international communism, the domino theory, and
America as the guarantor of freedom and self-determination. To the critics,
Vietnam is the classic example of misplaced interests and the failure of the
"quick military solution. " The assumption that increased American military
activity, including the bombing of North Vietnam would force the North to
capitulate and would bring them to the peace table has been proved incorrect.
Critics have grown tired of the claims made by three administrations that
Vietnam is in the vital interests of the United States and that in terms of the
end of the war "there is at last, light at the end of the tunnel. " Opponents
like Senator Frank Church maintain that "the bitter truth is that no nation,
including our own, is entitled to summon its sons to battle in foreign wars
unrelated to its vital interests. And Vietnam has always been unrelated to
the vital interests of the United States, which is to say the freedom and safety
of the American people.
"
Further, Church concludes that:
From the standpoint of our interests, we have been fighting an
unnecessary war for seven long years, making it possibly the
37
Frank Church, "Let Us Come Together, " Congressional Record, Vol. 117,
No. 61, Part 10, April 29, 1971, p. 12668.
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most disastrous mistake in the history of American foreign
policy. It can never be vindicated; it can only be liquidated. 38
In much the same vein, Senator Mark Hatfield has argued:
To believe that a declaration and implementation of "all-out
war" will reduce the problems of this conflict is to ignore
the conditions of the struggle that is taking place. Even if
military victory were possible—which under humanitarian
and moral reasons is not--the South Vietnamese people
would still be vulnerable due to the lack of support of their
own government.
. . . What the bombing of the North
accomplished was a vast loss of lives, both military and
civilian, and a loss of international goodwill and sympathy
and perhaps a naive but growing fear by emerging nations
that we were being colonial in our actions. "^^
Opponents of the war have carried out the attempt to end the American
involvement on several fronts. Massive violent and non-violent demonstra-
tions have been frequent during the last eight years. Support for anti-war
candidates in state and national elections has been growing. But the most
effective, and thus the most frequently attacked as the tools of isolationism,
have been the efforts by the Congressional anti-war critics to end American
involvement by means of the legislative process. For many legislators, the
question no longer is "can we win the war" or even "should we win the war"
but, rather, "how can we end the war?" Senator Edward Kennedy made a
statement to this point on April 27, 1972:
Ibid.
,
p. 12668.
^^Mark Hatfield, "A Vietnam Appraisal, " Congressional Record, Vol. 115,
No. 127, Part 16, July 29, 1969, p. 21143.
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The President says we will never surrender to the
enemy, but neither will Hanoi. The sooner we accept
the fact, the sooner we will be on the road to a realistic
compromise and negotiated settlement in Paris, the only
road that leads to peace in Indochina. Until the President
accepts this simple fact, it will be the responsibility of
Congress to seek to end the war by legislative means. 40
Proposals for withdrawal have been numerous. A bill sponsored in
1970 by Senators Church and John Sherman Cooper, while finally passed
under an amendment offered by Senator Mike Mansfield, obligated the President
"to withdraw all of its forces and end all military operations at the earliest
practicable date. "^^ Another formal bill, S. 376, the Vietnam Disengagement
Act of 1971, called for the withdrawal of American forces by the end of 1971.
More recently, in March, 1972, a new anti-war bill was introduced in the
Senate by Senators Mondale and Gravel. Bill S. 3409 provided for the cessation
of bombing in Indochina and the withdrawal of United States military personnel
from the Republic of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. In support of this bill,
Senator Walter Mondale stated:
Our bill is simple. It requires total withdrawal within 30 days
in exchange for a release of our prisoners. It would prohibit
all further bombing of Indochina except as the President determined
necessary to protect our troops in South Vietnam as they withdraw.
The time is past for lengthy speeches on this war. The
Senate may debate or alter the details of our amendment. But in
the end, it will all come down to the basic question: Do we let this
nightmare continue 7"^^
E. M. Kennedy, "Statement on President Nixon's Announcement on Vietnam,
"
Office of Senator E. M. Kennedy, April 27, 1972, p. 1.
41
Mark Hatfield, "Speech before the Senate on the Vietnam War, " Congressional
Record
,
Vol. 117, No. 181, November 23, 1971, p. 19538o
^^Walter F. Mondale, "Mondale Urges Speedy Enactment of New Anti-War
Bill," News Release, March 1972, p. 1.
158
Other efforts have aimed at cutting off funds for the war. Long and
furious debates have occcurred over appropriations to continue the war effort.
The most recent of these involved the "Foreign Relations Authorization Act
of 1972" (S. 3526). Angered by the President's docision to close off (ho ports
of North Vietnam and to step up the bombing of "military targets" in all
Indochina, Senator Gravel in May 1972, attempted to introduce before the
Senate, the "National Security Memorandum No. 1," which questioned the
wisdom and effectiveness of such measures. Gravel's reasoning was that
the effectiveness of such a policy was dubious and that the Senate had the
obligation not to provide funds for it. It was also his intention to make public
the conclusion of this study for the purpose of arousing public opinion against
the President's action.
Public opinion has also played a role in other Congressional efforts to
end the war. In the interest of the public's right to know, the critics have
applauded the publication of the Pentagon Papers
. Senator Willian Fulbright
maintains that "It has been a victory for the basic principles of freedom upon
which our Government rests, and ironically, all the publicity over the
documents has given even more prominence to the deception and secrecy so
characteristic of our involvement in Indochina. " Senator Fulbright, who as
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has been an effective
critic of American policy in Vietnam also introduced a bill (S. 1125) to force
administration officials to appear before committees of Congress Investigating
^^J. William Fulbright, "The Pentagon Papers. " Bill Fulbright Reports from
the United States Senate, 1971.
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aspects of foreign policy. His motive is to make public as much as is
possible the facts about the war and other related aspects of American
policy. Fulbright states:
The purpose of this bill is to make a small breach
in the wall of secrecy which now separates Congress from
the Executive in matters of foreign policy, and particularly,
m matters pertaining to the war in Indochina.
. .
.44
Measures have been adopted by the Congress to force the Administra-
tion to pursue meaningful negotiations to end the war. Feeling runs high
among the critics that American proposals for a negotiated end to the war
have been unrealistic. There is considerable sentiment that negotiations
have been pursued apathetically in hopes that military activities will be
successful in gaining concessions from the Hanoi government. As a result,
the Senate has moved to push the negotiations onto a meaningful level. For
example, Resolution 148 urges the Administration to negotiate an end to the
war regardless of the outcome of the South Vietnamese elections of 1971.
In some cases, the critics have urged alternative proposals for negotiations
which reflect the desire to liquidate American involvement in the war rather
than pursuing victory or maintaining American power and prestige.
Acknowledgment must be made of the fact that those who criticize
44
J. William Fulbright, "S. 1125, " Congressional Record , Vol 117, No. 29,
Part 4, March 5, 1971, p. 5232.
45 For example, see speech by
Come Together,'^ Congressional Record, Vol. 117, No. 61, April 29, 1971.
Senator Frank Church of Idaho, "Let Us
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American involvement in Vietnam do not all advocate Immediate and total
withdrawal from Indochina. There are many different proposals for solving
the American dilemma in Vietnam. Some critics of Vietnam maintain that
while the United States has made a mistake in Vietnam, it can not suddenly
withdraw all of its influence and power from that part of the world. Considera-
tions of the Asian balance of power and the repercussions on American
credibility in other areas of the world forestall such action. Henry Kissinger,
the national security advisor to President Nixon wrote in an article in
January of 1969, that "whatever the judgment of our actions, ending the war
honorably is essential for the peace of the world. Any other solution may
unloose forces that would complicate prospects of international order.
He suggests that unilateral withdrawal of the United States from Vietnam
could result in the release of restraints on those in other parts of the world
who are constrained by the possibility of American opposition to their actions.
This situation could have unsettling consequences on the prospects for inter-
national order.
There are other variations on this theme, all of which are concerned
with considerations of the balance of power, American credibility, and national
security. Necessarily there are many shades to the Kissinger phrase of what
is an honorable settlement. These result in differing suggestions for settlement
^^Henry A. Kissinger, '*The Vietnam Negotiations," Foreign Affairs
,
Vol 47,
No. 2, January, 1969, p. 234.
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other than unilateral withdrawal depending upon the calculations of the
considerations noted above. Proposals for partial withdrawal from Vietnam
with a bolstering presence in the neighboring nations are numerous and have
in them consideration for the Asian balance of power. Proposals for a bi-
lateral troop withdrawal and a political settlement which include a coalition
government in South Vietnam have also been suggested. Others advocate the
withdrawal of the American presence on the mainland of Southeast Asia but
continued involvement and commitment in the South Pacific. The critics who
opt for these proposals while critical of the Vietnam commitment are persuaded
that total withdrawal is not a realistic alternative because of its larger
implications on the balance of power and the credibility of future American
commitments.
All of the measures mentioned are designed to end American participation
in what is considered a tragic mistake. They are also aimed at bringing
some changes in the overall conduct and assumptions of foreign policy. Vietnam,
in many ways, represents a conjuncture of the old and the new in American
foreign policy. Begun under the assumptions of the Cold War era, the Vietnam
War has resulted in the rethinl^ing and re-examination of those assumptions to
47
the point where many have been discredited.^' The issue now, claim the critics,
is that they be discarded. Reluctance on the part of three administrations to
'^Defenders of American involvement in Vietnam, especially within the last
two administrations, no longer feel secure in arguing the validity of the
Domino Theory, nor do they seek to picture Hanoi as a pawn of an international
Communist conspiracy.
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move in that direction has resulted in these new initiatives on the part of
the liberal critics to seek the termination of the Vietnam War.
The expansion of the war into other parts of Indochina warrants
analysis of the American policy in Laos, Cambodia and Thailand. The
American-supported forays by the South Vietnamese into Cambodia and
Laos and the use of Thailand as a huge air force base have been soundly
criticized as dangerous escalations of the American involvement. Here
again, point out the critics, the United States is seeking a quick military
solution to problems that can only be resolved in political negotiations.
From a staff report of May, 1972, by the Committee of Foreign Relations of
the United States Senate concerning Thailand, Laos and Cambodia comes
acknowledgment of the unfortunate situation facing Laos and Cambodia:
Fate has thus forced a cruel bargain on Laos and
Cambodia. On the one hand, American assistance sustains
them for without it they would literally be at the mercy of
the North Vietnamese, forced to accept a solution or de facto
situation which would grant the North Vietnamese unrestricted
access to their territory and a strong if not decisive voice in
their affairs. On the other hand, their reliance on continued
American assistance prevents them from agreeing to the kind
of compromise that would offer them an alternative to continued
fighting but would, in return, require them to permit the unopposed
use of their territory by the North Vietnamese. 48
The solution to such a cruel choice, claim the critics, comes not from continued
military action but from negotiations. Any final solution must involve the
totality of the Indochina dilemma and not each nation separately. Since the
Committee on Foreign Relations, "Thailand, Laos and Cambodia,"
Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 1972, p. 38.
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problems of Laos, Cambodia and Thailand are outgrowths of the fighting in
Vietnam, they must be included as important elements in any final settlement
reached between the belligerents. The 1972 Staff Report concludes:
It seems clear that the North Vietnamese will be able to
continue to use the territory of Laos and Cambodia to pursue
the war in South Vietnam, no matter how successful Victnami-
zation proves to be and to keep South Vietnam in a stage of
permanent siege. How long that situation will continue will
depend on developments in Peking, Paris, Hanoi, Moscow and
Washington. 49
Asia
For a number of years now, numerous people have been raising ques-
tions about the American attitude and policy toward the Peoples Republic of
China. Over the last two and one-half decades, Communist China has
experienced more than any other nation the brunt of the American policy of
containment and isolation. Over these years, it has been Red China, due
principally to an ideologically-fanatic leadership and its large human resource,
which has been portrayed as the major threat to America and free world
interests in the Asian and sub-Asian continents. Supporters of American
policies of Chinese isolation and containment have consistently represented
China as the dangerous outlaw of international peace. Slogans such as the
"Yellow Peril" have been used time and again to trigger the American
imagination against the dangers and treachery of the Chinese Communists.
^^Ibid.
, p. 39.
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Those critical of such tactics and policies have argued for a policy of
understanding and the reduction of tension between the United States and
Communist China. They claim that international peace cannot be achieved
through a policy which seeks to isolate the world's most populous nation from
normal relationships. In advocating such a reversal in policy, Senator
Fulbright has maintained that "we must acquire loiowledge not only of China
but of the Chinese. To most of us, China is a strange, distant and dimgerous
nation, not a society made up of 800 million individual human beings but a kind
of menacing abstraction."^^ While seeking a policy of understanding with main-
land China, there has also been considerable support for her admittance into
the United Nations and the lessening of the American commitment to the
Chinese Nationalists regime on the Island of Taiwan. Critics point to the contra-
diction in a policy which refuses representation in the councils of the United
Nations of 800 million people while at the same time supporting a Chinese
dictatorship on Taiwan.
In recent months, the arguments of those critical of America's post-
war policy toward Red China have found favor with the Nixon Administration.
In the last year, there have been indications that the United States is in the
process of a policy re-evaluation on the Chinese issue. The recent-trip by
President Nixon in February 1972, to the Peoples' Republic was announced as
^^J. William Fulbright, "The United States and China," Congressional
Record, Vol. 112, No. 40, March 7, 1966, p. 3.
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the beginning of a new relationship between the two nations. Previous to the
President's trip, mainland China had been admitted into the United Nations
and President Nixon had lifted the embargo on various non-strategic items for
trade with the Chinese. There has also been a softening of rhetoric between
the two governments reflecting the desire for increased mutual cooperation and
understanding.
Out of these encouraging events has come widespread support from
former opponents of American policy toward China. They have inspired new
hope that the American commitment to policies of containment and isolation
are to be abandoned. Furthermore, states Senator Jacob Javits, "There is
reason to believe that beneficial consequences of the China initiative, if
properly followed through, can do much to offset the enormous damage inflicted
on the United States role and prestige in the world by the tragically improvident
and miscalculated war in Vietnam. "^V52
Western Europe
The issue of the large American commitment in Western Europe has
been of particular interest to the critics. This is, of course, expected since
51Jacob Javits, "After the Nixon Visit: The United States, China and Japan,"
Congressional Record, Vol. 118, No. 41, March 17, 1972, p. 4082.
CO
In a similar vein, the President's trip to the Soviet Union in May, 1972,
promises to result in new efforts at understanding and cooperation between
the communist and non-communist world. These too are applauded by those
who have sought these new directions based upon the assumption of mutual
trust rather than fear.
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a major contention between the globalists and the liberal critics involves
!SC
the size, number and costs of overseas commitments needed to guarantee
United States security. Arguments for and against continuation of the;
commitments vary in the specific statistics used to support a particula
point of view. Bit it is generally agreed as Senator Fulbright suggests that
"The United States has more in the way of men, bases, and military invest-
ments outside its own boundaries than any other nation or combination of
nations—including the other nations of NATO and those in the Warsaw Pact."^*^
Debate over the American troop commitment to the defense of Western
Europe has gone on for several years. In the spring of 1971, Senator Mike
Mansfield brought the debate to the floor of the Senate by introducing a bill
which sought to cut the American troops in Western Europe in half. In
defense of his measure, Mansfield stated:
There is no bargaining power in the irrelevant; an
excessive and antiquated U. S. deployment in Europe, and
the enormous costs which it entails cannot strengthen the
U. S. position in negotiations. It can only weaken further
the international economic position of this nation. 55
^"^J. William Fulbright, "The Mansfield Amendment on Troops in Europe,"
Washington Office of Senator J. William Fulbright, May 19, 1971, p. 1.
54see Mike Mansfield, "New Approaches to Foreign Relations," Speech
at University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, October 26, 1971.
^^Mike Mansfield, "The United States and the Soviet Union: Power in
Transition," Address, 1971 Eisenhower Symposium, The John Hopkins University,
Baltimore, Maryland, November 18, 1971, p. 21.
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In a study he presented to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Mansfield
commented:
It may be understandable, yet it is still regrettable that
the viability ot NATO seems yet to depend so much upon United
States leadership, physical presence and exhortation. The
habit is twenty-five years old and may be hard to breal< but it
is essential for both Western Europe and the United States to
move away from this one-sided emphasis.
. . .
In my judgment, the question of substantial reductions
of U.S. forces in Europe at this time revolves around a matter
of political atmospheres, rather than military necessity. Very
few military men will say without numerous reservations that
the presence of four and one-third American divisions in
Germany, along with the total strength of the alliance can prevent
the Soviet Union from reaching the Atlantic if it were to undertake
a full-scale conventional attack. The real deterrent is nuclear. . . .
Addressing the same subject but having wider implications, Senator
Fulbright concludes:
. o . the troop and base structure in Europe seems to have
acquired a life and momentum of its own, impervious both to
improvements in our military capability and to significant
changes in the basic political situation. It is because this
Administration, as well as its predecessors, has failed to
take the initiative in the past few years in re-examining our
European posture in light of these changes that the Congress
must provide a forum for consideration of the issues
involved. . . .
I doubt that many Americans realize that the United States
has accumulated an investment in European installations
(including Spain) of almost$1.2 billion. . . . It is not as if a
U.S. withdrawal from some of these facilities would leave
virtually nothing behind.
Mike Mansfield, "Western Europe and the New Economic Policy,"
Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1971, pp. 12-14.
^'^Op. cit.
,
Fulbright, "The Mansfield Amendment on Troops in Europe,"
p. 2.
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Supporters of Mansfield's Amendment inside and outside of Congress
premise their argument for troop withdrawals on the contention "tint the
American military engagement is based upon compelling economic, ideological,
cultural and historical ties. The expression of the engagement need by no
means require four and one-third divisions in West Germany supported by a
sizable logistics network. "58 it is assumed that in terms of a security
deterrent a small American force is just as good as a larger one. It is also
maintained that modern transport could get the needed troops to the front in
time to be effective.
One of the strongest arguments in favor of cutting the European
commitment is based on economic issues. Advocates of the proposed cut
point to the estimated $14 billion dollars it takes annually to maintain the
American presence in Europe. They claim that this involves too much of an
economic burden and is a drastic misuse of funds. They also maintain that
there is considerable waste and inefficiency as a result of the large bureaucratic
structure accompanying the military commitment. Further economic arguments
portray the cuts as a solution to the balance-of-payments problems and the
spending of American dollars abroad. In this time of great anguish over the
American economy, these arguments carry much weight.
But the real debate revolves around the threat or the perceived threat
to the security of Europe and thus the United States. Opponents of present
^^John Yockelson, "The American Military Presence in Europe: Current
Debate in the United States," Orbis, Vol XV, Fall, 1971, No. 3, p. 798.
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troop levels are convinced that the threat of war which existed in the early
post-war period is now remote. Their premise is based upon the assumption
that there now exists an informal agreement between the two super-powers
over the question of Europe. Both, it is claimed, want to maintain the status
quo. As a result, regardless of what the Soviet Union docs in terms of its
military establishment, the large American presence is so much extra baggage
and is in urgent need of streamlining.
Finally, in answer to those who consider the argument for the reduction
of troops in Europe as another example of growing American isolationism,
Senator Fulb right responds:.
Adoption of the Mansfield Amendment should not be regarded as
an isolated or spiteful act in reaction to the dollar crisis.
Neither should the Mansfield Amendment be regarded as a
retreat from the NATO commitment; it is a reasonable adjust-
ment to take account of changing circumstances too long ignored;
an adjustment which T believe any bureaucracy is incapable of
inaugurating.
. . .
The Mansfield amendment is no move toward "neo-isolationism"
or toward fortress America. It is a move to begin to bring some
perspective into our relationships not only with Western Europe,
but with our military relationships elsewhere as well. Unless
we manage to bring under some kind of public control the enormous
military bureaucracy abroad, we will end up as did the Roman
Empire which became so much a slave to its foreign commitments
that it died at home.*^^
Critics have also been active in their opposition to American policies in
other parts of the world. The recent confiict between India and Pakistan over
what is now the nation of Bangladesh resulted in great castigation of United
^^Op. £it., Fulbright, "Mansfield Amendment on Troops in Europe," pp. 3-4.
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States policy. The continued shipments of American arms to both bellig-
erents despite an embargo preventing such assistance in 1965, aiid the
small effort made by the United States to relieve the human suffering in
Bangladesh previous to the outbreak of hostilities are examples, say the
critics, of continued adherence to unsound and contradictory policies.
As a result, the United States has, because of its implicit support of Pakistan,
lost a great deal of influence and leverage with India, the largest democracy
in the Asian region. It has, also, claim the critics, managed to line up on
the side of repression and brutality in that the United States made little effort
to halt the homicidal actions of the West Pakistan Army in Bangladesh.
Critics have called upon the United States Government to recognize the
nation of Bangladesh as an independent entity. While such recognition would not
correct the mistakes of American policy, it would go a long way in demonstrat-
ing renewed American commitment to freedom and independence for all people
and would bolster the legitimacy of the newly independent nation of Bangladesh.
The American policy of isolation toward Cuba has also come under fire
from several sources. Both Senators Church and Edward Kennedy have
addressed this problem recently. While criticizing American policy toward the
Southern Hemisphere as a whole, both maintain that the policy of isolating
^'^See Senator Frank Church, "The India-Palustan War," Congressional
Record, Vol. 117, p. 189.
It is ironic that those labeled as isolationists have in the case of both China
and Cuba advocated ending UoS. policy of isolation.
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Cuba has failed and that the "most glaring result of our policy has been to
propel the Cuban government into the waiting arms of the Soviet Union
and the East European bloc. "62 ^^^^.^^ ^ ^^^^^^ American policy
toward Cuba, Senator Kennedy poses several initiatives for change:
We must ask whether the policy of isolation ensures the
security of the United States. We must ask whether the policy
of isolation increases or decreases Soviet military influence
in the Hemisphere. ... We must ask whether the policy of
isolation is retained because of apprehensions among our Latin
American countries or whether it is the anachronistic opposition
to change of our own country which forces its maintenance.
. .
."^"^
Other areas which have come under critical analysis include the United
States' support of the Greek "junta" and the U. S. policy in the Middle East.
In Greece, American support of an oppressive dictatorship that refuses to
restore the constitutional rights of its people has been widely criticized. A staff
report for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February, 1971, concludes:
The Embassy appears to have operated on the assumption
that the regime was sincere in its declared intention to return to
parliamentary democracy and that the continuation of the arms
embargo was harmful to the development of the kind of relation-
ship which would permit the United States to exercise some
persuasion on the Greek regime to restore civil liberties and
parliamentary government. It appears to ocher observers with
whom we talked, however, that the Embassy tends to read more
into the regime's statements than the regime intends or than is
warranted on the basis of the performance to date.
To many with whom we talked, it does not appear that the
United States has placed as much emphasis on pursuing its avowed
political objectives as on pursuing its military objectives. ^4
^^E. M. Kennedy, "Statement on United States-Cuban Relations, 1972," Office
of Senator E. M. Kennedy, April 18, 1972, p. 2.
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Foreign Relations Committee, "Greece: February 1971, " Washington,
United States Government Printing Office, 1971, p. 16.
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Conclusions such as this about the American support of the Greek
regime have been the premises for advocating withdrawal of that support
and a reinstatement of the arms embargo. Greece is often cited by critics
of the underlying assumptions of American foreign policy as a classic
example of the misconstruction of American interests and democratic values.
It is the discarding of these kinds of commitments that is deemed necessary.
The Middle-East presents opponents of American foreign policy with a
difficult situation. United States policy in the middle-east, while often trying
to burn the candle at both ends, has generally been aimed at the reconcilia-
tion of all belligerent parties. As such, the United States has chosen to pursue
a low profile which has been generally supported by all except those who want
the United States to commit itself to one side or the other.
Those who fear that the middle-east unrest could result in a super-
power confrontation have urged the United States government to support
measures for a United Nations resolution of confrontation. Senator Fulbright
is one who thinks that "A settlement mediated by the United Nations could serve
as a precedent for the settlement of other conflicts through the procedures of
Those who criticize American support of the Greek regime on the grounds
that it is not a democracy may be guilty of the same crime they accuse the ardent
anti-communist of, that is a foreign policy based on ideological considerations
only. To restrict American support to democracies only would probably do
irrevocable damage to United States interests.
^^The United States has clients in both the Arab states and the state of Israel.
American corporations have large investments in the Arab oil industry. On
the other side, the Jewish population within the United States is quite vocal
and constitutes a considerable political constituency.
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international organization."^'^ Others have found fault with the American
practice of selling arms to both sides and advocate a policy of restraint.
There are other areas of the world where the United States has shown
an inclination to become involved. In advocating policies for these situations
opponents of globalism have generally tended to advise that the United States
either not get involved as American interests are not at stake or they have
urged that the United States play the role of mediator, placing emphasis on
the necessity for negotiation, cooperation, compromise and peaceful change.
Foreign Aid
Until recently, the issue of foreign aid had been conceived as a massive
effort on the part of the United States to share its wealth with other people not
as fortunate. It was an idealistic attempt to aid other nations in their develop-
ment, to fight disease and to perpetuate the image of the United States as the
friend of humanity. It was also assumed to be an effective tool for coaxing the
new nations into the Western camp away from the Communists.
Recently, there has been increasing disillusionment with this image
of foreign aid. This disenchantment finally found its expression on the floor
of the United States Senate on October 29, 1971, when that body voted to
reject the Nixon Administration's foreign aid authorization bill. The Senate's
rejection meant different things to different people. As reported in
^^'^J. William Fulbright, "Old Myths and New Realities, II The Middle East,"
Congressional Record, Vol. 116, No. 147, Part 22, August 24, 1970,
p. 29812.
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The New York Times, "to Hugh Scott, the Senate Republican leader, it was
a manifestation of the new isolationism, an effort to 'tell the world to stop
because we want to get off.
'
But to Mike Mansfield, Mr. Scott's Democratic
counterpart, it was a search for a 'new foreign aid concept' to 'take the
burden off our shoulders. ' "^^
Reasons for the Senate's rejection of the bill were numerous, and
they all added up to a strange coalition of political interests. John Finney,
reporter for The New York Times
, summarized the reasons as follows:
The foreign aid bill was rejected a few weeks ago
Friday for a concatenation of reasons—the fiscal con-
servatism of many Southerners and Republicans, who
never really liked foreign aid; the grassroots resentment
over helping other countries when the domestic economy
is in such trouble; the disillusionment of erstwhile liberal
supporters who have become disenchanted over the way
foreign aid has turned into military programs that seem
to lead to Vietnams; the angry reaction abetted by the White
House to the expulsion of Nationalist China from the
United Nations and the lackadaisical attitude of a White House
which presumed the bill would be passed by the Senate.
Among those reasons cited by Finney for the downfall of the foreign
aid bill, only one, that of the liberals, had a positive aspect to it. The liberal
vote against the bill represented "a challenge . . . to a foreign policy that was
conceived 20 years ago in the anti-communist atmosphere of a cold war and
found its financial support in an aid program which over the years became more
^^"Axe for Foreign Aid," New York Times , October 31, 1971, p. E2.
^^John E. Finney, "Squeeze Play on the Arms Issue," New York Times ,
June 11, 1972, Section 4, p. 2.
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military than humanitarian in purpose. "^0 specifically exhibited dis-
satisfaction with the policy of aiding anti-Communist dictatorships. Senator
Frank Church in a recent analysis of American foreign aid practices maintains
that "American aid is being used not to promote development but for the quite
opposite purpose of supporting the rule of corrupt and stagnant-but vociferously
anti-Communist-dictatorships."'^! Church also claimed:
A government may torture and terrorize its own population
but—from the standpoint of our policymakers—as long as it
remains anti-Communist, provides "stability," generally supports
American foreign policy and is hospitable to American investment,
it qualifies, for purposes of aid, as a "free country" l'^^
The liberal vote against foreign aid was also a refusal to continue support-
ing a program which allocated more than half (58 per cent) of its allotted funds
for military aid. This growth in military aid represents a distortion of the idea
upon which the foreign aid program began. The liberal critics, by their vote
made known their intention to change it.
After the Senate's defeat of the foreign aid program, there have been
initiatives for change. One change due to the Senate battle was reform in the
manner of consideration of the aid bills. Now military and economic aid will be
considered separately, allowed to stand or fall on their own merits. This
70
Ibid .
,
p. 2.
Frank Church, "Why I Voted No," New Republic , November 13, 1971,
p. 14.
'^^Frank Church, "A Farewell to Foreign Aid, " Washington Post, November 7,
1971, p. Bl.
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represents a victory for the liberal reformers because "military aid can no
longer be used as the 'sweetner' to win conservative votes for economic aid.
In turn, the liberals and moderates will be in a better position to challenge
the military aid program. "'^'^
Previous to the October debacle, foreign aid reforms were also under
way. In March 1971, S. 1129, a bill to improve and reform the military
assistance program, was introduced. The purpose of this specific bill,
sponsored by Senator William Proxmire, a long-time critic of the growth in
American military aid, was threefold:
• ... to cut back and reshape our foreign military aid program.
It puts the foreign military aid program back under the Secretary
of State where it belongs.
It places the responsibility to authorize funds back under
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign
Affairs Committee who should be the chief congressional watch-
dogs over foreign policy.
The bill removes from the Secretary of Defense the primary
responsibility for determining and procuring foreign military
aid. . . .74
Liberal criticism of foreign aid has not been limited to military assistance.
There is widespread disenchantment with economic aid as well, resulting from
the "abundant evidence that our foreign program is much less philanthropic than
we care to portray. "'^5 in fact, claim the critics, -figures indicate that the
foreign aid program is patently self-serving. George Woods, the former
no
Op. cit.
,
Finney, p. 2.
"^^William Proxmire, "S. 1129." Congyressional Record , Vol. 117, No. 30,
Part 4, March 8, 1971, p. 5321.
"^^Op. cit. , Church, "Why I Voted No," p. 15.
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president of the World Bank, has made the point that "bilateral programs of
assistance have had as one of their primary objectives helping the high-
income covmtries themselves; they have looked toward financing export sales,
toward tactical support of diplomacy, toward holding military positions
thought to be strategic. "'^^ Others, such as Frank Church, William Proxmire,
and Harry Magdoff, maintain that the American bilateral aid program is "in
effect, the soft loan window of the Export-Import bank. "77 in fact, Church
concludes:
No less that military aid, our economic assistance creates and
perpetuates relationships of dependency. The law requires, for
example, that aid shipments be carried only in American ships
and that purchases be made only in the United States. . . .
Dependency on the United States grows steadily too with
the mounting burden of servicing debts. The Peterson Report
acknowledges that mounting debts, which must be continually
refinanced on an emergency basis, keep the poor countries on
a "short leash. "'^^
Awareness of the failures and burdens of American aid has also dawned upon
the recipients of that assistance. As one Chilean political scientist remarked
about the aid program of the 1960's:
If that is what one decade of development does for us, spare
us another. Foreign aid has been used, not to develop us, but
to achieve the political purposes of the donors, to smother us in
debt, to buy up our most dynamic productive assets. '^^
Ibid
.
,
p. 15.
77
Ibid
. P- 15.
'^^Ibid. p. 16.
^^ibid
. P- 16.
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Even though technically the vote of the Senate ended the foreign aid
program, it is not this goal that the liberals seek. They do not desire the
abandonment of foreign aid. They realize that the United States has a
responsibility to help the poorer nations. They hope to initiate new policies
to "transform the program from a slush fund for military juntas and American
corporations into a long-range cooperative investment in human welfare. "80
Toward this end, liberal critics have suggested that American foreign
aid not be distributed unilaterally; rather, it should be allocated to the various
international banking and economic development agencies to insure that it is
put to its proper use. Another proposal suggested by Senator Stuart
Symington, calls for "more trade, less aid" in dealing with other countries.
Others have advocated an increase in outright grants rather than loans. In
this way, a minimal of political strings and military obligations are attached to
assistance.
80
""""Scrub It Up, Don't Wipe It Out," New Republic
,
November 13, 1971, p. 7.
81
This proposal for change advocated by the liberals points up dramatically
the difference between arguments of the radical and liberal critiques. Harry
Magdoff in his sophisticated analysis of American foreign aid maintains that
the very institutions to which the liberals would trust to carry out the allocation
of funds in the proper manner are in fact controlled by the developed industrial
nations, principally the United States. Magdoff claims that the United States
uses such institutions as the International Monetary Fund, The World Bank,
the Development Assistance Committee and the Inter-American Development
Bank to control the flow and whereabouts of capital. (See Harry Magdoff,
The Age of Imperalism
.
)
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The liberal critique in no way represents what Senator Hugh Scott called
"a manifestation of the new isolationism. "^2 .^^ instead, an effort to make
foreign aid more concerned with humanitarian needs and less a self-servino-
program of political and economic interests. It is an effort to reconstruct a
foreign aid program based upon the assumptions about American responsibilities
and goals articulated by the liberal critique. To these ends, Senator Edward
Kennedy remarks:
Our responsibility is clear, especially as we view the
practical impact of our recent foreign policy on developing
countries in Latin America, in South Asia, and elsewhere.
We have a responsibility to make people, rather than narrow
military or geo-political interests, an important subject of
our view of the outside world.
Defense Spending and Arms Limitation
In attempting to reorder the priorities of American foreign policy, critics
have fought long and hard against what they consider the excessive expenditures
for national security and defense. It is on this issue that the proponents and
opponents of American foreign policy are at loggerheads over the interpretation
and evaluation of "national security. "
Traditionally the United States has been wary of a large military estab-
lishment. For a Jong period, verbal warnings against the creation of a large
military complex were sufficient to alert the civilian authority to any danger.
^^Op. _cit. , "Axe for Foreign Aid," p. E2.
^*^E„ M. Kennedy, "Address before the International Development Conference,
"
Washington, D. C, April 19, 1972, p. 3.
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With the post-war commitment by the United States to global interests,
however, the defense community has grown to the point where budget
requests approach $80 billion amiually and there is little sign of a decrease.
Growing concern over the lack of fiscal responsibility plus a desire
to place less emphasis on arms and military procurements has resulted in
increased resistance to the requests for defense expenditures within the
Congress. But these anxieties are only manifestations of a larger concern,
that being the effort to redefine the security needs of the nation. Senator
Mark Hatfield makes this point clear:
Excessive costs and inefficient management should rightfully
disturb the Congress. Yet, I do not believe this to be the most
urgent and troubling factor in our rate of defense spending.
We must begin consideration of defense expenditures by ask-
ing what the meaning of national security is in today's world.
. .
What is the role of conventional military power in today's world?
What is the relation between the military might we possess and our
political and strategic aims? What is the basis for building
international security? ^"^
Critics of American globalism suggest that the concept of national secu-
rity is greatly distorted and has resulted in the over-commitment to defense
priorities. Consequently, they have sought to redefine the needs of American
security through proposals advocating cutbacks in defense spending, by
soliciting opinions from experts on security from outside the Defense community
and by voting down, when possible, procurements win-, •^crn\ rxressive.
^^Mark Hatfield, "Speech before the Senate on Military Weapons Systems,"
Congressional Record , Vol. 116, No. 131, Part 20, June 31, 1970, p. 26772.
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In terms of cutbacks in defense spending, most critics have focused
on the waste and inefficiency of the Defense establishment. A recent study
done by the Brookings Institute called for a reduction in the defense budget
of between $6 and $10 billion. This slash is due mainly to tightening up the
controls on waste and inefficiency. Senator Hubert Humphrey's calculations
on defense expenditures parallel those advocated by the Brookings Institute.
They, too, are cuts due to "cutting the fat." The controversial 1972 defense
budget of Senator George McGovern is more in tune with efforts to re-evaluate
foreign policy objectives and priorities. McGovern suggests cuts of up to
$25 billion from the current budget of $75 billion. His argument for such a
drastic reduction is that since the United States at present has the capacity of
overkill twenty times the amount needed, it is time to begin evaluating American
defense programs in terms of quality and not quantity. McGovern's assumptions
are much the same as Senator Hatfield's who maintains that our defense posture
85
"has been an amalgamation of everything that the military can do in the world."
The use of outside experts has gone far to blunt the monopoly on expertize
claimed by Defense Department officials. In many cases, the outside assess-
ments of costs and weaponry effectiveness have done much to arouse suspicions
85
Ibid., p. 26773.
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as to the accuracy of the Pentagon experts in these matters. This was
especially true during the long and heated debate over the anti
-ballistic
missile system. Its overall effect, besides giving the critics factual argu-
ments with which to challenge the Defense Department's statistics, is to
bolster the assumptions of opponents to the large military establishment. In
several cases, notably the ABM and SST debates, this has had a great deal
of influence upon the ability to muster up the votes to oppose the procure-
ment of funds.
Closely tied to the question of national security and defense expendi-
tures is the debate over the nuclear arms race. Critics of the policy of
"supremacy over the Soviet Union" have argued long for some sort of arms
limitation agreement which would restore an element of reasonableness to
what is considered to be a suicidal confrontation. Opponents of the arms race
seek a standstill in the development of nuclear weapons, particularly missiles
87
equipped with multiple warheads (MIRV). For this reason, they have enthusiastically
The Pentagon has been widely criticized for padding their budget estimates.
They have also been known to xmderestimate the overall cost of new military
weapons to insure congressional support for them. After the project has been
approved and work has begun on it, additional requests for funds to meet the
rise in costs are common. For example, the Army recently (June, 1972)
requested an additional $1.3 billion to meet the increased costs of developing
the SAM-D missile. Other notable examples include the Air Force C-5A
transport plane and the Navy's new F-14 fighter.
^"See Knoll and McFadden, American Militarism 1970, New York: Viking
Press, 1969.
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supported the recent SALT negotiations and have indicated strong support for
the agreements signed during President Nixon's May, 1972, trip to the
Soviet Union. The SALT agreements are significant because, for the first
time, accord has been reached over the limitations of certain arms and
acknowledgement has been made by both sides that each has the capacity to
inflict total destruction upon the other.
Recently, there has been increasing apprehension on the part of many
who support the SALT agreements that Administration officials are "turning
the recent Soviet-American agreement to limit nuclear arms into an
"enormous escalation of the arms race. "88 ^^^-^g testimony urging approval
of the SALT agreement. Defense Secretary Melvin Laird declared that "unless
Congress gives a go-ahead to multibillion-doUar missile submarine and
bomber projects, plus some others, allowed by the accords and in the
Pentagon's $83 billion budget, "89 he would withdraw his support from SALT.
Arguments of this kind have worried the advocates of change. Fears abound
that the initiative begun in SALT will be lost in a continuation of the arms
race, meaning higher costs and less security. There is growing alarm
that what appeared to be a step toward the re-ordering of priorities has been
turned into justification for the continuation of the time-worn policy of nuclear
88Michael Getler, "Laird, Fulbright Clash at SALT Treaty Hearing,"
Washington Post
,
June 22, 1972, p. A5.
^^Ibid.
,
p. A5.
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superiority and the stance of "negotiation from positions of strength. "90
Reassertion of Congressional Power
The initiatives to change American foreign policy have largely centered
in Congress. Through their efforts to re-direct American foreign policy,
Congressional leaders have become increasingly aware of the usurpation of
their constitutional powers in foreign policy by the executive branch. The
increased use of measures such as the executive agreement, executive privi-
lege, the "Top Secret" stamp and secret para-military espionage agencies
has permitted the executive branch to circumvent Congressional authority and
involvement in the making of foreign policy. Those seeking to change policy
in order to have a part in the decision—malcing have been forced to resort to
such negative measures as the withholding of funds for proposed programs. ^-^
^Radical critics maintain that even George McGovcrn's proposals for arms
limitation included in his "Towards A More Secure America: An Alternative
National Defense Posture" implicitly accepts the same assumption of past
Administrations. I. F. Stone in "McGovern vs. Nixon on the Arms Race"
claims that McGovern clings to the "idea of maintaining American technological
superiority in weaponry, which has been the main motive power pushing the
arms race to ever greater levels of destructive power and expense. (New York
Review of Books, 8).
^•^The initiative to reassert the role of Congress in foreign policy by withholding
appropriations may be an effort in futility. In a report by Timothy Ingram, it
becomes clear that the executive branch through means such as Transfer
Authority, Excess Stocks, Secret Funds, The Pipeline (carryover from year to
year of excess funds), reprogramming and the impoundment of funds, has ways
of by-passing Congress and can literally write its own checks. (See Timothy
Ingram, "The Billions in the White House Basement," The Washington Monthly ,
January, 1972.)
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As of late, there has been an effort to re-assert Congressional authority
and participation in the making of foreign policy. According to Senator Javits,
" a counter-movement is now gathering momentum to reassert the foreign
policy and war powers role of the Congress—in order to restore the balance
so clearly specified in the Constitution and so urgently needed to establish a
credible order of priorities in our national endeavors at home and in the world. "^^
Initiatives other than withholding of funds have focused on three areas.
First, there has been the move to reassert the war powers of Congress through
legislative action. The most important of the efforts taken has been the introduc-
tion before Congress in March 1972 of the War Powers Act, (S. 2956). In
response to a situation described by Senator Fulbright as "A well-intentioned but
misconceived notion of what patriotism and responsibility require in a time of
world crisis. Congress has permitted the President to take over ... the power
to initiate war and the Senate's power to consent or withhold consent from
significant foreign commitments."^*^ The War Powers Act seeks to restore the
imbalance resulting from the executive usurpation of war-making powers. "^"^
It is specifically designed to make rules governing the use of the Armed
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Jacob Javits, "The Resumption of Congressional Responsibility in Foreign
Affairs," Congressional Record, Vol. 117, No. 87, June 9, 1971, p. 8628.
^•^J. William Fulbright, "Presidential Dictatorship, " Congressional Record,
Vol. 117, No. 12, February 5, 1971, p. 1867.
^See Senator J. Javits, "The War Powers Act," Congressional Record ,
Vol 118, No. 49, March 29, 1972.
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Forces of the United States in the absence of a declaration of war by the
Congress. In this way, critics of the American policy of intervention
hope to force Congressional participation in the decisions as to the
commitment of military forces in all situations. Hopefully, Congressional
scrutiny of future "crisis" situations will result in careful evaluation of
each situation on its own merits rather than a general commitment and
response.
A second move by Congressional critics is the reassertion of the
constitutional powers of the Senate to make treaties. In reaction to the
practice of Executive Agreements, which has almost replaced the public
and formal treaty. Senate Bill 596 introduced in January, 1972, would
require that'international agreements other than treaties hereafter entered
into by the United States be transmitted to the Congress within 60 days after
the execution thereof. , .
The reason for such a bill is the discovery that "there have been
numerous agreements contracted with foreign governments in recent years,
particularly agreements of a military nature, which remain wholly unknown
96
to Congress and to the people. " Global commitments of the level that the
United States has entered into under the Executive Agreement have caused
^^J. William Fuibright, "Transmittal of Executive Agreements to Congress,
"
Calendar 564, Report No. 92-591, p. 1.
96
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great concern among Congressional leaders who seek a reduced American
profile abroad and who are concerned about the prospect of more
"Presidential Wars" such as Vietnam. In a study conducted by the Senate
Subcommittee investigating United States Commitments and Security
Agreements Abroad, it was "found that the United States now maintains 375
major bases and more than 3,000 minor installations around the world, a
large number of which were established through executive agreements or
understandings. Many of them were unknown to the public and to most of the
members of Congress. "^"^ Commitments of this kind, argues Senator
Fulbright, should not be made without public awareness and agreement.
Our country should not become entangled in such
serious obligations as those incurred through stationing
our forces abroad or storing nuclear weapons in foreign
countries without the participation of the Legislative
Branch, and through it, the American people.
The continuing battle over this issue has resulted in the recent Senate
vote on June 20, 1972, to "block military base agreements with Portugal
and Bahrain until they are submitted as treaties. "^^ Indications are that this
is only the beginning of a major confrontation between the executive and
^'^Stuart Symington, "Statement on the Legality of Executive Agreements,"
Press Release
,
April 25, 1972, p. 2.
^^J. William Fulbright, "Foreign Assistance Act of 1972, " Calendar
No. 789, Report No. 92-823, May 31, 1972, p. 31.
^^Spencer Rich, "Senate Insists on Role in 2 Base Pacts, " Washington
Post
,
June 23, 1972, p. A2.
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legislative branches of government over their respective roles in foreign
policy.
Finally, Congressional critics have challenged the shroud of secrecy
in decision-making perpetuated by the doctrine of "executive privilege."
During the Nixon Administration, where the duties and functions of the State
Department have been largely taken over by a small staff headed by
Dr. Henry Kissinger within the White House, the failure and at times refusal
to consult with Congressional leaders has led to an assault upon the right
to executive privilege. The reluctance of those officials to appear before
Congressional committee hearings has meant that legislative leaders have
little access to information vital to their role as representatives of the people.
On this point, Senator Symington concludes:
Such isolation from members of the Senate on the grounds
of Executive Privilege not only nullifies the basic constitu-
tional concept of advice and consent, but also distorts the
fundamental premise on which our country was founded
—
representative democracy.
On this issue, there is very little that the Legislative Branch can do
constructively except apply pressure on the Executive to allow those
individuals protected by Executive privilege to testify. Such tactics while
ineffectual in most cases must be pursued in lieu of any real authority on
this issue. Unfortunately, for Congressional critics of American foreign
""^^Stuart Symington, "Further Concentration of Power, Executive Privilege
and the 'Kissinger Syndrome, ' " Released by Office of Senator Stuart
Symington, March 2, 1971, p. 11.
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policy, this is only one of several instances where the legislator's role in
foreign-policy decisions is reduced to such tactics.
Summary
These, then, are the specific areas and issues in which the liberal
critics have focused their efforts to change American foreign policy. Under-
lying these specific issues are general conceptions about the role of America
in the international community, the scope of American security interests and
the nature and intentions of perceived adversaries. What has been discussed
in this chapter is not a policy advocating full isolationism or even a trend in
that direction. Instead it is a revulsion against excessive internationalism
carried out by means of interventionist actions in the attempt to maintain the
status quo. Rather than being isolationism, it represents a "new inter-
nationalism" based on a realistic assessment of American interests, goals
and capabilities. It is a re-evaluation of changes in the global and regional
balance of power, a redefinition of vital interests and national security, and
it represents a movement away from the realism of power politics toward a
foreign policy of realistic idealism. As J. L. Steele concludes:
The conflict between the President and an influential
minority of the present Senate is real; but the heart of the
dispute is not isolationism versus internationalismo At
issue is a desire to put space and time limitations on the
fighting in Indochina, to strike a new balance bet"ween the
President and Congress in committing military forces to
combat abroad, and to avoid further proliferation of U. S.
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commitments around the globe without congressional
sanctions. There is also a feeling that the nation's
values should be re-examined so that more money
will be spent on domestic priorities and less on extrav-
agant weapons systems that may prove to be redundant,
provocative or both.
Finally, in relation to the issue of the characterization of the liberal
critique as an instance of isolationism it seems clear that the liberal critics
do not seek an American withdrawal from the international sphere. They
do not advocate cutting off economic, diplomatic or military ties with the rest
of the world. If they did, then it would be correct to label their analysis as
isolationist. It would fulfill the explicit requirements established by the
definition explicated in Chapter Two and clarified through the case studies
of Japan and China. However, the liberal critics have never argued for a
foreign policy of that nature. Thus, it is inappropriate to characterize
them as isolationists.
CONC LUSION
The purpose of this treatise has been twofold. First, the attempt has
been made to arrive at a meaningful, working definition of isolationism.
Given the various and disparate meanings attached to the idea of isolationism
such a process is imperative if concept clarification is considered a worth-
while goal. The process of conceptual clarification is a arduous task, one
which raises great controversy among scholars. Within Political Science,
debates over key concepts such as "power," "sovereignty" and "interest"
reveal striking differences in theoretical perspectives which have divided
the discipline into various and competing camps. Yet, it is important that
the language and concepts used in explanation be carefully defined, regardless
of the conflict that such a process might cause.
The task of reaching a meaningful and objective definition of isolation-
ism has been complicated by the many and mostly unsuccessful attempts at
its clarification. In Chapter Two several of these efforts at defining
isolationism were presented with the conclusion drawn that they represented
not only a broad range of meanings but that they were only S5anptoms of
isolationism rather than the defining criteria.
In selecting a definition of isolationism it was thought that the most
productive approach would be to take the core meaning of isolation, which
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is withdrawal, or a state of seclusion and base the meaning of an isolationist
foreign policy on it. As a result, isolationism comes to mean a policy of
withdrawal from all commitments into a state of seclusion and self-sufficiency;
a severance of all relationships so as to place alone. A nation adhering to a
policy of isolationism would then seek to sever, in a conscious way, all
significant political, military, commercial and diplomatic relationships with
all other nations.
Support for this definition and its ultimate clarification is facilitated
by the fact that there are instances in the past where a nation successfully
implemented and sustained a policy of isolationism as defined here. This
study focused on two of those instances, Japan in the seventeenth, eighteenth
and half of the nineteenth centuries, and China during the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. Further, in support of the chosen definition and also to
bolster the claim that over time there has been widespread misuse and mis-
construment of the core meaning of isolationism, the case studies of
Britain's period of "splendid isolation" and the traditional foreign policy of
the United States were suggested as the other part of the dichotomy between
what is and what is not considered isolationism. That is, in applying the
same definitional criteria to all four case studies, each of which has
historically been characterized as an instance of isolationism, it was concluded
that Japan and China are, according to the suggested definition, examples of
isolationism. On the other hand, the studies of the United States and British
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foreign policy revealed evidence that the characterization of these policies
as isolationism is misleading as they do not fulfill the requirements
established by the defining criteria.
Unfortunately, even the most current expose on isolationism con-
tinues to deal in symptoms and fails to grasp the historic foundations of the
meaning of isolationism. In Ms most recent essay A New Isolationism
;
Threat or Promise. Robert W. Tucker rejects the above definition of
isolationism. He favors a definition which would broaden the meaning of
isolationism. Tucker maintains that isolationism is the withdrawal from
certain relationships rather than all and that it can be applied to one area of
the world and not another. In other words, a nation may pursue a policy of
isolationism toward Asia while adhering to normal international relations of
cooperation and commitment with Western Europe. Likewise, a nation is
isolationist if it severs economic ties with other nations while maintaining
diplomatic or military relationships.
To reiterate, the view here is that Tucker, as others before, has
fallen into the trap of dealing with symptoms rather than criteria. Plus, his
definition treats only parts of the whole. The judgment here is that political
isolation is not isolationism but only a part of that policy. Because the
United States severs all relationships with the Peoples' Republic of China
does not mean that American foreign policy is on the whole or in total
isolationist. If meaning is to be given to isolationism it must be recognized
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that it is necessary to deal with the concept as a whole and not in parts.
In other words, either one is talking about isolationism or one is not. It
is not possible as Tucker and others before him have done to mal<e a distinction
between "genuine isolationism" and isolationism meaning absence of certain
relationships, and in the long run retain clarity as to the core meaning of the
concept. There is no advantage in sustaining the confusion and lack of clarity
surrounding isolationism by these kinds of distinctions. The suggestion here
is that isolationism be defined in the narrow sense presented in Chapter Two
and that foreign policies which fail to meet the defining criteria as established
should be defined as something other than isolationism.
The second purpose of this discussion has been to investigate the
relevancy of isolationism to historical and contemporary American foreign
policy. In doing so, the task has been to apply the criteria of the definition
of isolationism to the circumstances, tenets, and assumptions under which
American foreign policy operated from its very beginnings. From such a
study, it is concluded that the United States has never been genuinely
isolated nor has it pursued a policy of isolationism at any time.
More important, this treatise represents a challenge to those persons
who argue that the recent initiatives on the part of the liberal critics to
change American foreign policy constitute a revival of the isolationist move-
ment within the United States. It is hoped that through the examination of the
general assumptions and the specific programs of the liberal critics it is
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evident that they do not desire a complete withdrawal of the United States
from the responsibilities and commitments of international politics.
Rather than isolationism, opponents of American globalism seek a new
relationship, a more restrained policy which emphasizes multi-lateral
actions over unilateral activity, cooperation and negotiation rather than
confrontation, and peaceful initiatives rather than a warlike stance. To
label such programs as isolationist is to continue to misconstrue the
meaning of isolationism and to further confuse the real issues. In address-
ing these points Senator J. William Fulbright concludes:
The people who are called neo-isolationists are no such
thing; the word is an invention of people who confuse
internationalism with an intrusive American unilateralism,
with a quasi-imperialism. Those of us who are accused
of "neo-isolationism" are, I believe, the opposite:
internationalists in the classic sense of that term—in the
sense in which it was brought into American usage by
Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt. We believe in
international cooperation through the international
institutions. We would like to try to keep peace through
the United Nations, and we would like to try to assist the
poor countries through the institutions like the World
Banl<, We do not think that the United Nations is a
failure; we think it has never been tried. ^
The point is that the debate over American foreign policy is not one
between internationalism and isolationism. It is more a debate over the proper
role that the United States should pursue in carrying out its responsibilities
J. William Fulbright, "The Conduct of United States Foreign Relations,"
Congressional Record , Vol. 118, No. 2, January 19, 1972, p. 492.
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as an international power. It is not a question of whether to participate
but how to participate. It is not a question of having or not having power
but how to use that power.
The real issue is excessiveness versus restraint. It is the critics
of globalist excess who have seen this as the important question and who
have sought to focus the debate on this issue. Senator Mike Mansfield is
one who has managed to see through the folly of what he calls the "non-issue"
of isolation and has addressed the real issues of importance in the debate
over American foreign policy. In his remarks on March 29, 1971, in
Olivet, Michigan, Mansfield stated:
Isolation is no answer to the nation's needs. But neither is
internationalism some sort of incantation against the ills of
international life. We will search in vain to safeguard our
security and well-being by an internationalism which leads
us to project military forces into the farthest reaches of the
globe and to maintain them there without the comprehension
of the people of this nation and without the understanding and
cooperation of the rest of the world's people.^
What the critics seek is not isolation but a more responsible policy
which focuses not on the excesses of military power, nor on the excesses of
economic exploitation; but one without the trappings of excessive global
commitments, which pursues and maintains its international responsibilities
in line with and according to humanitarian and democratic values. As
Senator Fulbright concludes, "the United States must decide which of the two
Mike Mansfield, "The Nixon Doctrine," Remarks at Olivet College, Olivet
Michigan, March 29, 1971, p. 4.
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sides of its national character is to predominate—the humanism of Lincoln
or the aggressive moralism of Theodore Roosevelt."^ Those seeking
change from the excesses of American globalism opt for the humanism of
Lincoln. And isolationism has never been a synonym for humanism.
-^J. William Fulbright, "The Two Americas, " Congressional Record ,
Vol. 112, No. 52, March 25, 1966, p. 6749.
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